CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 5

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

The following documents were obtained from the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District, Honolulu.

a. Five secret photostats (one positive and one negative) of decoded cablegrams from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo. Dates and numbers of cablegrams in date order: 363, 3 December 1941; 364, 4 December 1941; 365, 4 December 1941; 221, 5 December 1941; 368, 6 December 1941; and 369, 6 December 1941.

b. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 27 November 1941 to the following addresses: Shagro, San Francisco; Dr. Holmes, 45 Young

Hotel, Honolulu; Growsumida, Honolulu; and Shokin, Honolulu.

c. One secret photostat of copies of four cablegrams all dated 25 November 1941 to the following addresses: Rev. Hiro Higuchi, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.; American Consul, Papeete; Y. Watanabe, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.; and Shokin, Honolulu.

d. One secret photostat of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 19 No-

vember 1941 addressed to Inosuke Hachiyae.

e. Four confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities, dated: 9 February 1942, 14 February 1942, 15 June 1942, and 15 February 1943.

f. One photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 8 December 1941,

Japanese time.

g. An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands prepared by Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, 14ND, dated 20 April 1943.

h. Memorandum for the Files, dated 3 December 1941, prepared by Lt. (jg)

T. W. Joyce.

h1-h35. Various evaluations and related paper from 14ND, Honolulu.

12/3/41

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo #363

Wyoming and two seaplane-tenders departed third.

12/4/41

364

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

PM/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun fwd and aft X fueled?

Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British Consulate

12/4/41

365

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th

12/5/41

221

From: Kita

To: FM Tokyo

In reply to Number 221 (Banker)

Auditing accounts with Government expenditures only not completed X Upon settlement of above will have balance of \$16,224.13

(Special students expenses \$2610 ?????????

6 DEC. 41

368

From: Kita

To: F. M. Tokyo

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickman Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo

defense of battleships and will report further.

Delivered 1248 Transmitted 1304

> 6 Dec 1941 Delivered to RCA—1801 Transmitted—1807

No. 369

From: Kita To: Washington—Tokyo

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

CL—3 DD—17 am—3 Ships in dock: CI—4 DD—2

(CA and CV all---)

PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet (?)

11/27 2.33 PM

Shagro San Francisco
Two hundred screenings reply price

(S HATA SHOTEN)

11/27 7.31 AM

ZL HU17 Mexico City 13 1130AM 27th Dr Holmes 45 Young Building, Honolulu

We stay here expecting you.

FATHER

11/27 9.14 AM

ZL HU 36 San Francisco 35 1105AM 27th Growsumida Honolulu

Recable yesterday advice positively best possible would not have sent cable yesterday unless all possibilities extending contract had been exhausted must have immediate cable authorization and amendments lettercredit otherwise cannot prevent cancellation

11/27 9.01

ZL OHU39 New York 17 155 PM 27th Shokin Honolulu

TODORIYORIDEN KONOSAINARUBEKU TASUUKITYOOSESI MURUKOTOSIKARU BESITOOMOWARURU NITUKIHUUYOONA RABANISEIYATOSI RETOONIYORITUGO OTUKEHOKUBEIKA KUTENISSEIGENIN HAIRYONEGAITASI SIMEISIKYUUDEN POONOKENKAKUTEN ETOKUHOKUSEYO

SHOKEN

11/25 6.55 AM

RH 014 Los Angeles Calif 15 905AM 25th Rev Hiro Higuchi Waipahu Community Church Waipahu Oahu.

Richard Currier died last night pneumonia

HANK

11/25 10.30 AM

W 054 Washington DC USG 88 FST 55 3.15 PM 26 American Counsul Papeete

Twentyfifth Swiss interests your August 25 eight am Swiss Legation has informed department that in letter dated September 20 Paul Nordmann stated that he has been temporarily released from internment to consult physician at Papeete Legation received prisoners post card dated September 25 signed by Nordmann stating that he was in bad health and still detained by police authorities at Papeete Legation is particularly anxious to learn reason for expulsion decree against him on July 31 please make informal inquiry and report by telegraph

HULL

11/25 12.35 PM

SB HU70 Los Angeles Calif 24/23 230PM 25th NLT Y Watanabe Box 511 Wailuku Maui

Gladly received your letter air mailing \$500 today depending everything on you wire when ship

MAYEDA

11/25 1.58 PM

w 83 New York 18 5.50 25 Shokin Honolulu

TODORIYORIDEN KINZITUHONPOOSE NKITIMUKESYUPPA NSUBE-KINITUKIKO NOSAIZAIBEIKAKU TENINSAISYOOGEN DONIKIRITUME-SEI ZEI TASUUKITYOO SURUYOOTOKUBETU NAIRYONEGAI TASI NAODOOSENNITEKI TYOOSIUBEKISIME ISIKYUUTODORIE HENDEN-SEYO

SHOKIN

Mackay Radio

1941 NOV 19 PM 8 47

NLT HACHIYAEINOSUKE TOKYOMITUKOSI

GOANCHAKUO SHUKUSU REINOKENWA KOSHOCHU KINJITY KAI-KETUNOMIKOMI JUSHOWA TOMO HONOLULU EIBUNWA TOKETU-KANNO KYOKAWOETE OKURUYOCHUIARI ASUSIRASU

ARAKI

Translation:

INOSUKE HACHIYAE, TOKYO MITSUKOSHI

FELICITATIONS ON SAFE ARRIVEL IN REGARD TO CERTAIN MATTER NOW IN NEGOTIATION LOOKS LIKE DECISION IN NEAR FUTURE RESIDENCE STILL HONOLULU ENGLISH WORDS TO BE SENT AFTER PERMIT FROM FREEZE OFFICE. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED WILL LET YOU KNOW TOMORROW

ARAKI

Note: If this was sent by Joe ARAKI it deserves attention. SS

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORTS

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities. Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date: 9 Feb. 1942. Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941-9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending in 14ND. Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: and References: (See first page of details.)

14ND (3) Copy to: ONI (5)

CinCPac (1) Com 14 (1) FBI-Hon (2)MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis: On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl-Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the German Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has

been found that KUEHN'S signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941 will be

charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

Deductions: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

Approved:

J. H. MAYFIELD Captain, U. S. Navy District Intelligence Officer

WBS/zw 11D

- Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities References:
 - (a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39. (b) Com14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
 (c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.

- (d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
- (e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltd. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI),
- (f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
 - 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKI, 2-3-42.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
 (i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.

(j) 1ND Investigation4 Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-SHIRODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

(A) Table Showing Number of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed

very important.

3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced [2] immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive

investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo (Secret Military Message No. -) (By Chief of Consulate's Code)

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fujii

Re Signals I Wish to Simplify Communications as follows:

(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) Battle Force, including Scouting Force, are about to put to sea-

1. Several Aircraft Carriers plan to put to sea.

2. All Battle Force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.

3. Several Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third. 4. All Aircraft Carriers have sailed first to third.

5. All Battle Force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive. 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.

7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.

8.

[3]

(2) Signal 1. Light in Lanikai Beach House at night—one light from 8 PM to 9 PM indicates "1", from 9 PM to 10 PM indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time,

when not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile headlight and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5",

"6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 AM until noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai Bay during daytime in front of barbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates

"5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama House from 7 PM to 1 AM every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".
5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9:45 AM—

(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6".

(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7".

(c) Beauty operator wanted-same-indicates "5" or "8".

in the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala Road which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 PM to 8 PM indicates "3" or "6"; 8 PM to 9 PM indicates "4" or "7"; 9 PM to 10 PM indicates "5" or "8".

5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, the FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable,

there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet

units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such

signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of his family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the

indicated markings.

[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach House"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, interpretation of the state of Marie 1988.

island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer

by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly have been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their

appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

'The inquires made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen [7] It was pointed out by many of the near this beach over this period. residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. traveling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobiles headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward'R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following pertinent incident:
"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected

esiponage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing the light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kula (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident ad have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of hs attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander

Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941. FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regard-

ing investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight-actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping

this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December 1941, the reporting officer in Company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which

were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire

in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe

fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan-"Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have

been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

"However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in

part:

Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was

interviewed.

"Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 18 December, 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanitorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA, since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report

being prepared on FURUKAWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also

to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is

Ichio Fujii.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three

intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, aboard the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the

case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant

George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

Miss Kimie DOUE Takaichi SAKAI Katsukichi MURAOKA Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO Kanaye SAHARA Kiyoshi SHIGEFUJI 22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work

were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vinyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [14] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters-written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and

his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accomppanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On those occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and

Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTO-SHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMUURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitome Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, those men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these

men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation

in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immmediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper

over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and

Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928–1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936, KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about \$80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was

rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for \$40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was \$6,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was \$9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of \$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is

contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the \$40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941,

and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "these figures were purely fictious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's

statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a.m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago;

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals con-

tained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used

to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality besystem of signals, [22] tween certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that, locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box

No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Counsulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours

stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have nover been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30 and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as

follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new \$100.00 bills, some \$20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Maluniu Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above men-

tioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either \(\mathbb{N}\)S October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has

seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.

48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the \$14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction

with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original \$14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, \$5,000.00 in new \$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given \$2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth Kuehn). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through,

Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following informa-

tion appeared on the suspect card:

"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu None at present
Formerly (1918) officer in Germany Navy; cultivates acquaintances among
officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money
from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently
(May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable
sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real,
estate."

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy, The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNS

had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of

the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States

naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Govern-

ment, through the Consulate.
60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December, 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report

supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

Pending-14ND.

6 February, 1942.

Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November, 1941.

Date	Time	Types of ships								
		BBs	CAs	CLs	CVs	SSs	DDs	DMs	AVDs	(#)
1/22	0800	3	6	1	1	4	21	8	2	3
	1800	3 3	6	1	1	4	22	8 8 8	2 2 2	3
1/23	0800	3	6	1	1	4	22	8	2	3
1404	1800	3	6	1	1	4	22	4	2	
1/24	0800 1800	3 3	6	1	1	4	21 21	4	2	
1/25	0800	3	6	1	1	4	24	4 5	2	
1/20	1800	3	10	1	9	4	26	5 8	2	
1/26	0800	3	10	î	2 2 2 2	4	24	8	2	
*/*************************************	1800	3	11	î	2	4	23	8 8	3	
1/27	0800	3	11	1	2	4	23	8	2 3 3	
	1800	3	11	1	2	4	28	8	3 3	1
1/28	0800	1	8	0	2	4	11	4	3	
	1800	6	8	5	1	2 2	26	4	3	
1/29	0800	6	7	6	1	2	24	4	3	
1.000	1800	6	7	5	1	2	26	4	3	
1/30	0800 1800	5	7	5 5	1	2 2	25 26	4	3 3	

Key: BB-battleship; CA-heavy cruiser; CL-light cruiser; CV-aircraft carrier; SS-submarine; DD-destroyer; DM-light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD-seaplane tender (destroyer type).

(#) Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

[1] ENCLOSURE (B): Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941

BATTLESHIPS (BBS)

·	
0600—At moorings (ARIZONA, NEVADA, OKLAHOMA)	3
0658—NEVADA underway	3
0705—ARIZONA underway	3
0748—NEVADA cleared	2
0801—ARIZONA cleared	1
1045—PENNSYLVANIA entered	2
1053—CALIFORNIA entered	3
1102—MARYLAND entered	4
1110—TENNESSEE entered	5
1J23—WEST VIRGINIA entered	6
1155—PENNSYLVANIA moored	6
1210—CALIFORNIA moored	6
1232—MARYLAND moored	6
1240—TENNESSEE moored	6
1306—WEST VIRGINIA moored	6
1547—UTAH moored (#)	7
1648—UTAH moored (#)	7
1800—At moorings	7
(#\\ m\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	-

(#) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship.

HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)

0600—At moorings	11
0625—NORTHAMPTON underway	11
0632—CHESTER underway	11
0640—SALT LAKE CITY underway	11
0718—NORTHAMPTON cleared	10
0727—CHESTER cleared	9
0735—SALT LAKE CITY cleared	8

LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS)

0600-	-Underway in harbor (DETROIT)	1
	-DETROIT cleared	0
	-HELENA entered	1 2 3
[2]	1131—HONOLULU entered	2
	-ST. LOUIS entered	3
1200-	-PHOENIX entered	4 5 5 5 5
1212-	-RALEIGH entered	5
1250-	-HELENA moored	5
1300-	-HONOLULU moored	5
	-RALEIGH moored	5
1305_	-PHOENIX moored	5
	-ST. LOUIS moored	5 5 6
1020	DEMOCIA model	0
1990-	-DETROIT entered	6
	-DETROIT moored	6
1800—	-At moorings	6
	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)	
0600-	-At moorings (LEXINGTON, ENTERPRISE)	2 2
0735-	-ENTERPRISE underway	2
0838-	-ENTERPRISE cleared	1
1800-	-At moorings	1
	SUBMARINES (SSS)	
0600_	-At moorings	4
1954	-ARGONAUT underway	4
		4
	-TROUT underway	4
	-ARGONAUT cleared	3
	-TROUT cleared	2
1800-	-At moorings	2
[3]	DESTROYERS (DDS)	
		00
0600-	-At moorings or underway	26
0600- 0602-	-At moorings or underway	25
0600- 0602- 0605-	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared	$\frac{25}{24}$
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608-	-At moorings or underway	25 24 23
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608-	-At moorings or underway	25 24 23 22
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608- 0612- 0617-	-At moorings or underway	25 24 23
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608- 0612- 0617-	-At moorings or underway	25 24 23 22
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608- 0612- 0617- 0620-	-At moorings or underway	25 24 23 22 21 20
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608- 0612- 0617- 0620- 0621-	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0621— 0623—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BACH cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0621— 0623— 0625—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0628—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -BALCH cleared -FALCH cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0628— 0630—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -RALPH TALBOT cleared -FANNING cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0638— 0630—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608- 0612- 0617- 0620- 0621- 0625- 0628- 0630- 0630- 0632- 0640-	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -TANNING cleared -FANNING cleared -FANNING cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
0600- 0602- 0605- 0608- 0612- 0617- 0620- 0621- 0625- 0628- 0630- 0630- 0632- 0640-	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -TANNING cleared -FANNING cleared -FANNING cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0632— 0632— 0640— 0641— 0647—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -RALPH TALBOT cleared -FANNING cleared -MCCALL cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0628— 0630— 0641— 0647— 1205—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HALPH TALBOT cleared -FANNING cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -WORDON entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0617— 0620— 0621— 0625— 0628— 0630— 0632— 0641— 0647— 1205— 1221—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -TALIPH TALBOT cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -DUNLAP cleared -DUNLAP cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12
0600— 0602— 0605— 0605— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0623— 0625— 0638— 0630— 0640— 0641— 0647— 1205— 1221— 1228—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -CRALPH TALBOT cleared -FANNING cleared -DUNLAP cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -WORDON entered -ALYWIN entered -CONYNGHAM entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 11 12 13 14
0600— 0602— 0605— 0605— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0638— 0632— 0634— 0647— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1232—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -CRAVEN cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -FANNING cleared -FANNING cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM entered -CONYNGHAM entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0630— 0632— 0640— 0647— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1232— 1236—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -FANNING cleared -FANNING cleared -MCCALL cleared -MCCALL cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered -CONYNGHAM entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 11 12 13 14
0600— 0602— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0625— 0630— 0630— 0630— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1236— 1236— 1243—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HOCALL cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -BENHAM cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered -CASSIN entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
0600— 0602— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0625— 0630— 0630— 0630— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1236— 1236— 1243—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -FANNING cleared -FANNING cleared -MCCALL cleared -MCCALL cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered -CONYNGHAM entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0632— 0640— 0641— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1236— 1243— 1243— 1245—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HOCALL cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -BENHAM cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered -CASSIN entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
0600— 0602— 0605— 0605— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0623— 0625— 0638— 0632— 0640— 0641— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1236— 1243— 1245— 1247—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -EALPH TALBOT cleared -FANNING cleared -DUNLAP cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -WORDON entered -ALYWIN entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered -DALE entered -DOWNES entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
0600— 0602— 0605— 0605— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0632— 0630— 0641— 0647— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1232— 1243— 1245— 1247— 1251—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -CRAVEN cleared -CRAVEN cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM entered -CONYNGHAM entered -CASSIN entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0630— 0630— 0632— 0641— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1243— 1245— 1245— 1247— 1254— 1254— 1254— 1254— 1254— 1254— 1264—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTERSON cleared -PATTEMED cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -FANNING cleared -FANNING cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -BENHAM cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered -DALE entered -DOWNES entered -DOWNES entered -MONAGHAN entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0625— 0630— 0630— 0641— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1236— 1245— 1247— 1254— 1254— 1300— 1300—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HOCALL cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -ALYWIN entered -ALYWIN entered -CASSIN entered -CASSIN entered -PULL entered -DALE entered -REID entered -DEWEY entered -DOWNES entered -DOWNES entered -TUCKER entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 22 21 20 21 20 21 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0623— 0625— 0632— 0632— 0640— 0641— 1228— 1232— 1236— 1245— 1247— 1251— 1247— 1251— 1300— 1308— 1308— 1308—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -TANNING cleared -TANNING cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered -DALE entered -DEWEY entered -DEWEY entered -MONAGHAN entered -TUCKER entered -CONYNGHAM moored	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
0600— 0602— 0605— 0612— 0617— 0620— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0630— 0632— 0640— 0641— 1205— 1221— 1228— 1236— 1245— 1245— 1247— 1300— 1308— 1318— 1318—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -MAURY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -CRALPH TALBOT cleared -FANNING cleared -DUNLAP cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -WORDON entered -ALYWIN entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered -DALE entered -DOWNES entered -DOWNES entered -TUCKER entered -CONYNGHAM entered -TUCKER entered -CONYNGHAM moored -FARRAGUT entered	25 24 23 22 21 20 18 17 16 15 14 15 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 20 22 22 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
0600— 0602— 0605— 0608— 0612— 0621— 0623— 0625— 0630— 0632— 0644— 025— 1221— 1228— 1243— 1245— 1245— 1247— 1254— 1254— 1300— 1300— 1318— 1330— 1330— 1333—	-At moorings or underway -MUGFORD cleared -GRIDLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -BAGLEY cleared -HENLEY cleared -CRAVEN cleared -PATTERSON cleared -BALCH cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -HELM cleared -TANNING cleared -TANNING cleared -MCCALL cleared -DUNLAP cleared -BENHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM cleared -CONYNGHAM entered -CASSIN entered -HULL entered -DALE entered -DALE entered -DEWEY entered -DEWEY entered -MONAGHAN entered -TUCKER entered -CONYNGHAM moored	25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

1340—PHELPS entered	26
1345—CASSIN moored	26
	26
1350—REID moored	26
1407—DOWNES moored	26
	26
	26
	26
	26
	26
1446—HULL moored	26
1459—DEWEY moored	
1459—FARRAGUT moored	26
1515 DUNI DO moored	26
	$\frac{20}{26}$
	26
1800—At moorings	U
[4] MINESWEEPERS (DMS)	
0600—At moorings	8
0610—GAMBLE underway	
0610—GAMBLE underway	8
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway	8
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway	888
0610—GAMBLE underway	8888
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared	88887
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared	888876
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared	8888765
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared 0700—RAMSAY cleared	88887654
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared 0700—RAMSAY cleared	88887654
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared 0700—RAMSAY cleared 1800—At moorings	88887654
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared 0700—RAMSAY cleared 1800—At moorings SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)	888876544
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared 0700—RAMSAY cleared 1800—At moorings SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)	888876544
0610—GAMBLE underway 0612—MONTGOMERY underway 0615—BREESE underway 0625—RAMSAY underway 0652—GAMBLE cleared 0655—MONTGOMERY cleared 0657—BREESE cleared 0700—RAMSAY cleared 1800—At moorings SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)	8888876544

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU-Espionage Activies.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District D Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR. Date: 14 Feb., 1942.

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending.

Origin of Case:

Receipt of DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

Copy to:

ONI (5)CinCPac (1)COM14 (1)FBI-Hon (2)MID-H (2)14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A

Synopsis: During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.

Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very in-

accurate as to destroyers.

Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets

were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

Deductions: Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD, Captain, U. S. Navy, District Intelligence Officer.

WBS/zw
[1] Confidential

14 February 1942.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References: (a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject 2-9-42.

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODO, 2-8-42.

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and

(b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

- 2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter discussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.
- 3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure thereform, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following des-

patch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:

WYOMING and two seaplane-tenders departed third.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane

tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister

TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS HONOLULU arrived 1300/4th.

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT at 0947, 5 December. tween 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message

Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December: was sent by [3]

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735,

the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARY-LAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that

afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in [4] the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon

of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now used as mine-layers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon on 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of

interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the fourth.

There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following

message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the Battleship Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 3 destroyers. (CA and CV all ——) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts: The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl

Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation,, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU,

HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920, [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the

harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms "moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact,

the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, which called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic):

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for

torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further

comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify; (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.

The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner LURLINE is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the

following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth, about 1100 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British Consulate.

Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT's crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December,

1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 14.) C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU.

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting

only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9).

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTO-SHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the er-

roneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battleships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was

surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending

[1]

14 FEBRUARY 1942.

ENCLOSURE (A): Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

21 MARCH, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 APRIL, 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 MAY, 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emmons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickman Field at 0558 the 14th.

7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an anouncement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units [3] of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Reference San Francisco Msg #92: SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

26 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Chungking-Burma Road-trucks

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Danial Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] Managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via Clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force: The local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his Consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese Military Attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

15 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West coast and loading for Yladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not announced) enter port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma Road trucks 3000-2 ton trucks.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu-Espionage Activities.

Report made at: 14ND-Honolulu, T. H. Date: June 15, 1942

Report made by: Lieut. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, and Ensign Don Wood-

rum, USNR

Period covered: February 15-June 15, 1942 Status of Case: Pending-14ND Origin of Case: General investigation of espionage activities of Japanese Con-

sulate General, Honolulu. See reference (a).

References: See first page of details. Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: None

Copy to:

ONI (5) CinCPac (1)

Com14 (1)

MID-HD (2) Zone II (1) FBI-Hon (2) Zone III (1)

14ND (3)

Source File No.: 14ND/#54-A ONI File No.:

Synopsis: Questioning of former employees of Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, indicates that Tadasi MORIMURA, Consulate secretary who came to Honolulu in March 1941, was the chief collector of facts for the Consulate concerning the

movements of U.S. Navy vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor.

MORIMURA's coming to Hawaii was accompanied with publicity that he would attend to expatriation matters at Consulate, which work he did not do. His work at the Consulate was done in privacy of Vice Consul OKUDA's office, involved poring over a map of Oahu, but the exact nature of his work is not known. MORIMURA went to his office at hours of his choice. He spent much time away from the office, visiting strategic points on Oahu, such as Pearl City peninsula and Aiea Heights (both commanding a view of Pearl Harbor), Haleiwa beach (a potential landing place), Kaneohe Bay (across from the Naval Air Station), and made flying trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii. On drives around Oahu, he often took with him KOTOSHIRODO, Consulate clerk, and MIKAMI, regular taxi driver for Consulate, but sometimes sent KOTOSHIRODO alone to count ships in Pearl Harbor, which they last did on December 5, 1941. MORIMURA contacted many persons who have since been interned.

Deductions: Naval information reported to Tokyo by despatches analyzed in reference (b) was chiefly gathered by, or under the direction of, MORIMURA.

Approved:

I. H. MAYFIELD. Captain, U. S. Navy, District Intelligence Officer,

WBS/cop

References:

[1] JUNE 15, 1942

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu-Espionage Activities

- (a) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 9.
 - (b) 14ND Investigation Report, same Subject, dated February 14, 1942.
 - (c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kimie DOUE, dated Febru-
 - ary 3, 1942. 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Takaichi SAKAI, dated (d) February 3, 1942.
 - 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kanaye SAHARA, dated (e) February 3, 1942.
 - 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Richard Masayuki KOTO-(f) SHIRODO, dated February 8, 1942.
 - (g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated January 29, 1942.
 - 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Teisaku ETO, dated June (h) 15, 1942.
 - 14ND Investigation Report, Subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI, (i) dated February 6, 1942.
 - (j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Kenzo MAEHARA, dated May 11, 1942.
 - (k) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ryuichi MORIBE, dated March 6, 1942.
 - (1)14ND Investigation Report, Subject Ikuzo SATO, dated May 16, 1942.

This report has been prepared to supplement references (a) and (b), and to demonstrate, insofar as is known to this office, the means by which the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, gathered information relative to ship movements.

1. In paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of reference (a), it was stated that, when interrogated, Miss Kimie DOUE, former receptionist and typist at the Consulate, and subject of reference (c), stated that Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, had arrived from Japan on March 27, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, but did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned to a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, and the nature of his work there was unknown to Miss DOUE. MORIMURA often came to work about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and was seldom at his desk in the afternoon. Miss DOUE stated that there was a week during October or November, 1941, when MORIMURA did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi between 1000 and 1100, and she would not see him again the same day. The [2] staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the ROYAL TAXI STAND, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu, (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORI-MURA customarily called. (The proprietor of this taxi stand, John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (i), has been interned.) On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, subject of reference (f), one of the Consulate clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

2. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time.

Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

3. Takaichi SAKAI, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (d), when interrogated, corroborated Miss DOUE's statements about MORIMURA's failure to concern himself with expatriation matters and his frequent departure from the

Consulate during business hours.

4. Another Consulate clerk, Kanaye SAHARA, subject of reference (e), also was interrogated. SAHARA stated that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or the third, cut off at the first joint, but could not remember which hand was without a finger. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours with KOTOSHIRODO, adding the KOTOSHIRODO often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day.

5. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they were going to "important places", and, upon being asked what he meant by that, said "military places." On being asked why he though they were going to such places, SAHARA said it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and because neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO would make any mention of where they had gone when they returned to the Consulate. SAHARA added that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he often used on these trips.

6. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data on diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years old, and if [3] he is a regular member of the consular service, he should have been listed, as he could not at his age be a recent college graduate. (MORIMURA is said to have told Sakae TNAKA, a Consulate maid, that he was graduated from Hedai University.)

7. SAHARA added that he believed that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they entered or departed from the office. When asked if he thought this was not strange in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA made the explanation that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy one another's company.

8. In light of these revelations, KOTOSHIRODO was interviewed, and his personal history is set forth in reference (f). (It should be noted that none of the Consulate clerks were interrogated until after they had severed their connections

with the Japanese Government.)

9. KOTOSHIRODO stated that his duties at the Consulate were to receive and open local and Japanese mail, and to handle out-going mail. He usually logged in letters from the Foreign Office, Japan, but these letters were actually opened by Kokichi SEKI, one of the secretaries. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he wrote down the date of receipt and the number of each item from the Foreign Office, which was addressed to the Consul-General, but he did not see the actual letters, as those usually came in inner envelopes. SEKI would take this mail in to Vice Consul OKUDA, and from there is would go into the Consul's office. Each letter had a receipt inside the first envelope which was signed and returned to the Foreign Office. Routine letters would come back to SEKI from the Vice Consul, and either SEKI or KOTOSHIRODO would enter the subject of each letter and its date in a record book.

10. SEKI's predecessor at this job was Mitsugi IKETANI, who returned to Japan late in 1940. (It was recently learned that while he was in Hawaii,

IKETANI was head of the JAPANESE RED CROSS.)

11. Mail from the Foreign Office, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was of two types—that which pertained to the business of the Honolulu Consulate only, and letters addressed to all Consulates. The former type would carry consecutive numbers. Ordinary mail consisted of domestic matters such as births, deaths, marriages, expatriation, divorce, and adoption. This type of mail, and the circular letters addressed to all Consulates, would arrive by post, and would be picked up at the Consulate's post office box by the chauffeur, or would be delivered by a regular mail carrier. Other mail would arrive by diplomatic courier. would be opened in the telegraph (or, coding) room by Samon [4] TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary. The couriers would carry the mail in a suitcase, and upon arrival, would go straight into the telegraph room accompanied by the Consul, Vice Consul, and SEKI. KOTOSHIRODO did not remember the same courier ever coming twice, and he added that one would not necessarily arrive every time an N. Y. K. liner called at Honolulu.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that letters received from local sources were not logged in at the Consulate. Only those received from the Foreign Office, other Japanese Consulates, and those of especial importance were logged. Most of the local mail came from consular agents, and consisted of letters or routine reports.

13. Office supplies for the Consulate were purchased by SEKI, who also acted as treasurer. KOTOSHIRODO's desk was in SEKI's office, so he was familiar with the purchasing. Most office supplies were purchased from the Honolulu Paper Company, and the remainder from the Hakubundo Book Store. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the persons usually contacted at the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE were Tomoaki NAKAMURA or Minoru FUJUWARA, the manager. NAKAMURA was familiar with everyone in the Consulate. Confidential Informant J-1 (rating "A") had previously informed this office that NAKAMURA was one of the most frequent visitors at the Consulate, and although there was no evidence that he had purpose other than that of selling office supplies, it was noted that he treated everyone in the Consulate, from the Consul General down, with insolent camaraderie and general disrespect that was unusual—one might say, unique—coming from a member of the local Japanese community. NAKAMURA made frequent trips to all parts of the Island of Oahu in the course of business, but when interviewed, denied that he had ever supplied information of any nature whatsoever to the Consulate. NAKAMURA has been interned.

14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived

14. Upon his interrogation, KOTOSHIRODO was led to the matter of his activities with MORIMURA, a subject which he approached warily, and not altogether frankly, as will be demonstrated. He stated that MORIMURA arrived at the Consulate in March, 1941. A week later, KOTOSHIRODO drove the new secretary over Tantalus, a residential district on the heights overlooking Honolulu. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he drove MORIMURA out to Waipahu, a plantation town about a mile equidistant from the northern shores of the Middle Loch and the West Loch of Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA was anxious to visit a tea house called the SHIOYU, which was off the highway to the left below the high school, and which was noted for its balloon fish soup. KOTOSHIRODO had been there before. The Consulate chauffeur, Ichitaro OZAKI, advised that it was impossible to get service there without prior reservation, but MORIMURA insisted. However, at the intersection KOTOSHIRODO said, "Let's not go," and MORIMURA agreed, so they turned around. Following this admission, KOTO- [5] SHIRODO displayed a reluctance to remember any further trips with MORIMURA outside of town, but was finally per-

suaded to recall trips to the islands of Maui and Hawaii.

15. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he was asked to go to Maui by Vice Consul OKUDA. KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA left John Rodgers Airport, Honolulu, at 8:00 a. m. on the morning of May 5, 1941, and arrived at the Maui airport an hour later. They immediately hired a cab and a driver. The driver was a second-generation Japanese who could not converse very well with MORIMURA. MORIMURA spoke little English and had difficulty understanding the local Nisei brand of Japanese. However, they utilized the services of this driver for the two days they were on Maui. From the airport, they proceeded to the TOMEDA HOTEL, a Japanese hotel located in Kahului, the east coast port of Maui. KOTOSHIRODO said that this hotel was run by a Japanese with a "funny eye" (elaborated to mean that he couldn't see from it). MORIMURA talked to the owner of the hotel about a Japanese poem, but never introduced himself. (The TOMOEDA HOTEL was operated by one Itsuo HAMADA. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 10, 1941, described HAMADA as having a left eye that was either injured or made of glass. HAMADA was a consular agent, and was also an agent for the Nippu Jiji, a Honolulu bilingual (Japanese-English) daily newspaper. HAMADA is now in custody.)

16. It is interesting to note that HAMADA was a frequent contact of Shigeo FURUKAWA, the activities of whom were reported in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12 of reference (a). Letters from HAMADA to FURUKAWA at Kula Sanatarium, Maui, were found in FURUKAWA's possession, and it is known that HAMADA visited FURUKAWA, at Kula, a number of times. It was also reported that the two men phoned each other on occasions. One of HAMADA's letters was a forceful plea that FURUKAWA dismiss the notion of suicide from his mind. FURUKAWA, as was shown in reference (a), made two attempts at suicide following the outbreak of hostilities. Another letter talked of Japanese poetry, FURUKAWA being a poet of some small reputation. Before entering Kula Sanatarium, FURUKAWA was advertising manager for the

Nippu Jiji, of which HAMADA was the Kahului representative.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA stayed at HAMADA's hotel for two hours. They rested and had breakfast, but did not stay because the hotel looked too dirty. After they left HAMADA, they drove to the Grand Hotel in Wailuku, Maui, not a Japanese hotel. They registered here, and then drove to Lahaina, on the west coast of Maui. Ships of the United States Fleet, when visiting Maui, anchor off Lahaina Roads. They stopped at a fountain shop for a while, then drove back to Wailuku. From here they drove to Sprecklesville, a few miles from Wailuku. There KOTOSHIRODO went to a [6] Japanese school and met Tetsunosuke SONE. Consul General KITA had requested KOTOSHIRODO to give a package to the person to whom it was addressed, a female. KOTOSHIRODO thought the package contained a gift of some sort. He gave the package to SONE, because the woman to whom it was addressed was supposed to be one of SONE's former pupils. A report from the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated April 11, 1942, states that SONE was the principal of the Japanese language school at Spreckelsville, had served as a Japanese consular agent for 30 years, and had served as a private in the Japanese army for two years. SONE was taken into custody on January 5, 1942, and on January 21, 1942, the Internee Hearing Board at Wailuku, Maui, recommended that SONE be paroled. While KOTOSHIRODO was presenting the package to SONE, MORIMURA stayed in the car. After leaving the school, they saw a pineapple cannery, and then returned to the hotel in Wailuku about 4:00 p. m. After dinner they took a walk, saw a swimming meet, and about 9:00 p. m. dropped down to the fairgrounds hall where there was dancing. They bought tickets and went inside, but did not They returned to the hotel about 11:00 p.m.

18. The following day, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited Iao Valley, located in Maui's northern range of mountains, back of Wailuku. Then they drove up the summit of Mount Haleakala, a dormant volcano rising 10.000 feet above sea level which is located in the southern half of Maui. They remained at the top about 20 minutes, and on their return from the summit, passed Kula Sanatarium. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they merely drove up to the sanatarium, got out of the car, and surveyed the building. KOTOSHIRODO admitted taking a photograph of the building which he still has in his album. insisted that he did not give the print or the negative to MORIMURA, or to anyone else at the Consulate. In the afternoon they drove to the Makawao district, in central Maui, and arrived at the airport about 3:30 p. m. The plane took off at 4:00 p. m. and they arrived in Honolulu about 5:00 p. m. (The fact of MORIMURA's interest in the Kula region should be read in connection with the information reported in paragraphs 4, 9, 10, and 11 of reference

(a).)

19. The second trip, according to KOTOSHIRODO, was made October 13-17, Again, Vice Consul OKUDA requested that KOTOSHIRODO accompany They went to Hilo, Island of Hawaii, by plane, arriving in Hilo about 10:00 a.m. on the 13th. They hired a taxi driver, using him during their risit. His name was NARIKAWA, employed by the ABC TAXI COM-(probably Shigeo NARIKAWA, 1014 Kamehameha Avenue, Hilo). entire visit. PANY MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO registered at the Naniloa Hotel, operated by the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and were assigned Room 8. After lunch on October 13th, they drove up to Kilauea Volcano, and spent the entire afternoon around the craters. They visited the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO, and purchased photographs of the volcano in eruption and of the *lehua* flower. The [7] proprietor of the VOLCANO PHOTO STUDIO was then Kenzo MAEHARA, subject of reference (j), who has been placed in custodial detention, principally for his association with officers of Japanese naval and other public vessels which used to call at Hilo.) On October 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO drove to the Kona district (west side of Hawaii), via Kilauea Volcano, stopping for lunch at the SHIRAKAWA HOTEL, at Waiohinu. (Of Kayato SHIRAKAWA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the hotel bearing his surname, this office has no derogatory information.) At Kona, they stayed at the KONA HOTEL, at Holualoa, but according to KOTOSHIRODO they did not talk to anyone there. (Jentaro INABA, alien Japanese, proprietor of the KONA HOTEL (has no adverse record in the files of this office.) On the evening of the 14th, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO went to a motion picture show at Kainaliu, about seven miles from Holualoa.

20. Certain facts about the trip to Kona are of interest. Although there are a number of Japanese hotels in Hilo, MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODA preferred to stay at the Naniloa, which is a new hotel catering to the tourist trade. It is the most expensive hotel in Hilo. The trip from Hilo to Kona can be made in three and one-half to four hours by automobile. However, a leisurely trip must have been made, inasmuch as Waiohinu is only a little more than half way between Hilo and Kona. At Kona there is a hotel comparable to the Naniloa, the Kona Inn, also operated by Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, Limited, and catering to tourists. In Kona, however, they preferred to stay at a Japanese hotel.

21. On October 15th, they departed from Kona and drove to Kawaihae to see cattle shipping. Kawaihae is the port for the immense Parker Ranch, and other smaller ranches in the neighborhood. From here they proceeded to Kapaau, in the Kohala district, and lunched at the NAMBU HOTEL. Here they talked to an old man, whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not remember. The old man told them about the birth and childhood of Kamchameha (probably Kamehameha I, (1758–1819), first king of Hawaii.) Directories show the proprietor of this hotel to be one Yoshio HORI. They had lunch at one o'clock and, stopping only to view Akaka Falls, returned to Hilo, arriving there about dark. That night, after dinner, they went to the Hananoya Tea House where they met two Japanese girls. The chauffcur went along with them. They returned to the hotel about 4:00 a. m.

22. The following day, October 16th, they went to see the County Fair at the High School and Intermediate School Building. Later they saw Rainbow Falls, the Country Club golf course, Puumaile Home (county hospital for tubercular patients), and then went to eat Japanese food at the Tokiwatei. They returned to Hilo about 2:00 p. m. That evening they again visited the Hananoya

Tea House, but left at 11:00 p. m.

[8] 23. On October 17th, they checked out of the hotel and went directly to the airport, taking the 10:00 a.m. plane for Honolulu. They arrived in

Honolulu at 11: 45 a.m.

24. KOTOSHIRODO insisted that the two tea house girls, the driver and the old man at the NAMBU HOTEL at Kapaau were the only persons they contacted on the whole trip. KOTOSHIRODO stated that, on both trips, he handled money which was given to him at the Consulate before they left. On the Maui trip he was given \$110,000, and on the Hawaii trip, \$300.00. On the latter trip they

spent \$65.00 at tea houses, while the driver cost them \$55.00.

25. KOTOSHORODO admitted taking a number of trips to various points on Oahu with MORIMURA. In the early part of April, 1941, about two weeks after MORIMURA's arrival, MORIMURA asked KOTOSHIRODO to take him motoring to the Kaneohe district. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali and turned into the Kokokahi road which runs along Kaneohe Bay (across from Kaneohe Naval Air Station). They followed this road until they reached the Kailua beach pavilion. They got out of the car, and took a stroll in the park on the ocean side of the pavilion. In the car again, they drove past the cattle farm and the Kailua Theater, and then turned left on the road running to the Waimanalo district. Here they stopped near the old wharf on Walmanalo beach. They walked over to the wharf where several people were fishing. After about ten minutes, they got back in the car and returned to Honolulu, arriving at the Consulate about 4:00 p. m. In July or August, 1941, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA again made a trip to the Kaneohe district. This time they went in MIKAMI's taxi. Again they followed the Kokokahi road along Kaneohe Bay, and at one point MORIMURA told MIKAMI to slow down. Further, along the road they stopped at a roadside stand and purchased two watermelons. This stand was near a pine grove (KOTO-SHIRODO evidently mistook ironwood trees for pines), on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the road. They drove on to Kailua Tavern where MIKAMI had breakfast, while MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO each had a can of beer.

They were served by a waitress of Portuguese ancestry. After about twenty

minutes they returned to the Consulate via the Nuuanu Pali road.

26. On a Japanese holiday in April, the Yasukuni Shrine Extraordinary Cememony, when the Consulate was closed, MIKAMI drove KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Waianae, on the west coast of Oahu. They drove out beyond Waianae to Makua Cave, where the road ends. They departed from town about ten in the morning and returned about two, having lunched at a Chinese store in Waianae. KOTOSHIRODO admitted making three trips to Haleiwa, on the northwest coast of the island, with MORIMURA. The first trip was made in the latter part of April. They stopped at Haleiwa beach, near a ballground, for about ten minutes. Then they returned to Honolulu. Both the trip to, and [9] the trip from, Haleiwa were made via Wahiawa. The second trip oc-

curred some time in May; the third in July. On neither trip did they get out of the car. KOTOSHIRODO remembered stopping at the mauka-ewa (towards the mountain—towards Ewa plantation) corner of the Pearl City intersection for a while, but he could not remember whether MORIMURA talked with anyone on those occasions. (It should be noted that the Waianae and Haleiwa beaches are considered important as the places on Oahu where enemy troops might first attempt landings.

27. Early in the summer of 1941, MIKAMI drove MORIMURA and KOTOSHI-RODO up on Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. No one got out of the car, and KOTOSHIRODO was uncertain whether or not MORIMURA used binoculars. After a few minutes they drove down the hill again. In November they again drove to Aiea Heights. This time they drove in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and they were there about ten o'clock in the morning. MORIMURA directed them to visit a house just off the road, and stated that the person whom he was visiting was a Mrs. MATSUO. He asked KOTOSHIRODO to enter the house, too, so KOTOSHIRODO followed. MORIMURA introduced himself to her, and asked here about the condition of the Japanese school and the Japanese people in that district. Mrs. MATSUO hesitated, and refused to give a definite answer, stating that there were other people in the district who knew more about such matters. She offered to introduce him to other persons, but MORI-MURA said that would not be necessary. MORIMURA talked with her for about

Afterwards they drove directly back to the Consulate.

28. Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, and Lieutenant G. P. Kimball, USNR, of this office, questioned Mrs. MATSUO concerning MORIMURA's visit. Mrs. MATSUO is a nisci whose husband, now deceased, was a Japanese consular agent during his lifetime. She remembered the visit of MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, although she did not remember their names, and she did not know that they had come from the Consulate. She stated that MORIMURA asked her how the Japanese were being treated. She answered that the Japanese on the plantation (Honolulu Plantation were being well treated. MORIMURA then asked if they weren't "suspected". Mrs. MATSUO stated that she told him that Americans of Japanese ancestry were not suspected if they were loyal Americans. After they had gone, Mrs. MATSUO wondered if they were agents of the United States. The interrogating agents concluded that MORIMURA was looking for a case of disaffection in Mrs. MAT-SUO, but found her to be barren soil. From Mrs. MATSUO's house an excellent view can be had of the usual battleship moorings in East Loch.

29. During July or August, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove to the top of Punchbowl about 8:30 a.m. (Punchbowl is a small, extinct crater which overlooks downtown Honolulu.) According to KOTOSHIRODO, they merely

looked at the view and drove down again.

30. All the foregoing information has not been presented precisely as KOTOSHIRODO first told it. Much of it was drawn from KOTOSHIRODO only after several hours of questioning and prompting. Later he was taken to various areas on Oahu where he pointed out the exact spots he had visited with MORIMURA and MIKAMI. Later he typed out and signed a statement of all he had said. The information which KOTOSHIRODO gave has been rearranged in this report to indicate the various areas which he and MORIMURA visited.

31. KOTOSHIRODO finally admitted that he had made about thirty trips to the Pearl City peninsula and vicinity with MORIMURA. Sometimes they went in MIKAMI's taxi, sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car. On the peninsula proper they visited the Pan-American Airways landing, and also the soda water stand belonging to Teisaku ETO, subject of references (g) and (h). However, they did not always visit these two places. ETO is an alien about 67 years old. His soft drink stand is adjacent to the Pearl City Navy landing, and from this

spot, one may obtain an excellent view of Pearl Harbor.

32. About two days after his arrival, in March, 1941, MORIMURA hired a taxi and went around the Island of Oahu, alone. About a week after his arrival, SEKI accompanied MORIMURA to the Pan-American Airways clipper landing at Pearl City. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he heard this from About a week later, MORIMURA insisted that KOTOSHIRODO drive him to the peninsula in KOTOSHIRODO's car. They got out of the car and bought soft drinks at ETO's stand. MORIMURA talked to the ETOs, both the old man and his wife, about their business. He asked them how long they had been situated in this spot. KOTOSHIRODO did not know whether MORI-MURA had a previous introduction to the ETOs, or had merely struck up an

acquaintance. KOTOSHIRODO said that he heard SEKI and MORIMURA speak of ETO. They thought him a very common fellow, and thought it amusing that an alien Japanese was permitted to operate his business so close to a

naval base.

33. Another Consulate contact in the Pearl City area was a young Japanese who worked at a store on the mauka (towards the mountains) side of the highway at the junction of Kamehameha Highway and Pearl City Road. MORIMURA would talk to this Japanese while KOTOSHIRODO played the pinball machines. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they visited this place at least six times a month, and sometimes MORIMURA would go there alone. The last time KOTOSHIRODO stopped at this store with MORIMURA was in September, 1941. When KOTOSHIRODO was taken to the Pearl City junction, he identified the PEARL SERVICE STATION as the place MORIMURA had spoken to the young Japanese. However, KOTOSHIRODO has been unable to identify any employee of the PEARL SERVICE STATION or any other person thereat as the person to whom MORIMURA had spoken. This service station was owned and operated by one Nakajiro KURASHIGE.

34. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in the middle of April, 1941, all the Consulate staff members, together with their wives and children, went on a picnic at the home of Sam WOODS at Lanikai Beach, Oahu. The party went to their destination in four taxis and the official Consulate car. On the way to the WOODS residence, they travelled on the Kalanianaole Highway around Koko Head. They started out about 9:30 a.m. and arrived about 10:30 a.m. They lunched in the yard, and afterwards played soft ball. They were served coconut juice from nuts picked by an old Japanese man. Also present were a middle-aged Hawaiian couple. At about 3:00 p. m. they left for home, returning to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali. They reached the Consulate shortly before 4:00 p.m. It was originally believed that one SAKURADA, yard man for Sam WOODS, had arranged this party. However, investigation indicated that SAKU-RADA had nothing to do with the affair. MIKAMI, the taxi driver, apparently arranged the outing. MIKAMI had chauffeured for the WOODS on accasions, and also had connections on the windward side of Oahu, where Lanikai is located, through a Mrs. BECKLEY, who arranged luaus (Hawaiian feasts). MIKAMI sometimes would transport the food prepared by Mrs. BECKLEY to its destination. MIKAMI was well acquainted with Mrs. Mary FREITAS, housekeeper for the WOODS. The WOODS were away on the mainland, and MIKAMI arranged the picnic through Mrs. FREITAS.

35. KOTOSHIRODO also was questioned concerning the existence of maps at the Japanese Consulate. He stated that MORIMURA had a large map of the Island of Oahu on his desk, which he saw both MORIMURA and the Vice Consul study at times. KOTOSHIRODO denied that any marks were made on this map, or that any Japanese writing appeared thereon. He was shown a new Geological Survey map of Oahu (1928 edition), and he believed that this was identical to the map which MORIMURA had in his office. KOTOSHIRODO also stated that he had seen MORIMURA working on a map of the Pacific

Ocean with a compass and protractor.

36. In light of the evidence that MIKAMI was a conspicuous member of the KOTOSHIRODO-MORIMURA expeditions, MIKAMI was interrogated on January 6, 1942, by Agent Tillman, Lieutenant Kimball, and Captain F. O. Blake of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. MIKAMI stated that he drove persons from the Consulate to golf, to parties, downtown for shopping, to take the children to school, and to Waikiki for swimming. that while driving the Consul's car, he paid bills and did other errands. had been doing this for the past six or seven years. MIKAMI was extremely reluctant to answer questions, but eventually considerable information was obtained. He admitted driving MORIMURA along the Kokokahi Road, where views were obtained of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station. He said that several times MORIMURA had instructed him to drive slowly so that a better view could be obtained. At one spot they stopped for at least three or four minutes. MIKAMI believed that [12] MORIMURA had binoculars with him, but was unable to say whether MORIMURA had used them or not. KOTOSHIRODO went along with them the second trip only. MIKAMI stated that on one occasion he had driven MORIMURA to Haleiwa, via the windward side of the island. They stopped at "Sato's restaurant" in Haleiwa. ("Sato's restaurant" has been identified as the SEAVIEW INN, owned by Ikuzo SATO, subject of reference (1). It is known that on many around-the-island automobile trips of visiting

Japanese naval officers, a stop was made at the SEAVIEW INN, usually to eat While such stops might be accounted for by the fact that the SEAVIEW INN is the logical half-way point at which to stop for lunch on such trips, it should be noted that the restaurant is located in plain view of Haleiwa beach, which is considered one of the places on Oahu where enemy troops might attempt MIKAMI went on to state that he had driven MORIMURA to a landing.) Wahiawa on two occasions. On one of these trips they attempted to enter Schofield Barracks, but the sentry at the gate refused them permission to enter because MIKAMI's taxi did not have proper identification plates. He also stated that on one occasion, he drove Tomoaki NAKAMURA, of the HAKUBUNDO BOOK STORE (see paragraph 13, above), and someone from the Consulate, to Waipahu, They saw someone there, but MIKAMI could not remember who it was.) (When question separately, NAKAMURA vigorously denied that he ever made such MIKAMI also confirmed the trip to Waianae mentioned by KOTOSHIRODO.

37. MIKAMI admitted taking MORIMURA to Pearl City many times, and also admitted having stopped at ETO's stand at the end of the Pearl City peninsula. However, he claimed that he did not know ETO's name. He stated that sometimes he saw an old man, and sometimes he saw an old woman. He remembered hearing the old man say the fleet had just come in, or the fleet had just gone out, and that his business prospered when the fleet was in, but fared otherwise when the fleet was out. MIKAMI often played the pinball machines while MORIMURA conversed with ETO. When taken out to ETO's stand, MIKAMI pointed out a large pile of lumber on the east side of the boat landing. He stated that this occupied a spot to which he and MORIMURA once walked in order to obtain a better view of

the Naval Air Station on Ford Island.

38. One day, according to MIKAMI, he drove MORIMURA up the Waimano Road. The agents proceeded along this road with MIKAMI almost two miles to a point where MIKAMI said he, with MORIMURA, had turned around. At this particular point, and in the same general vicinity, there are no houses. The view of Pearl Harbor, where the agents turned around, is not good, which probably

accounts for the fact that MORIMURA visited this place only once.

39. The agents also drove MIKAMI to Honouliuli. Here MIKAMI indicated a Japanese store, opposite a Standard Oil installation, at which he stated MORIMURA had asked directions. He stated that he had driven MORIMURA [13] to Honouliuli only once. Leaving the location of the Standard Oil installation, MIKAMI directed the agents along a dirt road to the main highway, which he stated he had followed back to Honolulu. It was noted that this same highway, if followed in the opposite direction, would lead to Fort Weaver and the West Loch Naval Ammunition Depot docks. However, MIKAMI denied that he had ever driven MORIMURA in that direction.

40. At Aiea, MIKAMI directed the agents up the road to Aiea Heights to a point just below the residence of Mr. Chester Clarke, where an excellent view of Pearl Harbor is obtained. This was the same spot to which the agents had previously been directed by KOTOSHIRODO. MIKAMI stated that he had taken MORIMURA to this spot on two or three occasions, and on at least one occasion, MORIMURA had gotten out of the car and stood about three minutes observing

Pearl Harbor.

41. MIKAMI stated that on December 5, 1941, he again drove MORIMURA to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, proceeding along the old road through Fort Shafter and past Red Hill, and returning by the new Kamehameha Highway. MIKAMI stated that he saw two battleships at anchor between 1000 and 1030. Other ships, led by a battleship, were coming into the harbor at that time, but he could not say how many battleships were in the line. However, he remembered that the ship behind the battleship in the lead was almost as large, and the other ships were strung out behind. MIKAMI denied returning to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. (In paragraphs 6 and 8 of reference (b) it is noted that prior to the arrival of the ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA at Pearl Harbor on December 5, 1941, there were five battleships already moored. The ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA, inbound, passed the outer channel buoys of Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, that date, mooring before 1100.)

42. MIKAMI also stated that KOTOSHIRODO began to accompany MORIMURA to ETO's stand about the second or third trip that MORIMURA and MIKAMI made to Pearl Harbor. He added that he had taken KOTOSHIRODO to Pearl City without MORIMURA about four or five times. MIKAMI was asked if, when he took KOTOSHIRODO alone, the latter had ever said anything about his mission. MIKAMI replied that KOTOSHIRODO might have talked about

ships. When pressed further, MIKAMI's memory failed him, and he would say only that the purpose of KOTOSHIRODO's trips appeared to be a desire to see

the Naval base.

43. In light of the above statement, KOTOSHIRODO was again interrogated. He admitted that he had been to Pearl Harbor in MIKAMI's taxi about four times without MORIMURA, the last time in the latter part of November, 1941. He usually received instructions to make this trip from MORIMURA, who would direct him to go to Pearl Harbor and find out if there had been any change in the number of ships in Pearl Harbor. However, KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not consult with MIKAMI concerning his mission. On this last trip, as well as on certain other occasions when KOTOSHIRODO had gone to Pearl Harbor unaccompanied by MORIMURA, he stated that the latter made a rough sketch of the harbor showing the approximate locations of the usual battleship, cruiser, and carrier moorings. Not much emphasis was placed on the location or presence of destroyers in the harbor. On the last trip KOTO-SHIRODO went to the end of the peninsula, turned around without talking to anyone, and returned to the Consulate about 1000. He went to the end of the Pearl City peninsula to see exactly what type of carrier was berthed at Ford Island, for he could see from the highway that there was a carrier at the mooring on the west side of Ford Island. However, he went to the end of the peninsula pursuant to instructions from MORIMURA to "go all the way around."

43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his

43. KOTOSHIRODO also admitted that he had gone to Pearl Harbor in his own car, alone, four or five times to check on the number of ships in the harbor. This was also done at the direction of MORIMURA. These trips, and the ones he made with MIKAMI without MORIMURA, were during the period from July to November, 1941. The last trip he made with MIKAMI alone was on November 27 or 28, 1941. The last trip he made with MORIMURA was later in the same week. KOTOSHIRODO denied that he had been to Pearl Harbor at any time during December. However, he stated that he once heard SEKI say that MORIMURA was going out to Pearl Harbor almost every day, and was spending a good deal of money on taxi fares. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Consulate paid all of his gasoline expenses, and bought some of his oil. The greasing and

repair bills he paid himself.

44. On several occasions MORIMURA showed KOTOSHIRODO Jane's Fighting Ships. One of the things he remembers that MORIMURA pointed out was that certain American battleships could be distinguished by their masts, and that MORIMURA had used the word "yagura" /literally, "turret"/ to describe

the cage masts on certain battleships.

45. KOTOSHIRODO stated that when MORIMURA first came to the Consulate, he and Vice Consul OKUDA used to go out together. However, as far as he knows, the time that he took MORIMURA and OKUDA to Kailua, as described in paragraph 46 of reference (a), is the only time they ever contacted anyone

outside of the Consulate.

46. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA seemed to know Shigeo SHIGENAGA, proprietor of the VENICE CAFE, Honolulu. MORIMURA took KOTOSHIRODO there one time when Special Envoy KURUSU was on his way to Washington and was detained at Midway Island. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA had talked to some of the waitresses at the VENICE CAFE, and seemed to know them. (The [15] VENICE CAFE drew the largest part of its trade from Naval enlisted personnel. SHIGENAGA, the proprietor, is an alien, about 40 years old. His home, when searched, revealed a quantity of Japanese literature strongly nationalistic in tenor. Also discovered were photographs of high Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in 1939, as well as a photograph of a Japanese Army officer. SHIGENAGA has made several trips to Japan. In October, 1939, he invited Commander John P. Dix, USN, of the Shore Patrol, to visit Admiral Yorio SAWAMOTO aboard H. I. J. M. S. IWATE, flagship of a Japanese naval training squadron then visiting Honolulu. Commander Dix accepted, and SHIGENAGA made all arrangements through the Japanese Consulate. Commander Dix commented on the ease with which SHIGENAGA arranged the visit, and on the fact that SHIGENAGA treated all the Japanese officers present, from the Admiral on down, as equals. SHIGENAGA has been interned for the duration of the war.)

47. On Fehruary 9, 1942, Special Agent Tillman, Captain Frank O. Blake, of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and Lieutenant Kimball interrogated Kimika ASAKURA. who was employed as a maid at the Consul General's residence from June 16, 1941, to February 9, 1942. Miss ASAKURA is a dual citizen who was born at Alea, Oahu, on May 18, 1923. Miss ASAKURA

stated that a man named FUJITA, first name unknown to her, came to her home on or about June 13, 1941, and asked if she would like to work at the Consulate. She had never seen FUJITA before, but she believed that he knew her father. She believed that FUJITA was a flower raiser and lived in Pauoa Valley, Honolulu. He drove her to the Consulate on the same day. There she talked to Ichitaro OZAKI, the Consulate chauffeur, and later, to Kokichi SEKI, who engaged her services. Miss ASAKURA's duties at the Consulate were to clean the Consul General's living quarters, wait on table, and do his laundry. The Consul General lived upstairs in a building which is on the makai (towards the sea) side of the office building. Miss ASAKURA lived downstairs, sharing a room with Clara Yoshie KIKKAWA, who was the maid for the house in which MORIMURA lived.

48. Miss ASAKURA's predecessor at the Consul General's residence was a girl named Sakae TANAKA. Miss ASAKURA stated that Sakae TANAKA had been rather intimate with MORIMURA, according to gossip she had heard from Miss KIKKAWA, and the cook and his wife. Miss TANAKA left the Consul's

employ because she had a quarrel with the cook.

49. Consul General KITA's most frequent social visitor was MORIMURA. MORIMURA would drop over to visit KITA in the evenings several times a month. Sometimes SEKI would drop in, and she would hear him talking about treasury matters, money and business, with KITA. She stated that she had

never heard MORIMURA discuss business matters with KITA.

[16] 50. The mauka (towards the mountains) residence in the Consulate residence in the Consulate grounds was occupied by Vice Consul OKUDA and his family. SEKI lived upstairs in the office building. MORIMURA occupied one of the residences facing on Kuakini Street, while Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, occupied the other residence on that street. OZAKI, the chauffeur, and

his wife, lived above the garage.

51. Miss ASAKURA stated that on December 7, 1941, she called the Consul General about S:30 a. m. and informed him that breakfast was served. KITA was in bed when he was called. Later he came down and ate his breakfast. Miss ASAKURA did not see KITA having breakfast as the usual way of serving that meal was to set it on the table in the dining room where he could help himself. She was busy with her work and did not see anyone come from the office building to call KITA. Neither did the telephone ring. Later in the morning, reporters came to the residence and asked for KITA. When the maid could not find him at the residence, she suggested to the reporters that he might be at his office. Thereafter, Miss ASAKURA remained at the Consulate and assisted in serving members of the staff, who were all living in the office building. She stated that her services as an interpreter were frequently used by the detectives who were placed on guard duty at the Consulate from and after the morning of December 7th.

52. On February 11. 1942, the agents interrogated Miss Yoshio KIKKAWA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that she had obtained her position at the Consulate through Toyoki FUJITA, who lived next door to the KIKKAWAS and raised flowers. At the Consulate, Miss KIKKAWA did housework for MORIMURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA occupied a house on the Consulate grounds facing Kuakini Street. She confirmed the fact that she shared quarters in the Consul General's house with Miss ASAKURA. Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA usually got up at nine o'clock in the morning, had breakfast at nine-thirty, and went over to the Consulate office building about ten o'clock. He lunched about twelve, spending about an hour, and returned from the office about three. After that, MORIMURA sometimes played baseball in the grounds with other members of the staff and the clerks. Other times he read, listened to the

radio, or went out with friends.

53. Sometimes, however, according to Miss KIKKAWA, MORIMURA would get up about seven in the morning. Often he would leave the Consulate about three in the afternoon with KOTOSHIRODO, and would be gone for several hours, not returning until about seven in the evening. On two occasions, KOTOSHIRODO stayed and had drinks and dinner with MORIMURA. She stated that Samon TSUKIKAWA, another Consulate secretary, once came to see MORIMURA after dinner. Sakae TANAKA, a former maid at the Consulate, came to see MORIMURA several [17] times in the evening after she had left the Consulate. Girls from the Shunchoro Tea House came to MORIMURA's house several times in the evenings, and remained two or three hours. On eight or nine occasions, after attending tea house parties, MORIMURA slept until noon. Each morning, MORIMURA had to be wakened. In September, 1941, MORIMURA went on quite a drunk. When he awoke, about noon, he was still drunk, and he

made considerable commotion. Miss KIKKAWA went to the Consulate office building and informed SEKI, who came over and induced MORIMURA to go back to bed and sleep off his drunken condition. Upstairs, MORIMURA had a study, and in this was a wooden desk which he kept locked. On several occasions, Miss KIKKAWA saw letters written by MORIMURA, but the characters were too difficult for her to read, she said. She once saw a letter written by MORIMURA to a girl at a tea house. This letter she could read; it was a love letter written to a girl named Tomoyoko. (Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball later interviewed "Tomoyoko", a geisha. She admitted her association with MORIMURA, and told of a golf game she and another geisha once played with MORIMURA and Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, an espionage suspect who left

Honolulu for Japan on the Taiyo Maru, November 5, 1941.) 54. On December 7, 1941, Miss KIKKAWA, according to her statement to the agents, left the Consulate about 11:30 a.m. She had set breakfast on the table for MORIMURA about 8:30 a.m. There was a slip of paper on the table directing her to put breakfast on the table and then go home. MORIMURA usually left such messages on Saturday nights. There was nothing noticeably different about his activities just prior to December 7th, she said. Miss KIKKAWA emphatically stated that she did not like MORIMURA, that he was "awful" and said "nasty things." MORIMURA told miss KIKKAWA that he had lost the tip of his finger "on account of love". (It has been noted from several sources that one of MORIMURA's fingers, either the middle or third finger, was cut off at the first knuckle. However, the various observers have been uncertain which Miss KIKKAWA stated that MORIMURA was quite hand was mutilated.) friendly with Lawrence K. NAKATSUKA, a reporter for the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Occasionally, NAKATSUKA used to telephone MORIMURA, and on

one occasion that she knew of, they went to a tea house together.

55. Also on February 11, 1942, Miss Sakae TANAKA was interviewed by the agents. She stated that she lived in Upper Pauoa Valley, Honolulu, with her father. Yokichi TANAKA, a vegetable farmer. She was born in Honolulu on March 28, 1924, and worked at the Consulate from March 13 to June 12, 1941. She did housework in the Consul's residence. Miss TANAKA stated that she had obtained her job at the Consulate through FUJITA and in her own words, "he put me in there to work." She left the Consulate because of a quarrel with the cook, who had recently come from Japan, as to who had left the icebox open. Miss TANAKA denied having had any intimate relations with MORIMURA. stated that she once had asked him about his finger, but he She refused to tell her anything about it. She often went to the house where MORIMURA MORIMURA lived, to see Miss KIKKAWA, who worked there.

told here that he could not, and would not, let her go into his study room.
56. One Sunday, MORIMURA took both Miss TANAKA and Miss KIKKAWA over to Kaneohe, where they went out in the glass-bottom boat. This was while Miss TANAKA was still employed at the Consulate. They drove over with MIKAMI in his taxi, and MIKAMI joined them in the glass-bottom boat. the boat trip, they went to Kailua and had lunch on the beach, returning to Honolulu via Koko Head. While on the boat, MORIMURA asked MIKAMI questions about Coconut Island, in Kaneohe Bay, but Miss TANAKA could not remember any other questions about the bay which MORIMURA asked. While at Kaneohe they drove by Dr. Iga MORI's country place and stopped and looked at it. However, Dr. MORI was not there, so they did not go into the house. (Dr. MORI is an "elder statesman" of the Japanese community of Honolulu, and was an advisor to the Consulate. He was taken into custody following the outbreak of hostilities, but due to his advanced age and enfeebled condition, subsequently was released.) Later, Miss TANAKA stated that prior to going to the Kaneohe district, they had driven up Aiea Heights in MAKAMI's taxi.

57. Robert Orion Glover, Cy (AA) USNR, of the office of the Cable and Radio Censor, Honolulu, has reported that he was fairly well acquainted with MORI-MURA, having met him through his membership in the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI. Glover has been training in Japanese military arts under the direction of Dr. Henry OKAZAKI at the NIKKO RESTORATION SANATARIUM, Honolulu, since 1934, and has conducted classes himself since 1937. A kendo (fencing) group, of which Glover was a member, began meeting in the summer of 1941. One George HAMAMOTO of Maui, who was a member of this group, declared that the group needed more help with its study. For this purpose, HAMAMOTO introduced MORIMURA to the group, in October, 1941. Glover first met MORI-MURA in mid-October, and he was told that MORIMURA was a member of the

Japanese Consulate staff, that he had come from Japan only three months before, and that he was an accomplished kendo man. In his kendo matches and instructing, MORIMURA disapproved of the local style of fencing which, as described by Glover, consists of short, rapid thrusts without much power. MORIMURA stressed the superiority of the heavy chop stroke, stating that the latter had proved best in the China "Incident." Glover said that MORIMURA did not speak English very well, although he was an attentive listener, and appeared to understand the language. MORIMURA showed particular interest in the hades (whites) in the kendo class, and asked them many questions as to who they were, where they were educated, where they worked, and similar questions. Besides Glover, there were two other whites in the class, Ted Fielding, Y2c, USNR, and Harold Schnack, a [19] junior draftsman, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. MORIMURA once invited Glover and Fielding to join him in one of his wild parties, but the invitation was not accepted.

58. According to Glover, MORIMURA was known to travel a great deal, around Oahu and between the islands. MORIMURA once remarked to Glover that he was interested in Maui, that he had been over there and liked it very much. MORIMURA also went fishing a great deal, shore-casting and spear-fishing with a glass box. It was not clearly established whether MORIMURA ever went deep

sea fishing on sampans.

59. Alice ABE, a waitress at the SUNCHORO TEA HOUSE, Honolulu, whose professional name is "Sadako", also was interviewed by the investigators. She stated that MORIMURA and Ryuichi MORIBE, subject of reference (k), once held a private party at that tea house, with only those two men present. It is not known what was discussed at that meeting. (MORIBE, who has been interned, is a prominent alien businessman in the Japanese community of Honolulu. He admitted, among other things, attending a dinner with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and other prominent local Japanese who were close to the Consulate.)

60. A number of undeveloped leads concerning the Consulate and persons who had contacts with it are still under investigation by the local intelligence agencies, and new leads are from time to time uncovered in the investigation of seemingly unrelated cases of individuals being considered for internment. The same will be developed in further reports under the general title of this case, or under

individual case titles, as may be appropriate.

PENDING-14ND

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Confidential

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Fourteenth Naval District

Subject: Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities

Report made at: 14ND—Honolulu, T. H. Date: Feb. 15, 1943
Report made by: Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR, Ens. Don Woodrum, USNR.
Period covered: June 15, 1942–Feb. 10, 1943 Status of Case: PENDING—14ND
Origin of Case: Investigation of espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu

Character of Investigation: Espionage

Enclosures: (A) Copy of signed statement of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHI-RODO, dated Oct. 1, 1942, entitled "Trip to Kauai". (Photostat to ONI; copies to others.)

Copy to: ONI (5)
14ND (3)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)
Zone II (1)
Zone IV (1)
CinCPac (1)
Com14 (1)

Source File No. 14ND/54(c) ONI File No.:

Synopsis.—Former clerks and employees of the Japanese Consulate were reinterviewed and various investigative leads developed therefrom followed.

Review of all known Consulate espionage activity indicates that the Consulate was concerned only in "legal" espionage; that is, that which could be discovered by observation (in a broad sense) without entering any restricted area. Interest was displayed in U. S. Fleet movements, airports, harbors, Army camps, and any new construction by the Army or Navy. Interest also was shown in power plant on Kauai. Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO's trip to Kauai in July, 1941, to collect information for the Consulate, is discussed herein. Trips taken by Secretary Tadasi MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO appear to have been made for general survey purposes. There is no evidence that either of these individuals established contacts on Kauai, Maui, or Hawaii. However, there is evidence that Vice Consul OKUDA maintained a personal espionage agent on Maui.

Other information indicates that the Consulate was granted an allowance for "Korean Intelligence", and was using paid Korean informants to keep close con-

tact with Korean nationalist movements.

Deductions:

I. H. MAYFIELD, Captain, U. S. Navy, District Intelligence Officer. By direction

WBS/cop

[1] FEBRUARY 15, 1943. Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, same subject.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 15, 1942, same subject.

(d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO.

(e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Takaichi

SAKAI.
(f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Katsukichi MURACKA.

(g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject Kanaye SAHARA.

(h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject John Yoshiye MIKAMI.

(i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 2, 1942, subject Shigetaro

(j) FBI-Honolulu report, file 97-274, dated November 12, 1942, subject Noah Kwang Won CHO (available at Washington and Honolulu).

(k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated April 27, 1942, subject Isuke HORI-KAWA.

(1) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject Unji HIRA-

(m) 14ND Investigation Report, dated March 28, 1942, subject Zenichi KA-WAZOE.

(n) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 3, 1942, subject Kenneth Kilsoo HAAN.

(o) FBI-Honolulu report, file 100-1718, dated November 23, 1942, subject Kilsoo K. HAAN, with aliases (available in Washington, Los Angeles, and Honolulu).

(p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 12, 1943, subject Sanji ABE.
 (q) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 12, 1942, subject Kikujiro Clifford KONDO.

(r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 11, 1942, subject Katsuzo SATO.
 (s) 14ND Summary Report, dated February 8, 1943, subject Kenju OH-

TOMO.
(t) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 8, 1941, subject JAPANESE POSTAL EMPLOYEES.

(u) FBI-Honolulu Confidential Report, file 65-414, dated April 25, 1942, subject JAPANESE ACTIVITIES, HONOLULU, T. H. (CONFILE).

y) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject VISITS OF JAPANESE PUBLIC VESSELS TO THE ISLAND OF OAHU.

(w) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 3, 1942, subject Kimie DOUE.

[2] 1. This report is a continuation and an expansion of the material set forth in references (a), (b), and (c). During September and October, 1942, all former employees of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, who were still available were reinterviewed in the process of a joint investigation conducted by the Army Contact Office (MID), Honolulu; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu; and the District Intelligence Office. In addition, a number of other individuals who were in a position to supply information concerning the espionage activities of the Consulate were interviewed.

2. The following officers and agents were present at various times during the interrogations which were conducted at the Army Contact Office, Honolulu:

Military Intelligence Division:
Captain Frank O. Blake
Special Agent William T. Hiraoka
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu
Special Agent J. Harold Hughes
Special Employee Larry S. Chiwa
District Intelligence Office

Lieutenant G. P. Kimball Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson Ensign Don Woodrum

3. The following individuals were interviewed at the Army Contact Office by representatives of the three agencies:

Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, subject of reference (d).

Joan Kimie KOTOSHIRODO—Wife of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO. Takaichi SAKAI—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate,

subject of reference (e).

Katsukichi MURAOKA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Con-

sulate, subject of reference (f).

[3] Kanaye SAHARA—Formerly employed as a clerk at the Japanese Consulate, subject of reference (g).

Yasumasa MURATA——A clerk at the Japanese Consulate until 1938.

Miss Kimie DOUE—Formerly employed as a receptionist at the Japanese Consulate; subject of reference (w).

John Yoshiye MIKAMI-Regular taxi driver for the Consulate, subject of reference (h).

Albert Shuichi HAYASHI-Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.

Koreshige KUDO—Occasional taxi driver for the Consulate.

Shotaro NIIYA, alias Shigetaro MATSUO—Regular taxi driver for Kenzi KIMURA, manager of the Honolulu office of the N. Y. K. line. He is the subject of reference (i).

ICHITARO OZAKI-Consulate chauffeur.

Jitsuei TAKAMIYA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and Tadasi MORI-MURA, a Consulate secretary, on the occasion of their visit to the Island of Maui. 4. The following individuals were interviewed by agents of the Military Intelli-

gence Division alone:
[4] Shingo NARIKAWA—Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and MORI-

MURA on the occasion of their trip to the Island of Hawaii.

George Masayoshi KAWAMOTO—Relative of KOTOSHIRODO who was visited by KOTOSHIRODO during his stay on the Island of Hawaii.

Toshimasa MINATOYA-Taxi driver for KOTOSHIRODO and his wife on

the occasion of their visit to the Island of Kauai.

Namiko FUKUSHIMA—Recipient of a present from Consul General KITA which was delivered by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO to Tetsunosuke SONE, a toritsuginin at Puunene, Mari.

Mrs. Tetsunosuke SONE—Wife of Tetsunosuke SONE, interviewed in lieu of

her husband, who is now interned on the mainland.

5. The following individual was interviewed by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Noah Kwang Won CHO—A Korean Christian minister who rendered various services to the Japanese Consulate on Korean matters. CHO is the subject of reference (j).

6. The following individual was interviewed by officers of the District Intelli-

gence Office:

Lawrence NAKATSUKA—Reporter employed by the Honolulu Star Bulletin who covered the Japanese Consulate as one of his regular assignments.

TRIPS MADE TO VARIOUS PARTS OF OAHU

Pearl Harbor Area

7. The information set forth in this report concerning the various trips made by MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO is intended only to supplement the information thereon already set forth in reference (c). KOTOSHIRODO amplified certain phases of these trips, but he did not contradict his former story

except on a few minor points.

8. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip from the Consulate to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor about January, 1941, when he was asked by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA to drive Kokichi SEKI, one of the Consolate secretaries, to Pearl City and Alea. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that the purpose of these trips was to determine the number and types of ships in Pearl Harbor, and to keep the Consul General informed of the movements of United States Naval vessels. KOTOSHIRODO further stated that to the best of his knowledge, the personnel of the Consulate had begun making these trips either in December, 1940, or in January, 1941. (It should be noted here that there is no evidence that any agent of the Consulate ever entered the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, except upon official invitation.)

9. To the best of KOTOSHIRODO's recollection, it was early in 1941, probably January, that he overheard OKUDA tell SEKI that they (OKUDA and SEKI) should start "motoring around." KOTOSHIRODO also remembered having heary Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary, say, about the same time, that all Consulate secretaries should start making Sunday "excursions" to "public places" such as radio station KGU, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, and the like. KOTOSHIRODO stated that prior to January, 1941, he had never seen any evidence of any secretary's making trips away from the Consulate as he and

SEKI and MORIMURA subsequently did.

10. For the first few months, SEKI acted as observer. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having "heard" that SEKI had attended a naval academy in Japan at one time, but had been forced to withdraw before graduation because of his health. However, SEKI was interested in, and had considerable knowledge of, naval matters. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI made a number of trips to Pearl Harbor together.

11. When Tadasi MORIMURA first arrived in March, 1941, SEKI and MORIMURA went to observe the ships in Pearl Harbor together. Occasionally KOTO-SHIRODO went along with them. He stated that both secretaries knew how to identify various types of warships, and they would explain various identifying

characteristics to KOTOSHIRODO.

12. KOTOSHIRODO stated that in 1941 someone from the Consulate went out to look at the ships in Pearl Harbor about twice a week. However, SEK1 appears to have been of the opinion that observations should be made more often.

[6] 13. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he made his first trip alone to observe the ships at Pearl Harbor in August, 1941. He claimed not to have stopped any place on this particular trip, but to have counted what ships he could see while driving at 25 miles per hour on Kamehameha Highway, just outside the Navy Yard boundaries. Whenever he went to Pearl Harbor, whether alone or with MORIMURA or SEKI, KOTOSHORODO always was asked to state how many ships he had counted. On some occasions he was told to count only the number of destroyers, while SEKI or MORIMURA would count the other types of ships.

14. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he knew the usual berths and anchorages of the various types of warships in Pearl Harbor. He stated, correctly, that battleships berthed on the Honolulu side of Ford Island; that carriers berthed on the side of Ford Island nearest the Pearl City landing; that destroyers and cruisers moored in East Loch, off Waiau. He further stated that MORIMURA had pointed out a vantage spot on the Kamehameha Highway between Alea and Makalapa where the best view of the Submarine Base could be obtained. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he did not know what a torpedo net was, and he added that he had never heard MORIMURA discuss the subject.

15. KOTOSHIRODO remembered conversations with MORIMURA in which the latter had stressed the strategic importance of the Aiea and Pearl City regions for purposes of observation. MORIMURA had attempted to locate a girl friend in Aiea, presumably to develop her as an informant, and had asked KOTOSHIRODO if he had any close friends in Aiea or Pearl City "who could

be trusted". KOTOSHIRODO was unable to say whether MORIMURA had

succeeded in this plan.

16. MORIMPRA told KOTOSHIRODO that occasionally he would board a jitney bus in Honolulu and head for some destination beyond Pearl Harbor. He would get off at Aiea and walk around a bit. On one occasion, according to his story. MORIMURA got off the jitney at Aiea and walked back along the Kamehameha Highway, finally coming to a Navy Yard gate. KOTOSHIRODO was unable to state whether this was the Submarine Base gate or the main gate; however, the former seems more likely. At the gate, MORIMURA inquired about getting employment in the Navy yard. The sentry referred him to an office downtown. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that he "roamed around" Aiea.

17. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and SEKI had been driven to Pearl Harbor on a number of occasions by John Yoshiye MIKAMI, the usual Consulate taxi driver. However, MIKAMI, when interviewed, denied ever having driven SEKI on any of the observation trips, although he admitted driving KOTO-

SHIRODO and MORIMURA on numerous occasions.

Kaneohe Bay Area

18. About one month after MORIMURA arrived in Honolulu, KOTOSHIRODO drove him (in KOTOSHIRODO's car) over the Nuuanu Pali, thence around the Kokokahi Road. They drove slowly and looked across the bay toward the Kaneohe Naval [7] Air Station. At the Kailua Beach Pavilion, they parked for about five minutes, but did not get out of the car. After leaving Kailua they drove through Kailua town, without stopping, and proceeded along the highway to Honolulu via Waimanalo. They stopped at Waimanalo beach, near the old pier. This time they got out of the car and walked out on the pier. However, they talked to no one. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that he could not see Bellows Field (Army) from the pier. They stayed here for five or ten minutes, and then returned to Honolulu by way of Koko Head. They made no other stops. KOTOSHIRODO cannot remember having heard MORI-

MURA make any comment about the Naval Radio Station at Wailupe.

19. Shortly after their trip to Maui (early in May, 1941), MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO, this time driven by MIKAMI, again went over the Nuuanu Pali. As they approached Kaneohe town, they turned onto the Kokokahi Road, and drove to the Kalama Road. While on the Kokokahi Road they had MIKAMI drive slowly. KOTOSHIRODO believes that MORIMURA had field glasses with him on this trip, but he was unable to remember whether MORIMURA had used them. However, he did remember MORIMURA's observing that all the hangars at the air station appeared to have been completed. MORIMURA had no camera with him. (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember seeing MORIMURA with a camera on any occasion.) On the Kalama Road, they stopped at a watermelon stand on the side of the road away from the beach. Then they proceeded to the Kailua Tavern, where MIKAMI ate breakfast, and KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA each drank a can of beer. They talked to no one but the waitress at the tavern. From there they returned to Honolulu via the Nuuanu Pali highway. The whole trip lasted about two and a half hours. KOTOSHIRODO believed that the purpose of this trip was to observe Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

20. Paragraph 34 of reference (c) describes a picnic held by the Consulate at the home of Sam WOODS, at Lanikai Beach, Oahu, about the middle of April, 1941. Ichitaro OZAKI, regularly employed chauffeur for the Consulate, recalled two such picnics, an earlier one having taken place in 1940, while OKUDA was Acting Consul General. On this occasion, the entire Consulate staff attended. They drove over the Nuuanu Pali, and then OKUDA ordered OZAKI to drive to Lanikai by way of Kaneohe (a considerable detour). They parked at Kaneohe and everyone in the party went sightseeing in a glass-bottomed boat in Kaneohe Bay. Then they drove to Lanikai by way of the Kokokahi Road. On the occasion of the second picnic, described in reference (c), they made no such detour,

but proceeded directly to the WOODS home.

21. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to describe again the trip to Kailua which was detailed in paragraph 46 of reference (a). This trip was made in the latter part of October, 1941. (KOTOSHIRODO was unable to remember, however, if this trip was made prior to the arrival of, during the visit of, or after the departure of, the TATUTA MARU, Japanese evacuation ship which was in port October 23–24, 1941.) OKUDA accompanied MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO

in the latter's car. This was the only trip on which OKUDA accompanied the other two, and OKUDA appeared to be very nervous. KOTOSHIRODO was given no explanation of the reason for this trip, nor was he told where to go when he left the Consulate. OKUDA merely in- [8] structed him to "just keep on driving". They proceeded over the Nuuanu Pali and went directly to Kailua. When they reached the Kailua Tavern, OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive straight ahead, toward the ocean, past the tavern to the first or second intersection. There KOTOSHIRODO was directed to stop the car, and MORIMURA got out. Then OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO drove down the road almost to the junction of the Kalama Road, where OKUDA told KOTOSHIRODO to stop the car and wait for MORIMURA, who was to be back in about 15 minutes.

22. KOTOSHIRODO stated that while driving from Honolulu he had glanced in the rear-view mirror and noticed that OKUDA had a money bag folded in such a manner as to indicate that there might be a stack of currency in it. When MORIMURA left the car he wore white trousers and an aloha (sport) shirt. He wore no coat, and his short was hanging outside his trousers. He had nothing in his hands. KOTOSHIRODO did not know where MORIMURA went. When the latter failed to return in 15 minutes, KOTOSHIROD suggested that they return and look for him, but OKUDA said they were to wait instead. After an absence of about 30 minutes, MORIMURA returned. His appearance was the same as it was when he left, except he was carrying a tree branch with him. When he got into the car, MORIMURA told OKUDA, "It's all okay", or something similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.

similar, according to KOTOSHIRODO's stated recollection.

23. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, when interrogated, stated that he had driven MORIMURA over to Windward Oahu some five or six times. KOTOSHIRODO came along on some of these occasions; at other times, MORIMURA was alone. On all occasions he was directed to drive slowly along the Kokokahi Road, which

commands an excellent view of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station.

24. According to the statement made by Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, the Consul General's efficial car was never used for exploring the island. This car was driven only 17,000 miles during the four years it was used by the Consulate. It was used primarily by the Consul General himself, or by OZAKI when he drove around town on errands. The only time it was used for a trip to Windward Oahn was on those occasions when the Consul General escorted some visiting dignitary on a sighseeing tour of the island. The itinerary for these trips was to follow the coast around Koko Head and through Waimanalo, then return to Honolulu via the Nauuanu Pali.

Other Parts of Oahu

25. The reinterrogation of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI added little information concerning trips to other portions of Oahu, it being largely a repetition of the information set forth in paragraph 26 of reference (c). However, some

miscellaneous items are of interest.

26. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard MORIMURA say that he had made a trip around the island only a day or so after his arrivel (March 27, 1941). KOTOSHIRODO believed that MIKAMI had driven MORIMURA on this occasion. KOTOSHIRODO denied ever having made a complete circuit of the island with MORIMURA.

[9] 27. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered hearing MORIMURA speak of staying overnight on some Oahu beach, but MORIMURA had added no details, and the time and circumstances under which MORIMURA had done this were

unknown to KOTOSHIRODO.

28. MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO of meeting a "nice girl" at Wahiawa. Apparently she was a Japanese language school teacher, but MORI-

MURA did not reveal her name.

29. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA had made only one trip to the Haleiwa region. On that occasion they went directly to Haleiwa Park, by the beach, where they stopped the car near a concrete wall. They did not get out of the car, but sat there for five or ten minutes. MORIMURA mentioned that it was a good swimming beach, but did not talk about the reef or any other kindred subject of possible military interest. At the time, KOTOSHIRODO had no idea why MORIMURA made this trip to Haleiwa.

30. KOTOSHIRODO recalled two trips to Waianae. On the first occasion, they were driven by MIKAMI, and drove to the end of the road, Makua Cave.

On the second occasion, KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA drove in the former's car, and they went as far as Nanakuli Beach.

31. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had never driven the road between

Waialua and Kaena Point.

32. KOTOSHIRODO could remember no significant discussions with MORI-MURA concerning military objectives on Oahu. Beaches as potential landing spots for invasion forces were never discussed, he said. Hickam Field and the Kancohe Naval Air Station were discussed only in a cursory fashion. Other airfields on Oahu were never mentioned. MORIMURA once estimated the air strength on Oahu to be no more than 500 planes. (That this figure was fairly accurate is reflected in the Navy Department's communique of December 5, 1942, which revealed that there were 475 Army and Navy planes on Oahu on the morning of December 7, 1941.)

TRIPS TO OTHER ISLANDS

Kauai

33. During the course of the reinterrogation, KOTOSHIRODO admitted that he had made a trip to the Island of Kauai for the Consulate during July, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO had not mentioned this trip on the original interrogation. He and his wife made this trip together; they were not accompanied by any

other representative of the Consulate.

34. Originally, MORIMURA had been scheduled to make the trip to Kauai with KOTOSHIRODO, and the latter had been so informed by OKUDA about 10 days prior to the prospective date of departure. However, a disagreement arose among [10] OKUDA, MORIMURA, and SEKI. SEKI, who had made none of the trips to the outside islands, wished to make this trip himself, and because of this, friction developed between SEKI and MORIMURA. To settle the argument, OKUDA decreed that neither should go. Instead, he told KOTOSHIRODO to take Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO along as a "front".

35. Two days before he left, KOTOSHIRODO conferred for about an hour with

OKUDA in the latter's office, and received the following instructions:

(a) OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a rough sketch of the Barking Sands Airport, said by OKUDA to have been taken from a newspaper, and instructed KOTOSHIRODO to note any activity there;

(b) OKUDA also showed KOTOSHIRODO a photograph of Nawilawili port,

taken about 1939, and instructed the latter to note any changes;

(c) OKUDA stated that he had heard a story (KOTOSHIRODO could not remember the source) that the United States Navy was planning to make some use of Hanalei Bay, and KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note evidence, if any, of Naval activity there;

(d) KOTOSHIRODO was instructed to note what use was being made of the airport in the old race track at Lihue, and to further note any expansion activity

there;

(e) He was further instructed to take a look at the power plant in Wainiha Valley (the only power plant on the Island of Kauai). The Vice Consul showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of Kauai, in English, which showed the location of the power plant, and had transmission lines printed in red. (It is believed that this

map was a United States Geological Survey map, edition of 1912.)

OKUDA impressed upon KOTOSHIRODO that the primary rule to be obeyed was caution. He was to tell no one that he was from the Consulate. He was to make no inquiries about the things he was sent to observe. He was to contact no friends or relatives. He was to obtain only such information as he could see with his own eyes. Before he left, both SEKI and MORIMURA told him to treat the trip as a vacation and have some fun.

36. KOTOSIHRODO and his wife departed for Kauai by airplane on Saturday morning, July 12, 1941. (This has been verified by an inspection of the records of the Inter-Island Airways, Ltd.) Mr. and Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO left their home at 0715 and were driven to the airport in MIKAMI's taxi. At John Rodgers Airport, KOTOSHIRODO learned that he would be unable to return to Honolulu on [11] Sunday afternoon, July 13th, as he had planned, so he decided to return the following morning. He then directed MIKAMI to meet the Monday morning plane. The plane for Kauai departed from Honolulu at 0800 and arrived at Port Allen airport about 0900, on July 12th.

37. A number of taxis were waiting for fares at the Port Allen field when KOTOSHIRODO's plane arrived. However, there was only one Japanese driver,

so KOTOSHIRODO approached him. The driver has been identified as Toshimasa MINATOYA. OKUDA had warned KOTOSHIRODO that he should use only Japanese drivers when "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO told MINATOYA that he and his wife were sightseeing on Kauai and wanted to see both sides of the island. They agreed on a price. (KOTOSHIRODO stated that he agreed to and paid \$25.00. MINATOYA, when interviewed, stated that the price was \$35.00. Records of the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, indicate that the latter figure was the correct one.)

38. From the airport, they drove directly to Waimea Canyon, getting out at the tourists' observation point for 10 or 15 minutes. Then they drove further up the road until they reached Kokee. At MINATOYA's suggestion, they turned back here. They returned to the Waimea Hotel, where MINATOYA and KOTOSHIRODO and his wife made mutual introductions and lunched together. However, KOTOSHIRODO did not tell MINATOYA that he was from the Consulate.

39. They left the Waimea Hotel about 1400 and drove to the Barking Sands. They had postponed this trip until the afternoon because of MINATOYA's information that the Army held bombing practice there in the morning. MINATOYA mentioned that there was a new airport at Barking Sands. They drove as far as a large sand hill, where KOTOSHIRODO and his wife got out of the car and walked to the top of a dune. They saw only sand, sea, and keawe (algaroba) trees. They remained at Barking Sands for about 15 minutes, and then departed in the direction of Lihue about 1530. Enroute to Lihue they stopped at the Spouting Horn for five for ten minutes, and the Ancient Hawaiian Battleground. Both these spots are well known points of tourist interest. They arrived at Lihue about 1730. They registered at the Lihue Hotel under their proper names, and dismissed MINATOYA with instructions to pick them up again the following morning. However, after KOTOSHIRODO and his wife had eaten dinner at the Lihue Hotel, they decided to go to a movie, so they called MINATOYA to drive them. All three went to the Lihue Theater, KOTOSHIRODO paying for the tickets.

40. One of the passengers on the plane on which the KOTOSHIRODOS flew to Kauai was Isuke HORIKAWA, subject of reference (k). HORIKAWA, who was taken into custody in April, 1942, was suspect because he was the owner of the Pensacola Hotel in Honolulu, a suspected Japanese espionage center prior to the war. HORIKAWA was the head cook at the Lihue Hotel, and was one of the wealthiest Japanese on the Island of Kauai. He was identified with a number of pro-Japanese activities on that island prior to the war. KOTOSHIRODO was questioned very closely regarding HORIKAWA's presence on the same plane, but KOTOSHIRODO main [12] tained that this was pure coincidence. He stated that when he met HORIKAWA later at the Lihue Hotel, they merely exchanged greetings as having been fellow travelers earlier that day. KOTOSHIRODO also remembered HORIKAWA from having seen him at the Japanese Consulate on two occasions.

41. On Sunday morning, July 13th KOTOSHIRODO and his wife ate breakfast at the hotel. At the suggestion of M1NATOYA, they had the hotel pack them a picnic lunch, and they left the hotel about 0900 and drove around the east coast of Kauai. They went first to Wallua Falls, then to a grass shack at a heiau (ancient Hawaiian religious site). They visited a number of tourist spots, and finally arrived at Hanalei about noon. They ate their picnic lunch at the Hanalei Park pavilion, while KOTOSHIRODO observed the bay. He noted only that the water in Hanalei Bay was shallow and very calm, and that there was no sign of any construction work going on. About 1245, they drove to Haena where they

visited both the wet cave and the dry cave, tourist attractions.

42. From Haena, they drove up Wainiha Valley to a point near the power plant. They turned the car around and parked about 50 or 100 yards below the power plant, and got out of the car to pick guavas. KOTOSHIRODO noted that the power plant was small, and had two lead-in water pipes, each about three feet in diameter. He also noted that the pipes were directly alongside the road, and that the plant was unfenced.

43. On the return journey, they stopped at Kilauea lighthouse, which is off the main highway, and went up into the lighthouse with the keeper. KOTOSHI-

RODO believed that he had signed his name in the lighthouse log.

44. From Kilauea, they drove directly to Nawiliwili harbor as far as the wharf where Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company steamers docked. He saw at once that there had been no new construction since the picture in OKUDA's possession had been taken (1939), so they left immediately. He did note, however, the Standard Oil Company gasoline tanks there.

45. From Nawiliwili they drove back to the hotel, arriving about 1630. They dismissed MINATOYA. That night they walked to the nearby Aloha Theater and saw a movie.

46. During the course of the afternoon, when they passed the Lihue airport twice, KOTOSHIRODO noted that the only signs of military activity there were

some Army tents pitched in camp.

47. The following morning, July 14th, MINATOYA came to the hotel about 0800. The KOTOSHIRODOS checked out of the hotel about 0830, and MINATOYA drove them to the Hanapepe airport. Their plane departed for Honolulu about 0930, and arrived in Honolulu about 1000. MIKAMI was waiting for them, and drove them home. KOTOSHIRODO then drove his wife to her dressmaking shop, and he went back to the Consulate.

[13] 48. At the Consulate, OKUDA and MORIMURA had a two-hour conference with KOTOSHIRODO, and took notes while questioning the clerk. KOTOSHIRODO detailed the general lack of activity on Kauai, and MORIMURA finally remarked, "There isn't anything big going on it seems". SEKI was not present at this conference. He merely asked KOTOSHIRODO later if he had had a good time, but also commented that it was "waste time" just to "look from

the road for things that were meant to be hidden".

49. On October 1, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO personally typed and signed a statement regarding his Kauai trip. A photostatic copy of his statement is herewith forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence as enclosure (A). Mimeographed

facsimile copies thereof are provided for the other disseminees.

- 50. Toshimasa MINATOYA was interviewed on three occasions by a representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, and his story substantiates that given by KOTOSHIRODO. Records of the Lihue Hotel and the Nawiliwili Transportation Company, MINATOYA's employer, also bear this out. There is no evidence of prior arrangement between KOTOSHIRODO and MINATOYA. MINATOYA remembered KOTOSHIRODO's having had a camera on this trip. The pictures taken by KOTOSHIRODO on this trip were examined by the interrogating officers and agents, and all proved to be either innocuous scenic views or pictures of Mrs. KOTOSHIRODO. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the only map he took with him on the trip was an ordinary tourist cartograph, which were available at many places throughout the Territory. He made no markings on this map, nor did he make any notes concerning his observations.
- 51. Prior to his departure, KOTOSHIRODO was given about \$100.00 for his expenses by SEKI, out of which he claims he returned about \$7.00 or \$9.00. However, he stated that his expenses were: \$50.00 for the air fare, \$20.00 for the hotel bill, and \$25.00 for the taxi. (As already mentioned, this last figure actually was \$35.00.)

Maui

- 52. KOTOSHIRODO, upon request, again detailed the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Maui in May, 1941. These details were substantially the same as those set forth in paragraphs 15–18 of reference (c). The only change is that it was reported in reference (c) that KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA visited a pineapple cannery while on Maui; whereas KOTOSHIRODO stated on re-interview that they had passed a couple of pineapple canneries, but had not visited either.
- 53. Prior to their departure for Maui, OKUDA showed KOTOSHIRODO a map of that island. However, he did not tell KOTOSHIRODO what to look for, that is, what military objectives. OKUDA told MORIMURA, who later told KOTOSHIRODO, that the important places to be looked at were:

[14] (a) Puunene Air Field (Navy);

- (b) Kahului Harbor;(c) Lahaina Bay;
- (d) National Guard Camp.

54. MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO visited Lahaina, a fleet anchorage off Maui, on the first day of their visit. However, they saw no ships there. Later that day they drove to Kahului on the other side of the island, passing Maalaea Airport, since abandoned, on the way. They drove out on a pier at Kahului. MORIMURA asked the driver whether Navy ships came into Kahului, and was told that destroyers and submarines occasionally paid that harbor a visit. MORIMURA commented on the fact that the water at Kahului was rough compared to that of Lahaina.

55. Sometime during their first day on Maui, MORIMURA discussed making a trip to the Hana region with their taxi driver. (This trip is long, and necessitates traveling over bad roads.) MORIMURA also asked if there were an air field there. The driver told them there was a field, but he thought that the road was too rough and too long for them to make the trip during the limited time MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO planned to be on Maui.

56. On the following day they drove to the top of Haleakala, and then to Kula Sanitarium. They got out of the car near the buildings. KOTO-SHIRODO took a picture; MORIMURA commented on being able to see the ocean both on the Wailuku side and the Lahaina side of Puunene Valley. They stayed at Kula about 10 minutes, seeing no one. In the afternoon they drove to the National Guard Camp at Waihee, about ten minutes out of Wailuku; however, they saw no troops. They drove along the coast a little farther, and then turned back and drove to the Puunene Ariport where they

boarded a plane for Honolulu about 1500.

57. Investigation indicated that the taxi driver on this trip was Kenneth Jitsuei TAKAMIYA, a Hawaiian-born Nisei, 26 years old, who was expatriated from his Japanese citizenship in 1934. He made only one trip to Japan, that being when he was five years old, and for a stay of only six months. TAKAMIYA, when interviewed, substantially confirmed KOTOSHIRODO's description of the trip around Maui. There was no evidence brought forth which would indicate that TAKAMIYA had any prior knowledge of the visit of the two men from the Consulate. Apparently the only two contacts made on Maui were with Itsuo HAMADA, as set forth in paragraphs 15–16 in reference (c), and with Tetsunosuke SONE, as set forth in paragraph 17 of reference (c).

58. Although the contact with Itsuo HAMADA was in itself highly suspicious, nothing has been brought forth which would indicate that this contact was anything more than a casual coincidence. However, investigation by representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Maui have added some details concerning the contact made with Tetsonosuke SONE. KOTOSHIRODO stated that they had visited SONE, who was a toritsuginin and principal of the Japanese language [15]—school at Spreckelsville, and had delivered to him a package sent by Nagao KITA, the Japanese Consul General. This package was to be given to a Japanese woman (whose name KOTOSHIRODO could not recall) who lived at Spreckelsville. Investigation indicated that the woman in question was Miss Namiko FUKUSHIMA. Miss FUKUSHIMA, when interviewed, stated that she had gone to school in Japan from August, 1937 to May, 1938, and during that period she had become very well acquainted with a Yosuko ISHII, daughter of a Consul General ISHII, sald to be a prominent member of the Japanese consular corps. After her return to Hawaii in 1938, Miss FUKUSHIMA maintained a personal correspondence with Miss ISHII. Apparently Miss ISHII had requested KITA to take a present to Miss FUKUSHIMA prior to KITA's coming to Honolulu as Consul General in March, 1941. The present, which Miss FUKUSHIMA produced for the interviewing agent, was a Japanese doll and a battledore. She stated that the package had been delivered to her by SONE.

59. A check of hotel registers, and an interview with Mrs. Itsuo HAMADA, failed to produce any evidence which would contradict KOTOSHIRODO's story.

60. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO carried binoculars on their trip to Maui. The only map they had was an ordinary tourist map, and the only mark that MORIMURA made on this map was a small check along the coastline just below Lahaina. MORIMURA reportedly made this check to indicate that the Lahaina coast was extremely rugged, and thus, presumably, unsuitable for landings. Neither MORIMURA nor KOTOSHIRODO made any written notes. OKUDA talked only to MORIMURA about the trip. Later MORIMURA observed to KOTOSHIRODO that "there wasn't much going on" on Maui. KOTOSHIRODO took a camera along, but made no effort to photograph the places they regarded as "important". The camera was used merely to add to their pose as tourists. KOTOSHIRODO stated that the Maui trip had cost between \$115.00 and \$130.00.

61. According to KOTOSHIRODO, one outgrowth of the Maui trip was the confirmation of a belief held by MORIMURA that OKUDA had a personal agent collecting information for the Consulate on Maui. MORIMURA had expressed this opinion on a number of occasions, although SEKI disagreed with him. SEKI said that such a person would have to be paid well, and OKUDA did not have the funds with which to pay such an agent. (SEKI was Consulate treasurer, and presumably would know of such expenditures, unless OKUDA had a secret per-

sonal fund at his disposal.) MORIMURA stated that OKUDA expected him to tell OKUDA every secret, but the Vice Consul was not so "open-hearted" with MORIMURA, especially about the secret of Maui coverage. Since OKUDA and MORIMURA worked so closely together, it irked MORIMURA that OKUDA would not tell him of the Maui agent. The incident that confirmed MORIMURA's suspicions about Maui coverage occurred a few days after their return from that island: Vice Consul OKUDA asked MORIMURA whether he had seen any mooring buoys at Lahaina Roads. MORIMURA said that he had seen none, but OKUDA contradicted him and said that there were some buoys there. MORIMURA then went to KOTOSHIRODO and asked the same question of the clerk, but KOTOSHIRODO could not remember any buoys there either. MORIMURA concluded that OKUDA's personal agent had supplied the contrary information.

[16] 62. Possibly supporting MORIMURA's theory are these facts-concerning the Maui trip: MORIMURA conducted that mission very laxly. He did not visit Hana to see for himself the airport facilities allegedly there. He traveled no farther north on the leeward coast than Mala Wharf. On the windward coast, he omitted more than half the road running north from Wailuku. He did nothing to observe the Puunene Naval Air Station field other than pass it going to and coming from the plane. On Hawaii and Kauai, almost every foot of highway along the coastline was traversed. It is believed that OKUDA's contact on Maui may have been Unji HIRAYAMA, a priest of the Hompa Hongwanji who resided at Lahaina, and who was taken into custody on December 7, 1941. It is known that HIRAYAMA, who is the subject of reference (1), was requested on at least one occasion (June, 1940) to keep the Consulate informed of any movements of the United States Fleet at Lahaina, and it is believed that he compiled with this request.

Hawaii

63. KOTOSHIRODO was asked to discuss again the trip he and MORIMURA made to the Island of Hawaii in October, 1941. KOTOSHIRODO stated the facts of the trop substantially as they are set forth in paragraphs 19–24 of reference (c). The details KOTOSHIRODO added in his later version principally concerned the various drinking parties in which they indulged while on Hawaii.

64. Before they left Honolulu on the trip to Hawaii, MORIMURA told KOTO-

SHIRODO that he wanted to see:

(a) Hilo harbor;

(b) Kilauea. (Speculating on the reason for their desire to see Kilauea, it should be noted that there was a Hawaii National Guard camp there prior to the war, and also there was some talk of building a new airport in the lava flats);

(c) South Point, where a new airport was actually in the process of con-

struction;

(d) Kohala, where there is an Inter-Island Airways landing field at Upolu. 65. In their trip around the island, they passed the Kilauea Volcano, and MORTIMURA asked about the military camp there. They drove down the road toward South Point until they came to a sign "Kapu—Military Reservation". They made no effort to enter the reservation, but instead turned the car around and returned to the main highway. They could see nothing of interest from outside the gate.

66. They stopped at the Kona Hotel that night on the suggestion of the driver. The next day they included Upolu in their itinerary, but they only [17] paused there for a few minutes. They did not get out of the car. While in the Kohala district they also inspected Kawaihae, the landing from which cattle

are swum out to the inter-Island steamers.

67. On the fourth day of their visit they drove all around the city of Hilo, seeing Rainbow Falls, Hilo Hospital, the waterfront, Hilo Country Club, and

Puumaile Home (for the tubercular).

68. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he and MORIMURA were not sent to contact anyone on the Island of Hawaii; on the contrary, they were strictly enjoined not to do so. However, KOTOSHIRODO made one exception, and made a personal call on his wife's cousin, Mrs. George KAWAMOTO. He brought her candy, and she was greatly surprised to see him. KOTOSHIRODO told her that he was staying at the Naniloa Hotel, but he stayed only a few minutes. However, after he had returned to the hotel, and was drinking in the bar with MORIMURA, George KAWAMOTO came in to see KOTOSHIRODO, having been told by his wife of KOTOSHIRODO's visit. KOTOSHIRODO introduced him to MORI-

MURA. They had a drink at the bar, and then KAWAMOTO invited them to

the Hilo Theater. They saw the show, and then KAWAMOTO went home.
69. A representative of the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, contacted George KAWAMOTO regarding his relationship with KOTO-SHIRODO. KAWAMOTO stated that his wife was a cousin of KOTOSHIRODO's wife, and he gave an account of a visit made to Hawaii by KOTOSHIRODO and his wife in 1940. Apparently this trip was merely a vacation. However, there is nothing in the Military Intelligence Division report to indicate that KAWAMOTO was interrogated concerning the trip taken by KOTOSHIRODO and MORIMURA to Hawaii.

70. Representatives of the Military Intelligence Division on Hawaii also interviewed Shingo NARIKAWA, who was taxi driver for MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO while they were on Hawaii. Although interrogated at length, NARIKAWA could remember nothing which was at variance with the story

given by KOTOSHIRODO.

TADASI MORIMURA

71. From the information that has been collected from the Consular clerks and other persons close to the Consulate, it is apparent that MORIMURA was something of a mystery man. All agreed that he had special privileges. He was frequently drunk, often had women in his quarters overnight, came to work late or not at all, as he pleased, insulted the Consul General on occasions, and generally conducted himself as if he were beyond penalty. This naturally caused much comment among the Consulate secretaries and clerks.

72. Some of the secretaries and clerks believed that MORIMURA was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. According to KOTOSHIRODO, however, SEKI denied this. SEKI said that he knew how Japanese naval officers behaved, and that MORIMURA definitely did not conduct himself as an officer.

73. It was publicly announced MORIMURA's arrival that he had been sent to Honolulu to assist in expatriation matters. Takaichi SAKAI, senior clerk at the Consulate, who had been handling the routine of expatriation matters for a number of years, stated that MORIMURA had made a pretense of helping with the work for only the first three or four weeks he was here, but had done none of it personally, and appeared to know nothing about the work.

74. John Yoshiye MIKAMI, who, although uneducated, has given himself an amazing self education in naval matters, had little regard for MORIMURA, and emphatically stated that the secretary lacked the sharp eye and the smart gait

of a Japanese military or naval officer.

75. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA was an eighth rank secretary in the Japanese consular service. This is the lowest rank, a first rank secretary being the highest. KOTOSHIRODO remembered having heard YUGE and Samon TSUKIKAWA, the Consular Secretary in charge of the code room, remark that eighth rank scretaries were usually sent to the least desirable posts in the consular service. The desirability of posts was said to vary according to climate. Most of the less desirable posts were in China. Honolulu, on the other hand, was considered one of the best posts in the Japanese consular service. It was usually given to men with many years of faithful service, and it was unusual for a secretary of the eighth rank to have his initial assignment in Hawaii. They believed this to be MORIMURA's first assignment abroad, since his name, at the date of his arrival here, had not yet appeared in the consular roster of the Japanese Foreign Office. Because of this, they assumed that he was recently admitted to the foreign service, and had served only an indoctrination period in Tokyo before coming to Honolulu.

76. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA never talked about his past life except of the time he spent in grammar school. However, on one occasion, MORI-MURA did refer to Chinese coolies pulling barges on the Yangtze river. He called the coolies the lowest people on earth. This remark led KOTOSHIRODO to

believe that MORIMURA had lived in, or had at least visited, China.

77. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffeur for the Consulate, supplied one version of MORIMURA's background. He stated that on one occasion he had overheard a conversation between SEKI and YUGE regarding MORIMURA. They had remarked that MORIMURA was the only child of a wealthy family of Ehime-ken on Shikoku, in Japan. His father died when he was rather young, leaving his mother in comfortable circumstances, inasmuch as the family owned considerable land. Prior to his arrival in Hawaii, MORIMURA had been working in the Foreign Office in Tokyo, possibly for as long a period as three years, although it was more likely that he had been there for only two years. On one occasion he had been discharged from the Foreign Office for excessive drinking, but his mother had written to a prominent official about the matter, and through this

connection had been able to have MORIMURA reinstated.

78. Whatever his background, MORIMURA was not popular with the rest of the Consulate staff. This was probably due to his youth, his favored position, [19] and the advantage he took of this position. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that SEKI greatly resented MORIMURA. SEKI had done the work of gathering data about ships in Pearl Harbor until MORIMURA came, but then had been relieved of these duties. SEKI openly exhibited professional jealousy, often telling KOTOSHIRODO that MORIMURA did not know what he was doing. The change in plans for the Kauai trip was cited as an example of this dissension. As KOTOSHIRODO put it during one of the interviews, both SEKI and MORIMURA were trying to gain all the credit for the information-gathering work. Further information about MORIMURA's background is to be found on pages 10 and 11 of reference (u).

79. KOTOSHIRODO stated that shortly after MORIMURA's arrival, the new secretary made a point of "making friends" around town. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA spent a lot of time at the offices of the Japanese newspapers, particularly the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA had many friends at the Nippu Jiji, but until questioned at length showed no great willingness to "remember" who they were. Finally he admitted that of all the men at the Nippu Jiji, Shigeo FURUKAWA, the advertising manager, was best known to MORIMURA. The significance of this fact is indicated by the information contained in paragraphs 9–11 of reference (a). Paragraph 16 of reference (c) should also be noted in this regard. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA was an excellent Japanese poet. (Other information corroborates this statement.) KOTOSHIRODO was then asked if he would explain the common interest between MORIMURA and FURUKAWA. It was pointed out that FURUKAWA was about 55 years of age, a poet, a family man and a business man, whereas MORIMURA was only about 29, was not a poet, and preferred to spend his leisure in drinking and playing with the geishas. KOTOSHIRODO stated in answer to this that they often played go (Japanese checkers) together at the Nippu Jiji. KOTOSHIRODO stated that MORIMURA also knew Zenichi KAWAZOE, subject of reference (m), who covered the Consulate "beat" for the Nippu Jiji. Other Nippu Jiji personnel whom MORIMURA knew were Shoichi ASAMI, the city editor, and Katsuichi KAWAMOTO, the business manager. All these men have been interned.

80. KOTOSHIRODO stated that FURUKAWA came to the Consulate very rarely. He remembered FURUKAWA's coming there only when he brought Nippu Jiji representatives from the outside islands to introduce them to the

Consul General.

81. KOTOSHIRODO stated that another close associate of MORIMURA was Katsuichiro TAKAGISHI, chief chemist of the Honolulu Sake Brewery. TAKA-GISHI was the subject of an intensive invistigation by this office prior to his departure for Japan aboard the Taiyo Maru on November 5, 1941. TAKA-GISHI is the son-in-law of an Admiral HYAKUTAKE of the Imperial Japanese (There are two admirals of this name, brothers, in the Japanese Navy; this office has been unable to determine which admiral is the father of TAKA-TAKAGISHI was a frequent visitor of the Japanese Consulate, GISHI's wife.) and often played golf with Consul General KITA, Vice Consul OKUDA, and Tsunetaro HARADA, manager of the Pensacola Hotel, where TAKAGISHI re-KOTOSHIRODO stated that he often thought that the friendship of MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI was "funny", because TAKAGISHI loved golf so much and MORIMURA did [20] not play the game. However, KOTO-SHIRODO admitted that MORIMURA and TAKAGISHI used to "chase women" together. It was never established that TAKAGISHI actually was engaged in espionage for Japan, although a mass of circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that he was so engaged.

SEKI AND MORIMURA DISCUSS ESPIONAGE

82. On many occasions KOTOSHIRODO was present at discussions between MORIMURA and SEKI. On other occasions, they would discuss things with him individually. It should be remembered that KOTOSHIRODO worked as SEKI's assistant while he was inside the office, although he was MORIMURA's assistant

in collecting information outside the office. Because of this situation, KOTO-

SHIRODO was in close contact with both men.

83. MORIMURA told KOTOSHIRODO that the Japanese consulates all over the world were supposed to gather all the information they could without doing "illegal things". (This point is considerably amplified in reference (u).) MORIMURA also told KOTOSHIRODO that an outside system, which was separate and apart from the Consulate, and which worked directly on orders from Tokyo, collected such information as it was necessary to obtain by "illegal" means. This would include, for example, the practice of buying secrets. MORIMURA observed that such an outside system would not report through the Consulate, nor would the Consulate contact the outside system. In all probability, the Consulate would know nothing of this outside system, he said.

84. MORIMURA once asked SEKI if there were any Japanese espionage agents (meaning those outside the Consulate) in the Territory of Hawaii. SEKI replied that he did not know. MORIMURA observed that he did not know what the facts were, but that there must be such a system. However, he did not know

the manner in which such an outside system would operate.

85. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA and SEKI discuss espionage coverage on one occasion. SEKI stated that it was necessary for the Consulate to have a "good man" on each island. However, MORIMURA was of the opinion that this requirement would be difficult to meet, since the average Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii lacked the technical knowledge necessary in the work. MORIMURA and SEKI agreed that because of the large number of Japanese in the local population, Hawaii should be "the easiest place" to 'carry on espionage. However, they believed this advantage to be lost, because the local Japanese were too poorly educated to do this work. MORIMURA was very outspoken on this point, claiming that the toritsuginin (the so-called local consular agents) were no good for the work, and that most Japanese in Hawaii was "just trash" and insufficiently educated. He remarked that the Japanese had come to Hawaii as laborers and were therefore uneducated, where the Japanese on the Mainland

of the United States were much better educated.

86. KOTOSHIRODO heard MORIMURA say that throughout the world then (1941), all nations "use other kind of people" (i. e., non-nationals of the country them) as espionage agents. MORIMURA believed that employing [21] Japan sometimes used non-Japanese espionage agents (although KOTOSHIRODO never heard him say whether such agents were operating in Hawaii). MORI-MURA once said in KOTOSHIRODO's presence that he had "heard in Tokyo" that Japan had long had a British naval officer acting as an espionage agent in China. (Whether this Britisher was working for Japan only against China, or against both China and Britain, or only against Britain, was not stated). MORIMURA had said that this officer had been so employed "for years". However, he com-He said that the mented on the fact that non-Japanese agents were expensive. first time such agents submitted information, they submitted a lot of it, but after that the law of diminishing returns began to operate, and eventually the employer would pay the same price for mere driblets. He also stated that it was safer and less costly to use Japanese agents in espionage work. However, more valuable information could be obtained by non-Japanese, although at a greater cost to Japan.

87. KOTOSHIRODO was asked whether he thought the extra-Consulate espionage system to which MORIMURA referred might be operating in Hawaii at the present time, and sending information from Hawaii to Japan. KOTOSHIRODO expressed surprise that such an operation was considered possible, saying, "How can?" The only pertinent fact he could recall in this connection was that MORIMURA once remarked that it would be impossible to use short-wave radio for getting information out of Hawaii after war started because of "a device" the Americans had which enabled them to ascertain the exact location of a radio transmitter. KOTOSHIRODO knew what short-wave radio was, and knew of Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but professed complete ignorance about amateur radio stations. He stated that he had never heard anyone at the Consulate talk about the subject, nor had he and MORIMURA ever stopped to see anyone in town

who operated an amateur short-wave radio station.

SS. KOTOSHIRODO stated that on another occasion MORIMURA remarked to SEKI that Hawaii would be a fine place from which to watch a Japanese-American war. Either SEKI or MORIMURA observed that there would be no way for a spy to communicate from Hawaii to Japan by radio, referring to the risk of discovery by radio detection equipment.

89. Apparently one of the "legal" methods of collecting information indulged in by the Consulate was the close scrutiny of daily newspapers. Yasumasa MURATA, a clerk at the Consulate until 1938, stated that the local newspapers were clipped daily. He added that the Vice Consul always had charge of this work. The Vice Consul usually would mark such items as he desired and pass them on to MURATA, who would do the actual clipping. Usually two—occasionally three—clippings were secured of each item. One copy was sent to Japan, and one retained at the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he used to receive the first edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin for the Consulate at his home, because the first edition was not delivered to the zone in which the Consulate was located. KOTOSHIRODO's home, two blocks away, was near enough to be included in the delivery zone. Apparently the Consulate wanted to keep close watch on all editions of the paper. Many of the Consulate despatches (reviewed after the outbreak of war) merely contained synopses of press stories.

[22]

SECURITY MEASURES

90. KOTOSHIRODO said that he was taught at the Consulate that the first rule in "information collecting" was "no get caught". He was told never to go out of his way to get information. Even if he could not see his desired objective from the highway, he was not to ask questions about it, nor leave the highway to view it. If ever he and MORIMURA were stopped by the authorities and questioned, KOTOSHIRODO was to explain that they were merely "sightseeing", KOTOSHIRODO was to do the necessary talking, because of MORIMURA's poor command of English.

91. He was told never to take pictures of "important places". Although he took a camera to Kauai and Maui, this was merely a "prop" to carry out their pose as sightseers. KOTOSHIRODO expressly denied ever having taken pictures of air fields, harbors, power plants, or other conceivable military objectives. His

snapshots were only of the usual scenic places, he said.

92. MORIMURA occasionally carried field glasses on his trips to various parts of Oahu. He never carried them to the outside islands. Even on Oahu he was extremely careful in their use. The field glasses used were bought early in 1941 at SEKI's insistence. Prior to that time, there had been no field glasses at the Consulate. To divert suspicion, the glasses were bought for the Consulate by Toro NISHIKAWA (now interned), an employee of the Nippu Ji ji. (NISHI-KAWA handled certain commercial printing orders from the Consulate.)

93. KOTOSHIRODO could recall no instance in which MORIMURA had made written notes of their observations prior to their returning to the Consulate after "sightseeing". KOTOSHIRODO likewise denied ever making any notes himself. Instead, he said that his practice was to report verbally what he had seen to MORIMURA or OKUDA, who would make notes, at the Consulate, of KOTO-

SHIDORO's reported observations.

94. KOTOSHIRODO stated that neither he nor MORIMURA ever carried maps which might attract suspicion. On such occasions as they did use maps, they carried cartographs published by the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, and the only occasion upon which notations were made thereon was on the trip to Maui, see paragraph 60, above. However, in earlier interviews, as reported in paragraph 42 of reference (c), KOTOSHORODO stated that on trips he made alone to the Pearl Harbor region, he had marked the positions of various warships on rough maps drawn by MORIMURA. (Note might be made here of KOTOSHIRODO's extraordinary powers of perception and memory for details of events which happened months, or years, before. Many of his statements were otherwise known to be true, tending to make KOTOSHIRODO's statements and admissions generally reliable.)

95. KOTOSHIRODO said that when he was first employed at the Consulate (1935), he was told by Vice Consul YAMASAKI that he was not to talk about Consulate business to strangers. When KOTOSHIRODO first began to make trips to Pearl Harbor, SEKI warned him not to mention these trips to his wife.

[23] CHRISTMAS PRESENTS GIVEN BY THE CONSULATE

96. Takaichi SAKAI stated that every year the Consulate gave Christmas presents to a number of United States Customs inspectors. He stated that he personally delivered gifts to the homes of Customs Inspectors Carl F. EIFLER, George W. SPENCE, Andrew A. BUTA, and John OLIVIERA. These gifts usually consisted of merchandise orders of \$20.00 to \$30.00 drawn on M. McInerny, Ltd., or the Liberty House, both large Honolulu retail stores.

97. The Honolulu barbormaster, James L. FRIEL, and his assistant, Frank J. UNTERMANN, received similar Christmas presents, according to SAKAI.

98. Another recipient was Ernest M. HIRAKAWA, an alien Japanese, foreman of the registry section of the United States Post Office, Honolulu. Comment has

been made on HIRAKAWA in reference (t).

99. Ichitaro OZAKI, regular chauffeur for the Consulate, confirmed the fact that he drove SAKAI around to deliver Christmas presents. Although he was unable to recall all the persons to whom presents had been delivered, he did remember that SPENCE and FRIEL were among the recipients. KOTOSHI-RODO also remembered that Christmas presents were given to a number of persons.

MIKAMI'S NAVAL KNOWLEDGE

100. The interrogating officers and agents were surprised at John Yoshiye MIKAMI's knowledge of naval matters. MIKAMI is so poorly educated that he speaks both pidgin Japanese and pidgin English. He has been a taxi driver for the greater part of his life. He was detained on January 6, 1942, and since that time has been incarcerated on Sand Island, Honolulu, with other internees.

101. During the course of the interrogation (September 28, 1942), it became apparent that even while interned MIKAMI had been able to keep familiar with current movements of the United States Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor. MIKAMI stated that only a week before a new battleship that he had never seen before, and a carrier that was either the LEXINGTON or the SARATOGA, had arrived at Pearl Harbor. (The SOUTH DAKOTA and the SARATOGA actually had arrived.)

102. He stated that in July, 1942, a large body of United States ships had left Pearl Harbor—for Australia, he presumed. He stated that these ships had recently returned. He then commented on the large number of destroyer move-

ments.

103. MIKAMI commented upon seeing "the same old battleships" return to Pearl Harbor in August (true), and also upon a new carrier he had never seen before which entered Pearl Harbor on the same day. This latter was the WASP, on her first trip to Honolulu. (The Fleet Intelligence Office, Pacific Fleet, was seasonably [24] informed of the knowledge that MIKAMI, an internee, was able to see concerning current ship movements, from the interne-

ment camp on Sand Island.)

104. MIKAMI conversed intelligently about naval subjects in general. He mentioned "anti-torpedo nets", knew their purpose, and stated he had never seen them in use on his trips to Pearl Harbor before the war. He also mentioned "anti-airplane balloons" which he thought were impractical for use around Pearl Harbor because they would give away the exact location of the objective. MIKAMI also discussed the "balance of naval power" theory, and expressed the opinion that the United States-Japanese war began 30 years ago when a naval race between the two powers was started. He also expressed the opinion that the United States would beat Japan only when she had beaten the Japanese Navy.

105. MIKAMI was asked how he had acquired such a broad knowledge of naval subjects. He said that he had been reading American magazines for about three years, naming Our Navy, Life, and the Naval Institute Proceedings. He said he received copies of the latter publication when the Consul threw its old copies away. He stated that he did not read Japanese naval magazines because "they tell big lies". However, whether MIKAMI actually gained his excellent (though perhaps superficial) knowledge of naval subjects by reading magazines in a language in which he is extremely deficient, or by some other means, remains

a matter of conjecture.

KOREAN CONTACTS

106. All the Consulate clerks agreed that the Japanese Foreign Office made a point of keeping stationed in Hawaii one secretary who could speak Korean. There were two reasons for this practice: First, to handle various Korean matters which were a legitimate concern of the Consulate; second, to use the Honolulu Consulate as a "listening post" regarding various Korean nationalist movements. The Japanese apparently regarded Honolulu as an excellent place for keeping in touch with existing or incipient Korean political developments.

107. Takaichi SAKAI, former senior clerk at the Consulate, who was employed there from 1927 until the outbreak of war, recalled that during his time secretaries Takeo KASHIMURA, Gishiro MASUO, Tadaaki IIZUKA, and Kyonosuko

YUGE had spoken Korean and had handled Korean affairs at the Consulate. (For some reason SAKAI "forget' 'to mention YUGE, the most recent of these secretaries, until it was brought to his attention at a subsequent interview. All the other clerks were familiar with YUGE's Korean duties, they having been instructed to refer all Korean callers to YUGE as a matter of office routine.)

108. All the clerks employed at the Consulate prior to 1937 remembered having seen Kilsoo HAAN at the Consulate on a number of occasions. HAAN is the subject of a number of reports by this office, the most recent of which is reference (n). Yasumasa MURATA, who was employed at the Consulate until 1938, stated that he once heard from Tsuko KUROKAWA, who was senior clerk at the Consulate at the time, that the Consulate had been paying money to HAAN.

[25] 109. From a confidential, but reliable source, the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently received the originals, in Japanese, of various papers evidencing the interest of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, in Korean matters. Translations of these papers are set forth in reference (o). One source indicates that up to 1925, the Consulate was allowed \$100.00 a month for its Korean Intelligence Fund. From 1926 to 1931, the Consulate appears to have operated on an accumulated surplus in this field. Following that time, the Foreign Office appears to have made special allocations from time to time, as needed. A summary of these translations indicates that the following Korean informants received payment from the Japanese Consulate:

Kwang Won Cho

110. This individual is a Korean priest, mentioned as being a frequent visitor of the Consulate by the various clerks. He is more commonly known by the name, Father Noah CHO. The translations indicate that he received a payment of \$37.00 on May 19, 1934, and a payment of \$20.00 on August 6, 1934. He is the subject of a Registration Act case by the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a report of which is noted as reference (j), the synopsis of

which follows:

"Subject /CHO/ born October 21, 1897 in Korea; came to Hawaii in 1923 as Episcopal missionary and has since been associated with St. Luke's Korean Mission, Honolulu. He became priest at the St. Luke's Mission in 1931; however his entire family, including mother, father, wife and five children presently residing in Korea, have never been in the United States. Confidential source reveals Subject paid \$37.00 in May, 1934, and \$20.00 in August, 1934, by Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, for informant's services. Signed statement obtained in which Subject admits contact with Consulate, beginning in 1932, and beginning about September, 1939, and extending to April 1, 1941. He admits having performed work for the Consulate relating to Korean activities; further, that during the latter period approximately \$200 was paid him by the Consulate for his services which included obtaining and translation of two Korean newspapers. Subject claims to have performed services for the Japanese Consulate under threat to bring harm to his family in Korea; however, his acceptance of remuneration makes this claim appear questionable. Subject denied receipt of any

payments in 1934."

111. A check of the files of this office reveals the additional information that the Reverend CHO returned from a trip to Japan aboard the ASAMA MARU on August 20, 1940. It is of possible significance that a fellow passenger aboard the ASAMA MARU was Sanjia ABE, subject of reference (p), former Territorial senator, now interned, who was returning from a trip to Japan during which he conferred with Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA, and also made an overseas broadcast to Hawaii in which he praised Japan's war effort in China. Other passengers on the same ship were Clifford Kikujiro KONDO, subject of reference (q), now in custody; Katsuzo SATO, subject of reference (r), now in custody; and Kenju OHTOMO, subject [26] of reference (s). OHTOMO, executive secretary of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, Honolulu, and whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese government, has been classified on numerous occasions by this office as dangerous to internal security. Ten other of Reverend CHO's fellow passengers are now in custody, and another two, although still at large, have been classified as dangerous by this office. Although it may have been pure chance that these persons traveled on the same ship, the coincidence is being set forth for what it may be worth.

Doo Ok Chung

112. Translation of these papers indicated that CHUNG received \$80.00 on May 22, 1933. A review of the files of this office indicates that he is a 54-year-old alien, a tailor by trade, and operates a concession at the Honolulu Army and Navy Y. M. C. A. CHUNG appears to be extremely active in Kilsoo HAAN's SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. A letter from Dr. Soon HYUN, formerly chairman of the League in Honolulu, to HAAN, dated June 22, 1942, described CHUNG

as one of "the cornerstones of our League".

113. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that CHUNG was born in Korea in 1889, came to Hawaii in 1903. He has three sons serving in the United States Army. Another son, four daughters, his wife, and his mother all reside in the United States. He has been active in Korean political circles since 1915, when he joined the KOREAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. He withdrew from this and aided in forming the KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE, becoming the second president of the latter organization. The KOREAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE have been comparatively inactive since 1929, and eventually he joined the SINO-KOREAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE. He denied, with seeming sincerity, his ever having had contact with, or accepting money from, the local Japanese Consulate, but there appears to be no other individual in Hawaii of a similar name.

Won Sam Kim

114. The translation indicated that this individual received the following payments:

May 28, 1934	
July 24, 1934 25.00	
September 10, 1001	
May 31, 1936 20.00	
April 13, 1936 10.00	
May 2, 1936 10.00	
June 6, 1936 10.00	
March 29, 1937 18.00	

Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that KIM was born in Korea in 1879, came to Hawaii in the early 1900s, and was a carpenter by trade. [27] In 1919 he had become a member of the KOREAN INDE-PENDENCE LEAGUE. He died on March 14, 1939, in Honolulu, and his widow denied all knowledge of his past activities or relations with the Japanese Consulate.

Sang Ho Lee (Yee)

115. LEE was paid \$100.00 on March 31, 1932, and \$20.00 on August 19, 1933. Directories of that period indicate that an individual of this name was with the Nahm Choon Furnished Rooms, 339 North Beretania Street, Honolulu. Later directories do not include the name. However, the latest directory lists a Mrs.

Sang Ho LEE, 1355 Miller Street, Honolulu.

116. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that LEE was born in Korea on November 5, 1879, and first arrived in the United States on February 3, 1905, under the name YE CHONG KUL. He visited China from July, 1922, to May, 1923. He departed from Honolulu bound for Korea on February 16, 1934, and has not re-entered the United States.

Ok Nam Shin

117. The translation indicates that this individual received \$50.00 on March 31, 1932, and \$3.40 on June 9, 1933. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that SHIN, a groceryman, was born in Korea in 1901, came to Honolulu in 1920, and returned to Korea in 1933. He returned to Honolulu in 1938, but went back to Korea shortly thereafter, and has never returned.

Kylsoo Haan

. 118. The following is a list of payments received by this individual, who is usually referred to as Kilsoo HAAN:

May 25, 1936	\$60.00
August 15, 1936	40.00
August 25, 1936	10.00

Chin Ho Tough

119. On May 22, 1933, TOUGH received the sum of \$80.00 from the Consulate. TOUGH (he is known by all the combinations of the above three names) has been the object of suspicion for a considerable period. He entered the Territory in 1931 as a Buddhist priest, but apparently has never practiced his profession. He was educated in Japan. For a while he worked at various military posts as a tailor, and later went into business for himself on the Island of Molokai. He has been very active on the UNITED KOREAN COMMITTEE. When interrogated, TOUGH stated that he had visited the Consulate on only one occasion, that being upon his arrival in 1931 when it was necessary to have his passport stamped.

[28]

OTHER CONSULATE CONTACTS

Ensei (Enjo) Kobayashi

120. On March 15, 1932, KOBAYASHI received \$8.00 from the Consulate. An alien, aged 54, he was a priest of the Jodo sect (Buddhist), a Japanese language school principal, and a *toritsuginin* at Hawi, Kohala, Hawaii, T. H. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and subsequently was interned. He is reported to be at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, and apparently is planning for repatriation to Japan.

Katsuichi Miho

121. MIHO received the sum of \$27.00 from the Japanese Consulate on March 15, 1932. MIHO is a 59-year-old alien. Prior to the war he operated the MIHO HOTEL at Kahului, Maui, T. H., and was a *toritsuginin* for that district. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be interned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Minoru Murakami

122. MURAKAMI received the sum of \$10.00 from the Consulate on March 15, 1932. MURAKAMI, a Japanese alien, formerly employed as a representative for the Nippu Jiji (Honolulu bilingual newspaper), has a long record of pro-Japanese activities and statements. He was taken into custody on December 7, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Apparently he desires to repatriate to Japan.

Masao Sogawa

123. On January 6, 1932, SOGAWA received the sum of \$50.00. He was editor and publisher of the Hawaii Shimpo, a Japanese weekly newspaper published in Honolulu until the outbreak of war. This paper was considered highly pro-Japanese in its sentiments. SOGAWA was taken into custody on December 14, 1941, and is reported to be now interned at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.

Wade Warren Thayer

124. On August 21, 1935, THAYER reportedly received the sum of \$40.00 from the Japanese Consulate. For years, THAYER was attorney for the Japanese Consulate, and was so registered with the Secretary of State. It is not known why this lone entry was found among the expenses of the Korean Intelligence Fund, inasmuch as it is believed that THAYER undoubtedly had some permanent financial arrangements with the Consulate with regard to his legal services.

THE CONSULATE PREPARES FOR WAR

125. Takaichi SAKAI stated that in the summer of 1941 the Consulate began to burn old documents. All the clerks helped in this work, and about the same time, the clerks were paid bonuses each month. The clerks were told not to talk about the fact that documents were being burned almost daily in the back yard of the Consulate. SAKAI could recall no such burning of papers shortly before the war started, although he did observe that the number of visitors to the Consulate from the N. Y. K. Line and from the Yokohama Specie Bank increased greatly in the last two weeks of peace. These visitors sometimes carried handbags with them.

126. Miss Kimic DOUE, former receptionist at the Consulate, remembered that about the middle of November, 1941, two Yokohama Specie Bank officials came to the Consulate and went into Consul General KITA's room, where they stayed for about an hour. One of these men was Nihei MIYAMOTO, submanager of the bank. KITA was not present, and the two men were alone in the room. They asked for a typewriter. Miss DOUE believed that MIYAMOTO and his companion wrote a telegram which they sent under the name of the Consulate. She stated that they had probably done their own coding. She added that, to her knowledge, Torataro ONODA, of the Sumitomo Bank, had never done

this.

127. Ichitaro OZAKI, chauffuer for the Consulate, recalled that in June, 1941, the two yardmen of the Consulate had burned a large number of official appearing books. OZAKI was able to set the month because it was just before his departure for Japan. He was in Japan from June to November, 1941. OZAKI explained that the Consulate was not supposed to keep material longer than 10 years, and every year they accumulated material to burn. OZAKI stated that he helped carry these books from the Vice Consul's office to the yardmen, who would burn them. He estimated that more than 100 publications were thus burned in 1941. The two yardmen who did this burning, Saburo SUMIDA and Rokuro FUKUSHIMA, were repatriated to Japan in 1942 with the Consulate staff. OZAKI stated that he was in Japan when the United States freeze order against Japanese assets went into effect, but he heard that the Consulate burned a considerable amount of material at that time.

128. OZAKI stated that it was his belief that telegrams received from Japan were burned as soon as they were received, or at least within a week. He stated that in the code room of the Consulate was a small brazier, and when papers were burned in this room, he would sometimes notice smoke coming out of the window. He believed that he had seen more smoke coming out of this room after he had returned from Japan (on the last ship, November 1, 1941) than he had prior to his departure. He believed that code room material was burned about once a week. The code room was always cleaned by Saburo SUMIDA. Samon TSUKIKAWA, Consulate secretary in charge of coding, was

always present during this operation.

129. On December 6, 1941, at about 1500, the two yardmen went into the coding room of the Consulate and removed a wheelbarrow full of papers and other [30] material. These they burned in a pit in the yard. OZAKI said that he put out this fire about 1900, just before darkness fell. He noted that everything had been burned. OZAKI said that yard rubbish was being burned all the time, so he was unable to state how often code room material was burned. The incident of December 6th was the only time he actually saw them remove the material from the code room.

130. OZAKI stated that the Consul and Vice Consul had an engagement to play golf with Tsunetaro HARADA on the morning of December 7, 1941. He remembered that MIKAMI's taxi had actually called at the Consulate for the two officials, but by that time guards had been placed around the Consulate. MIKAMI requested the guards to inform OKUDA of his arrival, which they did. However, OKUDA sent back a message that MIKAMI was not to wait because he, OKUDA,

probably would be unable to play golf that day.

131. OZAKI expressed his conviction, based on observations made prior to and subsequent to December 7, 1941, that Consul General KITA had no foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, he insisted that the Consul General had received a telegram from Washington at 0700 on the morning of December 7th. (This was a radiogram from Tokyo, reporting that Japanese-American and Japanese-British relations were strained.) Immediately upon its receipt, KITA had

called TSUKIKAWA, who lived at the Kyoraku Kan Hotel, two blocks from the Consulate grounds, and insisted that the latter come to the Consulate immediately to decode this message. OZAKI stated that he heard of this incident from SEKI about a week or two after the attack. CZAKI stated that TSUKIKAWA was at the Consulate at the time of the attack.

the Consulate at the time of the attack.

132. OZAKI stated that the Consulate staff members were burning papers when
the police arrived on the morning of December 7th. He remembered seeing smoke
come out of the code room window. After the Consulate staff was repatriated
(February, 1942), he went into the code room to clean it. All he saw was a big

tub filled with ashes.

133. KOTOSHIRODO stated that he first heard the noise (of battle) about 0900 on the morning of December 7, 1941, so he walked to the Consulate to find out what all the commotion was about. KITA, OKUDA, SEKI, and TSUKI-KAWA were all there, and appeared to be worried. MORIMURA dropped in a little later with his hair tousled, clothes wrinkled, and in short sleeves. KOTO-SHIRODO heard him remark that it was a "noisy morning". MORIMURA wanted to go up on the heights and see what was going on, but KITA would not allow him to leave the Consulate. KOTOSHIRODO left the Consulate about 1000.

CONSULATE DOMESTICS

134. As was reported in paragraphs 47 and 52 of reference (c), three of the domestics at the Consulate secured their positions through one Toyoki FUJITA, a flower grower. FUJITA was interviewed to determine his connection with the [31] Consulate. FUJITA stated that among other retail florist shops to which he sold his blossoms, was the SERVICE FLORIST, operated by one Tetsuo SHINAGAWA. SHINAGAWA supplied the Consulate with flowers. He secured this account because he is a brother-in-law of Ichitaro OZAKI, Consulate chauffeur, who apparently ordered flowers purchased by the Consulate. FUJITA first met OZAKI when he delivered some plants to the Consulate. On one occasion OZAKI asked FUJITA if the latter knew of a girl who would like to cook at the Consulate. FUJITA secured the services of Yoshie KIKKAWA. (Results of an interview with Miss KIKKAWA are set forth in paragraph 52-54 of reference (c).) Because FUJITA was once successful in securing a domestic, OZAKI asked him for assistance in securing help on two other occasions. FUJITA was able to send to the Consulate Sakae TANAKA, whose interview is set forth in paragraph 55-56 of reference (c), and Kimika ASAKURA, paragraphs 47-51 of reference (c).

JAPANESE NAVY TANKERS

135. Takaichi SAKAI stated that when Japanese naval tankers called at Honolulu, their captain would call at the Consulate and talk for an hour or more with the Consul General or the Vice Consul. Sometimes the captains would leave the Consulate carrying envelopes they did not bring with them. One Ishichi MATSUDA, now in custody, the owner of a grocery store at the old Aala Market, often visited these vessels. He was noted on numerous occcasions by representatives of this office to have carried a mail bag onto the boat. SAKAI explained that MATSUDA would pick up mail being held at the post office pending the arrival of the tankers, and carry it aboard. Presumably this was a labor of love. SAKAI recalled hearing that Japanese navy men sometimes left the tankers here, then sailed aboard a tanker calling at Honolulu at a future date. However, SAKAI could not recall where he had heard this. He further disclaimed all knowledge of what these officers did while in port, or of where they lived while here. (In connection with this topic, see reference (v), paragraphs 42–43.)

TORITSUGININ

136. Takaichi SAKAI stated that the term soryojikan toritsuginin was not accurately translated as "consular agents". He believed the more correct translation to be "Consulate General 'go-between' men". He remembered Vice Consul OKUDA's once expressing the opinion that the toritsuginin were not agents of the Japanese government within the meaning of the United States statute requiring such agents to register with the State Department.

137. It should be remembered that the status of the *toritsuginin* was never clarified by judicial decision. They were "agents" of the Consulate only in a very loose sense of the term. They rarely received remuneration from the Con-

sulate, and their duties apparently were merely routine. Actual military espionage on the part of a toritsuginin has been proven to the satisfaction of this office only in one case, that of Unji HIRAYAMA, subject of reference (1). Economic [32] espionage has been indicated in a number of other cases. However, the basic motive in placing all toritsuginin in custody immediately after the attack of December 7th was the fact that, as a class, they were extremely pro-Japanese, and there is evidence to indicate that they were chosen to be toritsuginin on the basis of their loyalty to Japan. There is scarcely one who was not engaged in a number of pro-Japanese activities in addition to his duties as toritsuginin.

Pending-14ND.

[1] TRIP TO KAUAI

One day in the early part of July, 1941, Morimura told me that he and I will be sent on a trip to Kauai in the near future. Sometime after that Seki told me that he wants to see the island by himself. So it seemed to me then that both of them wanted so much to take a trip. I don't really know how the situation was between them. After several days (few days before we left) Morimura suddenly told me that he is not going and said that I will be sent. After hearing that from Morimura, I asked Seki what has happened. And Seki said that they (Morimura and Seki) had some kind of misunderstandings. I told Seki why he (Seki) himself doesn't go since I was told he wanted to go so much. But Seki said he is not going and told me to take my wife with me. He told me to go and have a good vacation. And then Okuda called me to his desk and told me to go to Kauai with my wife and also told me to see Seki about the money. Seki gave me about \$100, and the following day I went down to the airway company office to buy our tickets. The day before we left Okuda called me at his desk and gave me the following instructions. (1) See the things that could be seen from the highways: (2) Not to talk to anyone: (3) He said that he knew the air field project at the Barking Sand is going on. He told me to see that if it could be seen from outside: (4) See the Lihue airport if there is any improvements: (5) See the Hanalei bay if anything is being done. He said he saw in a newspaper that the U S Navy is planning to use the bay for small boat base: (5) He showed me the geological survey map of Kauai and told me to see the Wainiha power plant. [2] He said that it is the source of power used on Kauai: (6) He showed me a photograph of Port Allen and Nawiliwili harbors. He told me to see any change has been added. He told me to take the usual sightseeing schedule and see what I can see. I called up Nikami on the phone and told him to take us to the airport next morning.

Next morning (I believe it was Saturday in the middle part of July) my wife and I went to the airport in Mikami's car. We left the airport at about 8 a. m. and reached Hanapepe airport at about 9 a. m. I noticed Horikawa was one of the passengers of the same plane. After we reached the Hanapepe airport I happened to see Minatoya (I didn't know him then) and hired him to show us around Then we started out immediately He said the auto fare will be \$25. for the Kokee. I asked him if we can see the Barking Sand. He said we cannot go there in the morning because the Army usually practice bombing there. We went up to the place where tourists usually see the canyon. We got out of the car and stayed there for about 15 minutes, and continued our drive to Kokee and we went as far as the place where there were some residences. Since Minatoya said there isn't anything more to see further up we turned back and came back Minatoya suggested to have our lunch at the Waimea Hotel so we to Waimea. went in and all three of us sat at one table. He then introduced himself and said he is working for some transportation company. He talked about his having brother who is a doctor in Honolulu. We, my wife and I, introduced ourselves too, but I didn't say I was from the consulate. Soon after lunch we left the hotel and started for the Barking Sand. We didn't stopped at anywhere on the way and [3] reached the Barking Sand. We got off the car then walked up the sand hill and tried if the sand really barks. I took a picture of my wife there. I looked from the sand hill if there was any work going on for the air field, but I couldn't see anything at all. Only things I saw were sandy beach and keawe trees. After staying there about 20 minutes and started back the same road to Lihue. On the way back to Lihue, we passed through Kukuiolono park and stopped at the Lawai beach to see the Spouting Horn. And then we rode to

Koloa beach where we got off the car and walked around the sandy beach seeing many human skeletons. After staying there about 20 minutes we rode to Lihue without stopping anywhere. It was about 5 p. m, when we reached the Lihue hotel. We registered there and shown to our room. We had our dinner at the dining hall. After dinner my wife and I thought of going to see some movie so we called up Minatoya on the phone and asked him to take us. He came soon after and we went to the Lihue theatre. We three sat together. I remember the title of the picture was "Strawberry Blonde". After show Minatoya took us back to the hotel. We stayed in our room until we retired. There was some kind of party at the hotel that nite. The following morning Minatoya came to the hotel at about 8 a.m. After breakfast I happened to see Horikawa in the kitchen so I went in just to say hello. I introduced myself and my wife. All he said to us was that "You were on the same plane yesterday morning. Are you on a sight-seeing trip?" Minatoya put the lunch in the car and we started out at about 9 a.m. We went to see the Wailua fall. We didn't go near to the fall but just saw it far from the hill. Then we went to see [4] the Grass shack where we got off the car and saw some old Hawaiian mats, drum and sandals. From there we went to see the Slipery fall. We got off the car and walked down to the fall. After staying there about 15 minutes we started to Hanalei direction. We didn't stopped anywhere before reaching Hanalei where we had our lunch. We ate our lunch in the pavilion. I didn't see anything been done at the bay. After staying there about 45 minutes we started to Haena. On the way I asked the driver if we can see the power plant and he suggested of seeing it on the way back. We went way back we went up the Wainiha valley and went as far as the power plant was. I expected to see something large but All I say were two pipes running down and one small power house building. Without stopping the car we just turned back from there and stopped about ½ mile down on the same road and picked up some mountain apples. After staying there about 15 minutes we started back anddidn't stopped anywhere before we reached Kilauea lighthouse. Minatoya suggested of seeing the lighthouse since it is the largest one in the world. The watchman of the lighthouse came and showed us in to the lighthouse. We climbed the stairs and saw the large lens. I remember we signed our names on the visitors' signature book. From there started back and didn't stopped anywhere before reaching Lihue. On the way to Lihue we went down to Nawiliwili harbor. We didn't got off the car. Minatoya said pointing one office building that was his company We reached Lihue hotel at about 5 p. m. After dinner at the hotel my wife Japanese movie and walked to the theatre. and I thought of going to see [5] I don't remember the name of the theatre, it was very near to the hotel) It happened that night was the bank night at the theatre. After seeing the show we went back to the hotel and retired soon. The following morning Minatoya came at about 8 a. m. we checked out the hotel at about 8:30 a. m. I remember I paid \$20.00 to the hotel. We went straight to the Hanapepe airport. We left the Hanapepe airport at about 9:30 a. m. and reached Rogers airport at about 10 a. m. Mikami met us there and took us home. I took my wife to her shop and went to the consulate. Seki, Morimura and Okuda asked me how was the trip. They asked me if I enjoyed. I said it was fine but I couldn't see much. Seki said it's natural that I didn't see much. He said many things couldn't be seen from the highways. Then Okuda called me at his desk and asked me to tell him what I have seen. I told him I didn't see anything at the barking sand. I told him it was so quiet and I even never seen a plane flying. I told him there wasn't anything at the Hanalei bay. All I noticed was the sea was calm and it was a large bay. He asked me how was the reef of the bay but I said I couldn't see any reefs. told him threr were two pipes running down the mountain at the power plant at Wainiha and one building. He asked me anything more so I said none. I told him there wasn't anything new at the Nawiliwili harbor and Port Allen harbor. I told him at the Lihue airport I didn't see anything but some army tents. I didn't tell him that I talked to Horikawa. Morimura never asked me anything about When I talked with Okuda Morimura was there too. [6] the trip. mura just said "There isn't anything big going on it seems".

On the trip I brought along one tourist map. I didn't bring any letter or notes

to anybody and I didn't bring back anything from anyone to the consulate.

Ост. 1, 1942.

[1] Station JZI Program Date 12/8/41 (Japan Time) Frequency 9535 Kilocycles

With our army and navy entering in a state of war with England and America at dawn of the 8th, an Imperial declaration of war against England and America was announced. Our army and navy, hence, has entered in a state of war with England and America. In regard to this, the Imperial army and navy headquarters at 6 am on the 8th announced that our army and navy entered a state of war with England and America in the Western Peific at dawn today, the 8th. At the same time, the brilliant achivements of our armed forces, too, were announced by the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters, as follows: (1) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today, the 8th made a death-defying raid upon the American naval and air strength in the Hawaiian area. (2) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today sank the British gunboat (sounded like Petrol) and captured the American gunboat (sounded like Nice) at Shanghai. (3) Our Imperial Navy at dawn today raided Singapore and achieved great results. (4) Our imperial Navy at dawn today bombed enemy military establishments at Davao, Wake and Guam. (5) Our Imperial Army, upon entering into a state of war at dawn today, attacked Hongkong. (6) Our Imperial Army, cooperating closely with our Imperial Navy, undertook a landing operation in Malaya at dawn today and is obtaining great results.

Furthermore, according to a Domei dispatch from the front, our imperial air force at eight this morning carried out its first raid on Hongkong and returned safely back to their base. Immediately afterwards, a second raid reportedly

was carried out.

Then, a Domei dispatch from Honolulu reported that our naval air force raided

Honolulu at 7 am Hawaiian time, which is 3:05 am Japan time.

According to an announcement made by the White House, the casualty inflicted by our air force's raid was very great and the oil storage tanks on Guam, which is presently being beseiged by our Imperial Navy, are throwing up large amounts of smoke.

[3] to respond to your will. On behalf of the government and the Army and Navy, we, Hideki and Shigetaro, your subjects, respectfully make this reply. December 8, 1941.

(Signed) Hideki Tojo,

Minister of War.

Shigetaro Shinada,

Minister of Navy.

Since our Army and Navy has started a war against England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, our Government at 7 am today held an emergency session of the cabinet at the premier's residence. Outside of Foreign Minister Togo, all the cabinet ministers were present. Firstly, Minister of Navy Shimada reported the developments of war against England and America and based on this report, the course to be taken by the government was decided, whereupon Premier Tojo called on the Emperor and reported the decision.

According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo reported by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull

According to a Domei dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo reported by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 P. M. on the 7th, 3:30 A. M. of the 8th Japan time, and present our government's official reply to the American note of the 26th. At the same time, Foreign Minister Togo invited American Ambassador to Japan, Grew, to his official residence at 7:30 A. M. today and handed him an official note similar to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7:45 A. M., he invited British Ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him the text of this reply.

Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our government at 11: 45 A. M. today declared war against England and America. At the same time, an order for the convocation of a two days special session of the Diet on the 15th was issued. At the emergency session urgent bills of appropriations and other nature will be presented and, at the same time, the governments policy to cope with the unprecedented emergency is expected to be explained by Premier Tojo and other ministers.

(Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time, 'West wind, clear'." Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.)

broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.)

At 8:30 A. M. today, our government made the Foreign Ministry announce the results of the Japanese-American negotiation and the Japanese-American notes. The announcement made clear the real facts of the effort exerted by our government till the very last minute to preserve the peace of the Pacific. Japan's note to America was an official reply to America's note of the 26th and notified the fact no settlement can be expected even if the negotiation were to be continued. It actually was a final notice

[5] Pacific has been brought about by America and England. It should be definitely stated at this time that President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill has undertaken the Pacific war without consideration of the war's havoc on humanity as one of their program for the domination of the world. In the course of the four and a half years of the China incident, each and every Japanese has shed tears of indignation against England and America's wicked hostile attitude, but has remained patient for the sake of the peace of the Pacific as well as the world. This patience, today has reached its limit. The time has come to rise unitedly and risk the fate of the nation for the cause of righteousness.

At dawn today, December S, the announcement of the Imperial Army and Navy headquarters to the effect that our Imperial Army and Navy will enter a state of war against American and British forces in the Western Pacific at dawn today was made public throughout our country through the radios and newspapers. Every one throughout the country has now further strengthened their determination that the inevitable has at last come and instantaneously, our peace loving idea has been transformed into a determination to punish the evil and cut off the sinister hands of the outrageously wicked England and America; Today, the sky over Japan was clear and devoid of even a speck of cloud and under this blue sky, which seemed to be congratulating the promising future of Japan, who has risen to fight for the establishment of a new order of East Asia as well as of the world just like the brilliant rays of the sun, our excellent air forces, as an indication of our strong air defense, is flying about everywhere! When I received this report that war on the Pacific had broken out, I hurried * * * and on my way, I saw reflected upon the passers-by as well as those working, a hereto unseen expression of seriousness. Then with the issuing of the Imperial decree declaring war at 11:45 A. M., the nation's determination to march forward and support the emperor's will gushed forth. Not long afterwards, Premier Tojo's confident determination of our country was announced over the radio, and, at the same time, the achievements of our Navy, which is carrying on operations against American and British forces from Malaya to Honolulu with an overflowing amount of power as though the Pacific were too small, were reported throughout the nation. Hence, the confidence and spirit to rise against England and America and to secure Asia as the haven of the Asiatic race through the establishment of a new order of the world has been made to flare up within the heart of the people.

The next is a Domei despatch of the 8th from Stockholm, which states that according to a Reuter's despatch of the 7th from Washington, official sources in Washington believe that Germany will declare war against America in the next

24 hours.

At this time, let me again make a weather forecast "West wind, clear." (Repeated this forecast.)

Now, let us broadcast to you the talk of Major General Yoshizumi.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

PREPARED BY THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION, DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

April 20, 1943

FOREWORD

The Counter Intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is charged with counter-espionage responsibility in the Naval Service, recently promulgated a new operating plan, from which the following is extracted:

"In accordance with the new concepts of intelligence and counter intelligence, the Counter Intelligence Section actively seeks primary data and no longer

passively waits for it to be received.

"This aggressive method of operation permits the Navy to detect and combat espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities directed against its war effort before the fact, rather than merely to establish an historical record of facts after the damage is done." (#)

One of the functions of the Counter Intelligence Section is to "delineate patterns of subversive thought and activity." (#) This is likewise a function of the Counter Intelligence Section (B-7) of the District Intelligence Office, Four-

teenth Naval District, which section has prepared the within analysis.

This analysis is intended to present facts and considered opinions pertaining to Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the correlative counter-espionage measures, both before and during this war. In formulating the analysis, deficiencies in existing counter-espionage methods and measures have been noted, and suggestions for the alteration or supplementation of existing methods and measures have been made.

No attempt has been made to analyze the related topics of sabotage and countersabotage. This analysis has been confined simply to espionage and counterespionage, with only the necessary incidental introduction of other intelligence

subjects.

Attention is invited to Appendix "A", which sets forth references to much of the source material pertaining to facts and opinions included in this analysis, and which particularly shows the sources of all quotations set forth herein.

A statement or paragraph footnoted to Appendix "A" is indicated by the symbol

"(#)" at the end of the documented portion.

Particular places on the Island of Oahu which are mentioned in the analysis can be seen with reference to one another by consulting the map attached as Appendix "B".

The within analysis perhaps will be revised at a later date to include relevant facts hereafter discovered. Criticisms and suggestions are therefore especially

requested.

I. H. MAYFIELD, Captain, U. S. Navy, District Intelligence Officer.

Distribution:

O. N. I.—Copies Nos. 1-10 Com 14—Copy No. 11 CinCPac—Copy No. 12 DIO-14ND—Copies Nos. 13-50 Copies handed to Col. Twitty C

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S-E-C-R-E-T

AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE ESPIONAGE PROBLEM IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This analysis is predicated upon the premise that accurate knowledge of the United States naval and military activities in the Hawaiian Islands (and particularly those in and around the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor) is of inestimable value to Japan. It may not be an overstatement to say that no single place in the world is of greater interest to Japanese naval leaders.

2. It is assumed that Japan, many years ago having foreseen the possibility of war with the United States, and fully realizing the importance of Pearl Harbor as a naval base, had arranged for an adequate espionage system to

operate in Hawaii during wartime.

3. It is believed that Japan has, over a period of more than 30 years, collected complete information concerning the geography and hydrography of the Hawaiian Islands, and has studied the military and naval necessities arising therefrom.

(See paragraph 81.)

4. At the present time, Japan is assumed to be primarily interested in the offensive, as distinguished from defensive, strength of forces of the United States based in or from Hawaii. The specific matters of interest to the enemy, in what is judged to be their present order of importance, are:

(a) Departures and arrivals of Naval task forces and units, and the disposition

of Naval units in Pearl Harbor and in other Hawaiian ports and waters.

(b) Status of readiness and repair of Naval units, and specifically, information

concerning damage to vessels and estimated time of repairs.

- (c) Character and strength of Marine forces in Hawaii, and particularly, departures of Marine forces.
 - (d) Movements of military aircraft from and to the Hawaiian area.

[2] (e) Movements of merchantmen and troop convoys.

(f) Military and air strength of the Hawaiian Islands, particularly Oahu,

and specifically, new airfield construction.

5. In any event, the matter of primary interest to Japan is the offensive strength and disposition of United States Naval forces in these Islands. If this assumption be correct, it is accurate to state that any Japanese espionage organization now operating in the Hawaiian Islands is primarily concerned with reporting naval information.

[3] II. FACTORS REQUIRED IN THE OPERATION OF A WARTIME ESPIONAGE SYSTEM

6. An espionage system functioning in hostile territory in wartime is of necessity much more carefully set up than its peacetime predecessor. The restrictions imposed in wartime by the creating of new restricted areas, additional patrolling of vital installations, the invoking of censorship, and the promulgation of curfew, blackout, and alien control regulations all contribute to the situation. New means of communication with the enemy overseas must be put into operation; previously untapped sources of information must finally be utilized; agents possibly "uncovered" prior to the war, because of their known proximity to military and naval installations, their alien status, or their contact with known enemy centers or agents, must be discarded.

7. It is believed that any espionage organization functioning in the Territory of Hawaii in wartime must consider and balance the following factors to pro-

duce a workable equation:

(A) Security

8. It is axiomatic that any espionage group in enemy territory must remain undetected to continue proper functioning. It must provide maximum security for the organizational nucleus, sacrificing, if necessary, less important members to preserve the heart and brains of the system. Only the most necessary risks must be taken in gathering information and communicating the same to Japan. Agents of the espionage system should be known to one another only to the extent absolutely necessary, limiting so far as possible the ability of one agent to expose the whole system. Agents who have no need to know each other should not know each other. In short, a strict echelon system should be maintained, with each agent knowing only the superior to whom he reports and the operative or operatives he directs.

(B) Mobility

9. There must be sufficient mobility of the espionage group to permit the ready collection and transmission of information, as well as to allow the necessary intercourse among agents of the group. This requires that movements of agents be unobtrusive, often necessitating the careful selection of pretexts. It must be anticipated in advance of war that movements in certain vital areas [4] the Honolulu waterfront) will be restricted in war-(for example, time. Hence, plans must be well laid to maintain the espionage organization normal mobility in such areas.

10. Therefore, the espionage agents must be able to reach without apparent effort all information within public view, and to have other information brought to them by "insiders," as far as is possible. Such mobility obviates the necessity

of information-gathering agents having to expose themselves as such.

(C) Flexibility

11. Wartime conditions are inherently unstable and unpredictable. The continued functioning of an espionage organization often may depend upon its ability to adapt itself to changing conditions. Proper security measures taken to prevent and detect espionage can be overcome only by a highly adaptable espionage organization—one which is prepared to use Caucasian agents as well as Orientals, women as well as men, and agents "planted" inside vital areas as well as those mingling with the general public outside.

12. It must reasonably have been anticipated by Japan that war with the United States in all probability would cause the Hawaiian Islands to be put under martial law, the exact nature of whose application could hardly have been anticipated. That the enemy, Japan, have a highly adaptable wartime espionage

system was therefore particularly required in Hawaii.

(D) Simplicity

13. It is a basic requirement that the espionage organization should be as simple as possible. Simplicity makes for security and efficiency in such an organization. Too elaborate an organization is likely to place various portions of the mechanism at the whim of uncontrollable outside factors, as well as increase the likelihood that if one agent is discovered and "talks," the whole system will be exposed.

(E) Deception

14. As a means of achieving security, mobility, flexibility, and simplicity in its operations, the espionage organization must employ deception generally, as well [5] as in specific operations. Its agents must, in the main, be discharge their duties casually and without apparent illegality. Transfers of money necessary for the running of the organization must not arouse suspicion. The existence of a "front," possibly in the guise of a legitimate business house, is therefore necessary to afford cover to many of the activities of the espionage group. How a business "front" could be utilized will be noted later. (Paragraphs 142-146).

III. FUNCTIONS OF AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM [6]

15. For the purposes of this analysis, the functions of an espionage system operating in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime are assumed to be:

(a) Collection of information;

(b) Evaluation of information;

(e) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination.

(A) Collection of information

16. In the Hawaiian area, information of value to the enemy can be collected by any or all of the following methods, which vary in risk, according to the circumstances indicated:

(1) Observation

17. From the Naval standpoint, the most important island of the Hawaiian group is Oahu, and unfortunately the geography of Oahu is such that observation of the movements of Naval vessels cannot be prevented. The arrival and departure of ships at Pearl Harbor in the daytime is visible, to anyone interested, from a number of places not in any restricted area and where the presence of an observer would not arouse suspicion. For example, every vessel entering or leaving Pearl Harbor by daylight can readily be seen (and by a trained observer, identified as to type and class) from many buildings in downtown Honolulu.

18. The number and type of ships in Pearl Harbor, whether in drydock, at berths, or at moorings, can be determined with a high degree of accuracy by anyone living on, or visiting, Aiea Heights, which overlooks Pearl Harbor. The fact that a field glass is required in aid of such observation is but a small obstacle.

19. It is known that employees of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, who were designated to observe and report on arrivals and departures of Naval units at Pearl Harbor, and the number of vessels there, prior to the outbreak of war, did much of their observing from Aiea Heights and areas nearer to Pearl Harbor, but at a lower elevation. (#) Likewise, many Japanese naval officers who visited Honolulu in recent years made sightseeing trips to Aiea Heights and the environs of Pearl Harbor. (#) It is also known that [7] at least one of the two-man Japanese submarines that participated in the attack on Oahu, on December 7, 1941, had aboard a panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor, which later was found to have been photographed from Aiea Heights—not by an espionage agent, but by a commercial photographer, who sold prints thereof openly in Honolulu. (#)

20. There are many ways, less direct than those noted above, where acute and intelligent observations will reveal information concerning Fleet dispositions. The number of officers and men on leave in Honolulu often will provide a clue to the number and identity of Fleet units in port. Where officers or men who maintain residences in Honolulu are known to be attached to a given ship, an observer will be able to state with reasonable certainty that if a certain officer or man

is at home in Honolulu, his ship is in port and not at sea.

21. Thus, unless the observer enters a restricted area without right, or uses visual or photographic equipment whose use is illegal, his activities in collecting information of naval value by observation alone can easily go wholly undetected.

(2) "Loose talk" and rumors

22. No matter how extensive a campaign may be to prevent "loose talk" and rumor-mongering concerning military and naval subjects, it seems impossible to restrain either entirely. Since much of what passes as rumor often contains germs of truth, the trained enemy agent, referring what he hears to a competent evaluator, can make this a profitable source of information for the enemy. Many stories—for example, the sinking of the aircraft carriers LEXINGTON, YORK-TOWN, and WASP, and the impending Battle of Midway—were common gossip in Honolulu before official announcement of the facts.

23. "Loose talk" is of two types—that which is offered gratuitously, and that which is "pumped" from one having knowledge of the facts. The distinction is obvious and is especially important in the operation of the espionage organization

from the standpoint of risk.

(3) "Pumping"

24. This type of information-gathering consists of eliciting facts from the possessor thereof, by pretext, use of force, or sensuous or intoxicating inducement. The [8] person imposed upon does not consciously and willingly betray his trust, but may be brought to do so by the enemy agent's use of force, misrepresentation, or proffer of food and drink, narcotics, or women. (#)

(4) "Inside" information

25. This is the type of information generally bought and paid for by the enemy agent, who need not (and generally cannot) obtain the information himself, but who commissions someone else to provide him with the information. Unless, however, the espionage organization has developed a source of "inside" information prior to the outbreak of war, it may find it difficult to do thereafter because of the extreme risk involved in approaching a person with a proposition that he commit treason in wartme. (#)

26. There is no evidence that any person in a position of military or naval trust in the Hawaiian Islands, either before or during this war, has supplied information to enemy agents. However, history teaches that vigilance against

treason must be maintained.

(5) "Planted" agents

27. As distinguished from the traitor already in a place of trust who sells information to the enemy, a "plant" is an agent installed in a place of confidence (usually within a restricted area) who himself gathers all available information of value to the enemy. Less valuable and less likely to be used, but possible, is a person (for example, a domestic) "planted" in the home of any military, naval, or civilian official likely to have considerable knowledge of vital information.

28. Less likely to be found, but not to be dismissed, is the possibility of enemy agents using "planted" mechanical devices for the gathering of important infor-Telephone wires over which vital information is transmitted may be Microphones may be arranged in conference rooms and offices.

(6) Overt criminal action

29. Unable to secure desired information by any of the foregoing methods, the enemy espionage organization may resort to actions more easily detected, and therefore carrying a greater risk. Among the more direct methods would be murder, assault, forgery, burglary, and larceny (to secure [9] writings, maps, charts, and code books) and perjury, impersonation, and trespass (to secure entry to restricted areas). Murder and arson might be indulged in to destroy the evidence of other crimes incident to espionage activity.

30. It is believed, however, that under present conditions in Hawaii, it is unnecessary for the enemy to resort to overt criminal activity to carry out its

espionage mission here.

(B) Evaluation of information

31. Since, as will be discussed below, the chief obstacle confronting an espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime is that of communicating information to Japan, it is desirable that all information collected by enemy agents be evaluated and digested locally as far as possible, so as to provide the shortest possible messages for transmission, whatever the means of communica-

tion may be.

32. While before the war broke out the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, was able to send lengthy intelligence reports and newspaper articles to Japan in the consular pouch, and was able to send encrypted radiograms and cablegrams without undue limit of length, it is assumed that the transmission of information to Japan is at the present time sufficiently difficult to prohibit the sending by most means of any great volume of information without great risk of detection. (#)

33. Therefore, it is believed necessary that the enemy have a competent evaluator (or evaluation unit) in the Hawaiian Islands, so that all available information can be digested to its important essentials. This presupposes one or more individuals highly intelligent and trained in military and naval

subjects.

34. It is also believed likely that the chief evaluator of the espionage organization will be found to be the principal organizer and primary directive force of the group.

(C) Communication of information to the effective enemy destination

(1) General considerations

35. In executing its ultimate function—that of communicating vital information to the enemy—the espionage organization, in all probability, exposes itself to a far greater risk than it does in discharging its other functions..

36. It is quite possible that more than one means of transmission of information is used. In general, it may be said that the more rapid types of communication involve the most risk, and that the sender will, therefore, use such means only when the value of data transmitted justifies the assumption of the greater risk.

37. "Spot news," such as the departures of a Naval task force, Marine force, bomber squadron, or a convoy, would merit the most speedy means of communi-Such intelligence obviously would lose its value if delayed too long

in reaching the effective enemy destination.

38. On the other hand, more "durable" information, such as that concerning new construction (airfields, hangars, and ammunition dumps, for example), relating to conditions of a static and permanent nature, would be of value to the enemy even if delayed months in reaching Japan.

39. It must also be noted that certain information may be unsuitable for transmission telegraphically, and may have to be transmitted manually. Articles such as maps, charts, ordnance, or a bomb sight are of greatest value to the enemy only if received intact.

40. Certain information, although capable of telegraphic transmission, may be so lengthy as to make anything other than manual transmission impracticable and dangerous. Detailed intelligence monographs and stolen code books

would be examples.

41. The problem of transmission of information has been thoroughly considered, chiefly for the reason that it is believed that there is more likelihood of discovering the enemy's espionage organization through its communication facilities than in any other way. The organization exposes itself most openly when exercising its communication function. The possible ways in which it is thought that enemy agents might send information from here so as to directly or ultimately reach Japan, are the following:

(2) Shore-to-ship contact

42. Under this heading, there are a number of different methods by which communication between an enemy agent in the Hawaiian Islands and enemy submarine off shore can be effected. While there is no conclusive proof that such communication has existed during the war or immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, there are two significant [11] facts which strongly suggest the possibility:

(a) It has been learned since the outbreak of war that the local Consulate had a plan for signalling by various means from the islands of Oahu and Maui. This plan emphasized visual signalling from the windward coast of Oahu, presumably

to submarines. (#)

(b) Since the outbreak of war, enemy submarines have appeared off various of the Hawaiian Islands, at night and close to shore. Evidence that such craft have appeared close off windward Oahu at various times is strong. However, enemy submarines have not engaged in combat activity in that area, nor could they have effected reconnaissance of United States Fleet units there (since that sea area is off the regular sea lanes and at the opposite side of Oahu from Pearl Harbor). It therefore appears that with the presence of enemy submarines off windward Oahu should be associated the possibility that they were there to receive communications from, or send them to, enemy agents on shoremore likely the former—or to make physical contact with agents on shore. (See paragraphs 47–48.)

(a) Blinker-tube signalling

43. The hills rising sharply from the shores of the Hawaiian Islands contain many natural signal positions. These hills are cut my many deep valleys, most of which open almost directly into the sea, rather than into plains lying between the main mountain ranges and the sea. A blinker-tube signalling device (easily improvised from a flashlight and a cylindrical tube, pipe, or can) operated from one of the valleys and brought to bear upon a prearranged sea area cannot be seen unless the observer is on an almost direct bearing with the tube.

44. Since the outbreak of war, local intelligence offices have received many

44. Since the outbreak of war, local intelligence offices have received many reports concerning suspicious lights, flashes, and flares—some well inland, some on land near the sea, and some off shore. In the many cases investigated, no instance of signalling to the enemy has been established, but neither liave all

cases been satisfactorily explained.

[12] 45. The killing of Gichiro UYENO, a Japanese alien by an Army sentry at Waimanalo (windward Oahu) shortly before midnight, July 25, 1942, is worthy of particular note. UYENO was discovered close to a machine-gun emplacement on the beach. Several times challenged by the sentry, UYENO failed to make himself known and took flight, whereupon the sentry shot him. While attempting to flee, YENO discarded a flashlight which he had been carrying. Examination of the flashlight indicated that it had once been "blacked out" with colored cellophane, but that the cellophane had been removed. According to available evidence, UYENO previously had always been in his quarters at a private home (where he was employed as a yard caretaker) by 8:00 o'clock each night, complying with the Military Governor's curfew for aliens. He was a recluse, but considered sane.

46. At the time he was first seen near the machine-gun emplacement, UYENO was approximately 400 yards from his quarters, in a place he had no legitimate

reason to be. He was abroad at night in violation of the Military Governor's order, was illegally in the vicinity of military emplacements, was carrying an unblacked flashlight (though unlighted), and failed to heed the sentry's challenges. In those circumstances, it is reasonable to say that UYENO knew he was risking death. The probability is that his mission at the time justified assuming that risk. It is conceivable that UYENO was proceeding to, or returning from, a point of vantage from which signalling would have been, or was, accomplished with the use of the undimmed flashlight. In this connection, it is relevant to quote the following entries from the log of the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, for July 26, 1942:

"0040 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus): Several 'Radar' plots indicate a strange surface vessel (or surfaced submarine) off Kaneohe Bay

"0045 Ph. from For'd Echelon (Lt. Porteus): Reports that a guard at Bellows Field shot and killed a Japanese man; CO asked to identify him."

The deceased Japanese later was identified as UYENO. The place where he was shot was approximately ten miles, on a straight line, from Kaneohe Bay. (#) 47. It is relevant to observe that during the latter [13] part of July, 1942, considerable suspicious offshore activity was noted in the windward

Oahu area, near the Naval Air Station, Kaneobe Bay. The following is a recipitulation of events, as related by a highly reliable informant:

On the first appearance in the last week of July, 1942, the Japanese submarine was seen to be sending signals toward the shore by means of blinker. The submarine was located at this time near the entrance of Kanehoe Harbor just off the Mokapu peninsula. On its second appearance, probably July 26, 1942, the submarine was fired on by the shore batteries with no effort. On its next appearance, July 27, 1942, it was reported that all shore batteries had fired on the enemy submarine, with at least one shot hitting its mark. The submarine retired to a position behind Moku Manu island. This position rendered safety to the vessel since it is characterized by two cliffs which rise from the water on either side of the channel between the two islands. The submarine's position in this channel rendered it impossible for direct shots to be thrown at it. It was also understood that airplanes took off to drop bombs on the submarine, but because of conditions, were unable to make satisfactory runs.

Coincident with the retiring of the submarine on this latter date, the figure of a man was seen to be swimming in the channel in Kanehoe Bay, energing from the water close to the old Navy Pier, Kahaluu landing, which is near Koolau. A company of soldiers was dispatched to head this individual off, but because of the nature of the terrain, which is characterized by swamp and heavy underbrush, he was able to evade this group. Footprints inspected

showed that this man was wearing rubber-soled shoes. (#)

In connection with the foregoing report must be considered the following memorandum, dated July 30, 1942, from the Intelligence Unit, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay:

"For the past several months the U. S. Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, has been menaced by attack from enemy submarines. Numerous radar plots of such submarines have been recorded and our aircraft, destroyers, and coast artillery have been brought into action against enemy [14] submarines as recently as July 27, 1942."

48. More recently, similar enemy activity has been apparent off Kaneohe Bay. On April 15, 1943, the District Intelligence Officer received the following report

from the same Intelligence Unit:

"On the night of April 6, 1943, in addition to radar contacts, the station crash boats, in search of survivors from a plane crash in the area outside of Kaneohe Bay, saw an object identified as a submarine conning tower.

(There were no such friendly craft in this area at this time.)

"At 1100 on April 10, 1943, planes from the Naval Air Detachment, NAS, Kaneohe, saw a submarine off Kahuku Point, (later identified as enemy), break surface and shortly, on his approach, submerge. At 2100 that same evening radar contacts were made off Kaneohe. Bay, bearing 345°, range 7000 yards. At 2200 the station gun batteries illuminated with star shells and fired upon the conning tower of a submarine, range 7000 yards, bearing 342°, proceeding rapidly to bearing 345° when it submerged.

"On April 11, 1943, a plane was dispatched from this station to search for an enemy submarine observed off the northeast coast of Maui."

49. Sight, sonic, and radar plots of enemy submarines and unidentified objects off windward Oahu (particularly in the area off Waimanalo to Kaneohe Bay) have been recorded during the war. These usually have been at night. These facts, together with the incidents involving UYENO and the unidentified swimmer in Kaneohe Bay, cast the highest degree of suspicion upon the windward Oahu region. The coincidence of several such events in the last week of July, 1942, coupled with particularly active suspected enemy submarine activity at that time, makes the situation doubly noteworthy. It is clearly possible that signalling to enemy craft has been, and still is, carried on in that region. Further, the possibility of actual physical contact between enemy submarines and enemy agents on shore is apparent.

(b) Personal contact.

50. The waters and beaches of much of the coastal areas [15] of the Hawaiian Islands are such that a reasonably good swimmer can swim from the beach to a submarine, or vice versa. This provides the enemy with a method not only of receiving written, graphic, pictorial, and oral information from shore, but of putting ashore instructions, equipment, and new personnel for use by the espionage organization.

51. The landing of Nazi saboteurs on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and a spy in Canada, and the report referred to in paragraph 47, above, illustrate the possibilities of effecting physical contact with shore. (#) With even greater ease, enemy agents can be landed or picked up on islands of the Hawaiian

group other than Oahu.

52. Before the war, there was speculation as to whether Hawaiian fishing sampans (largely manned by alien Japanese) might be making contact with Japanese vessels in or near the Hawaiian area for subversive purposes. Such meetings were never proved. (#) Contacts of local sampans with enemy vessels are not likely at present, due to the strict patrolling of all such craft in Hawaiian waters and the limited distance from shore within which they must operate. Furthermore, persons of Japanese ancestry are no longer allowed to fish in boats off shore.

(c) Sonic devices

53. Sonic equipment for underwater signalling is mentioned as a possible, though not probable, means of communication between enemy agents in small craft in Hawaiian waters and submerged enemy submarines. The latter, of course, carry sonic signalling apparatus as standard equipment.

(d) Water caches

54. The coastal areas of the Hawaiian Islands in some places have shelves outside the reefs, the shelves being at relatively shallow depths. This is true to a large extent of the Weimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area and the north shore of Oahu. For many years it has been the practice of local fishermen (many of whom are alien Japanese) to lay fish traps in those waters without buoys or markers attached, later picking them up by dragging or diving. The waters in which this type of fishing has been practiced are in many cases deep enough to permit a submarine to navigate close to shore, where it could recover a cache.

[16] (e) Land caches

55. There are a dozen or more small islands or rocks off windward Oahu, varying in height above the sea from 20 to 360 feet. Several lie parallel to the shoreline and are long enough to conceal a submarine off shore from the view of observers on shore. Several lie in the Waimanalo-Kaneohe Bay area. Espionage agents from shore could visit such islands or rocks with comparative security and leave intelligence pouches in prearranged places, such pouches to be later picked up by enemy submarines.

56. The use of land and water caches as a means of transferring information of any type to the enemy has a singular advantage over many of the other means of communication. Where caches are used, the transmitter can choose the time of day most appropriate to the performance of his task, and the recipient can do likewise. The times of their respective actions need not, and probably would

not, be the same.

(3) Radio

57. The use of this means of communication would be highly desirable to the enemy espionage organization, from the standpoint of rapidity of communication, but involves a high degree of risk. By radio, information could be sent directly to Japan, or, with less power, to Japanese stations in the Mandated Islands or to enemy surface units or submarines considerably closer to the Hawaiian Islands, for re-transmission.

58. Properly used, however, this method of communication could give the sender a fair degree of security, taking into consideration the following safeguards or

operating procedures:

(a) Transmissions on a given frequency to be of short duration;

(b) Varying frequencies to be used;

(c) Use of a mobile transmitter, hidden in a truck or automobile;

(d) Use of frequency modulation;

(e) Use of directional transmitting antenna;

(f) Use of ultra-high frequencies.

[17] 59. In this work, small sets operating only with a key could be used. It is known that Japanese landing forces in the Orient have used portable ultrahigh frequency field sets only 8" x 8" x 10" in size. By using the transmitter carefully, changing frequencies rapidly, and employing mobile equipment, a maximum degree of protection against detection could be achieved.

60. Frequency modulation transmissions would be chiefly of value in this work for its freedom from detection by ordinary (that is, amplitude modulation) receivers. Frequency modulation transmission in the higher frequencies is reported to have a service range of about twice the distance from the point of transmission to the horizon. Thus, a transmitter located at an elevation of 500

feet could send to an enemy submarine almost 30 miles away. (#)

61. In conjunction with frequency modulation or other type of transmission, the use of a directional antenna would greatly improve the security of the espionage activity by limiting the area within which monitoring equipment, fixed or mobile, would be able to intercept signals. Directional transmission in the higher frequencies, with their limited service ranges, would be used to best advantage with a fixed rather than mobile transmitter.

62. A strong objection to the use of radio is the unsatisfactory equation between the operator's vulnerability and his importance to the espionage organization. His technical skill would be a great asset, yet during periods of transmission

he world be the most exposed member of the organization.

63. Other than an unidentified message intercepted by an Army radio unit on the morning of December 7, 1941 (following the attack on Oahu), which message was partly in German and partly unintelligible, and which reported in a very general way the damage caused by the Japanese attack, there has come to the attention of this office no instance of communication by radio from the Hawaiian Islands to the enemy. (#)

64. However, in line with what should always be the basic operating premise of the counter-espionage agent—to assume the worst and work against it—it must be assumed that the enemy has carried on radio communication from these Islands. On January 10, 1942, the senior FCC representative in Hawaii wrote:

[18] "It is generally believed and logical to assume that radio is being used to convey information to the enemy in this area. The fact that no illegal operation has been discovered here to date means that the enemy is clever and that there is inadequate radio coverage. . ." (#)

After specifying the existing monitoring facilities and requesting additional equipment and personnel, the same writer believed that FCC would still be unable to cover the field completely, saying:

". . . Those recommendations constitute a practical compromise with the requirements for theoretically perfect coverage."

On January 16, 1942, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation wrote:

"In regard to present conditions in the Hawaiian Islands, it is apparent that illicit shortwave radio transmissions are being sent from clandestine stations operating in the islands themselves, in communication with mobile units of the Japanese Navy, through which intelligence information is being reported to the enemy. . ." (#)

65. Opinion is divided as to whether the enemy espionage organization would use radio as a frequent and usual means of communication with Japan, or use it

only in the rarest and most urgent cases. The answer to the question will depend directly upon the amount of risk apparently involved in such transmission and upon the suitability of other, less risky means of communication. Fixed and mobile FCC monitoring stations in the Hawaiian Islands maintain a constant watch for suspicious radio signals, and constitute a serious threat to any illicit sender. However, it is believed that such monitoring is not, and could not be, complete. Transmissions in the higher frequencies from certain portions of the island of Oahu cannot be received at certain other parts of the island. Emanations from a high-frequency transmitter located in a valley formed by sharply rising mountains usually might only be received within the valley or beyond its entrances, the mountains acting as a shield against lateral transmission. Using a directional antenna with a transmitter so situated, the field of interceptability could further be reduced, eliminating almost entirely the possibility of interception by at least the fixed monitoring stations.

[19] (4) Commercial radio station transmissions

66. In the Consulate communications plan already referred to (paragraph 42 (a)), this type of communication was provided for—a radio want ad offering for sale a Chinese rug was to mean that several aircraft carriers had left Pearl Harbor; one advertising a complete chicken farm for sale, that all aircraft carriers had sailed; and, one offering to employ a beauty operator, that the whole battle force had sailed. If used, these transmissions were to have been sent over Radio KGMB, Honolulu, at about 9:45 o'clock on any morning. No such advertisements were in fact ever placed.

67. Such a method of code transmission is entirely feasible, although normally there would be a delay of at least a day in reporting information in this manner, since Honolulu radio stations generally require that advertising copy be submitted at least the day before it is broadcast. Commercial radio transmissions of KGU and KGMB, Honolulu, while probably not to be heard at all hours of the day in the Mandated Islands probably could be heard there at night. Daytime broadcasts could be heard by Japanese vessels cruising between there and

the Hawaiian Islands, and by them be relayed to Japan.

68. The type of code to be used in conjunction with radio advertising would be simple to conceive and should create no suspicion in the minds of censors or the public, because it would use only words well known to the trade of the advertiser. The use of nouns representing trade names or products would be stressed in this code, to escape the effects of any ordinary paraphrasing that censors or radio station operators might impose. An internal indicator could be used to differentiate ordinary advertisements from those intended to convey information to the enemy.

69. While the use of spot ads of the type mentioned in the Consulate communications plan would arouse suspicion at the present time, it should be mentioned that there are a considerable number of commercial firms (some of them operated by Japanese aliens) who regularly advertise over the local commercial radio stations, and have done so since before the war. One of these firms might well be a "front" whose radio advertising could be used to transmit code

messages.

[20] (5) Trans-Pacific and inter-island radio telephone; radiograms

70. These means are grouped together because they each are interceptable by the enemy. There is good evidence that trans-Pacific telephone communications between Hawaii and California can be intercepted in Japan, but whether they are intelligible there depends on whether the Japanese have a suitable inverter ("unscrambler"). As to all of these means, however, sound counter-espionage practice requires that it be assumed that the Japanese can intercept such communications and render them intelligible.

71. Where these means are used to transmit information directly to an intercept station, a simple code similar to that which could be used in radio advertising would be appropriate. Here, again, the use of a business house as a "front" would add security for the espionage organization. Examination of trans-Pacific telephone censorship extracts indicates that many such calls are of a business nature, and involve conversations concerning products and bearing products.

nature, and involve conversations concerning products and brand names.

72. In addition, these means can be used for the purpose of communicating directly with other Japanese espionage agents, on the Mainland. Their use for that purpose would be essentially the same as the use of commercial cable, air mail, regular mail, and courier, which are discussed below.

(6) Cablegrams

73. Assuming the existence of Mainland "post offices" to which intelligence messages might be sent, the use of commercial cable as a means of getting vital information out of the Hawaiian Islands is quite feasible. This practice presupposes the existence of an information relay system, whose task it would be to re-route the information through any of many possible channels to an Axis country or to an Axis agent in a neutral state, for relay to Japan.

74. This method of communication requires only a simple code, perhaps of as few as 100 words and numerals, together with code designations for geographical sections on a grid map. If this means of communication were used often, several codes could be used to avoid the possibility of detection through repetition of

the same code words.

75. Although the use of cablegram eliminates to some extent the time lag incident to transmissions by air mail [21] and ordinary mail, there are some obstacles interposed by censorship, inasmuch as the immediate censor might take a fancy to paraphrase a message or suppress it entirely (in which case the sender would not necessarily be notified). However, it is believed that the use of proper codes, especially designed to avoid censorship and the effect of paraphrase, would make this a useful means of communication.

(7) Air mail; ordinary mail; parcel post; cargo; railway express

76. These media of transmission have several advantages not possessed by some of those previously discussed: First, the permitting of transmission of bulkier reports, in more detailed and more secure code; second, the opportunity for use of secret inks, grids, and other hidden writings; third, the transmission of maps, charts, plans, and other matter that must be represented graphically or pictorially, rather than verbally; and fourth, the transmission of physical objects of intelligence value, and written reports that have been reproduced on microfilm.

77. The great time lag between the happening of an event and the time a report of it reaches the effective enemy designation by one of the above means is the most serious disadvantage here. However, certain durable information (for example, that relating to the location of new airfields, drydocks, ammunition dumps, and especially the estimated dates of completion of construction in pro-

gress) would be only slightly diminished in value if so transmitted.

(8) Courier

78. The use of agents who are officers or crewmen of commercial airlines or the merchant marine has been suggested. (#) Such means would possess two advantages: First, in allowing the transmission of information by word of mouth;

and second, the handling of physical objects.

79. However, because of the vagaries of merchant marine sailing these days, an agent on a certain ship could not be expected to call at Honolulu regularly. This would necessitate having couriers on a large number of vessels, requiring the espionage organization to become too large in proportion to the benefits to be gained by the use of couriers. Also, the factor of time required in such transmission is an additional adverse condition. It is much more likely that officers or crewmen of Pan American Airways, whose clippers make fairly regular trips between Hawaii and California, or [22] other commercial airlines, would be sought to act as couriers.

(9) Carrier pigeon

80. Simply because it might be used for the carriage of information between islands of the Hawaiian group, this possibility is mentioned. However, it is considered relatively insecure, and perhaps vain, since inter-island mails are not censored and can therefore be used to better advantage than homing pigeons.

[23] IV. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII PRIOR TO THE WAR

(A) Type of information collected

·81. An alien Japanese internee, who claims to have engaged in espionage for Japan in Hawaii 30 years ago, has stated that Japan started its espionage coverage of the Hawaiian Islands shortly after the Russo-Japanese War. (#) Initial study is said to have been made of the geography, topography, and hydrography of the Islands, so that by World War I, Japan had a rather complete compilation of all basic data concerning those subjects.

82. As indicated in Paragraph 19, the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, was particularly interested in the movements of United States Naval vessels in and out of Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence that such movements were especially watched and reported by the Consulate prior to the summer of 1940. This probably is accounted for by the fact that until that time the status of relations between the United States and Japan did not demand such reporting and that up to that time Fleet movements were publicized in the press.

83. Of particular importance to the Consulate in 1941 was information concerning new airfields in the Islands. Persons attached to the Consulate travelled to the islands of Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii particularly to look for new airfield construction, while new fields on Oahu were constantly sought. (#) The importance of such information is readily apparent when one considers the

attack of December 7, 1941.

84. Arrivals of new air squadrons and troops to strengthen Hawaii's defenses in 1941, and the passing through Honolulu of men and materiel destined for China, also were closely watched and reported by the Consulate to Tokyo. (#)

85. Data concerning beaches, reefs, anchorages, tides and currents, and the like, undoubtedly were gathered chiefly by alien Japanese fishermen who almost exclusively manned Hawaii's sampan fishing fleet. Those beaches most suitable for enemy landing operations were closely studied, both by Consulate personnel and visiting Japanese naval officers on sightseeing trips.

86. The Consulate is also known to have been interested, but to a lesser degree, in the waterfront facilities on the four main islands; and, in the case of Kauai, the electric powerhouse at Wainiha was the object of scrutiny by a member [24] of the Consulate staff sent to the Island of Kauai for

that purpose in July, 1941. (#)

(B) Personnel

87. Upon the basis of known facts, persons who have engaged in espionage in the Hawaiian Islands for the benefit of Japan may be classified as (a) officials, (b) agents, and (c) volunteers. For instant purposes, Consulate staff members, employees, and toritsuginin ("go-betweens," popularly called "consular agents") are denominated officials. Other local residents—the self-appointed spies—are classed as volunteers.

88. It is believed that the Vice Consul, at Honolulu, was ex officio responsible for the conduct of espionage operations of the Consulate. Certain Consulate secretaries (alien Japanese) and one local-born clerk (a dual citizen) are known to have collected military and naval information for the Consulate, in each instance reporting their finding to the Vice Consul. In another instance, a consular agent who was a Buddhist priest at Lahaina, Maui, was called upon by the Vice Consul to report the movements of the Fleet at Lahaina Roads, (#)

Other consular agents were asked to report economic matters.

89. When interrogated after the outbreak of war, the local-born Consulate clerk above referred to stated that he had heard one Consulate secretary (who also was engaged in espionage in Honolulu) state that it was Japan's policy to maintain two espionage systems in countries abroad—one system run by consulates, and the other separate from the consulates and entirely unknown to them. Whether any such extra-consulate espionage system was active in the Hawaiian Islands is not known. The difference in functions of the two systems was said to be that a consulate would indulge only in such espionage activity as could be carried on without compromising diplomatic and consular relations (such as the gathering of facts from newspapers, viewing ship movements from places of vantage not in any restricted area, and observing airfields and beaches from public highways), whereas an extra-consulate organization would carry on "illegal" espionage (such as trespassing restricted areas and the buying of confidential information).

90. The Consulate undoubtedly had a few paid agents, although in the one outstanding case, it does not appear whether the agent who received pay through the Consulate was receiving the same for services rendered at the direction of [25]—the Consulate or of someone in Japan. This agent, Otto KUEHN, an alien German, is known to have received \$14,000.00 through the Consulate in October, 1941, but the money seems to have been transmitted directly from Japan, with the Consulate acting merely as delivery agent. However, subsequent to that time, KUEHN did commit overt acts of espionage and report his work to

the Consulate directly, for which acts he has since been tried by a military commission, found guilty, and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. sulate is known also to have paid certain other persons who appear to have been chiefly engaged in propaganda work, but who may well have engaged in espionage.

(#)

91. Much information of value to Japan is believed to have been gathered by Japanese espionage agents who came to Hawaii for relatively short periods of time, as non-quota immigrants or in the guise of visitors-in either case, seemingly having no connection with the local Consulate. One case is known of a Japanese agent who, around 1932, stayed in Hawaii for about four months. evidently to perform a specific mission. With the help of a Japanese bookstore owner (who had been naturalized as a United States citizen following his service in the United States Army in World War I), the visiting agent conducted considerable observation of the Island of Oahu and its points of naval and military (#)

92. Espionage agents, or observers, who stayed but a short time in Honolulu were chiefly those military and naval officers of Japan who were passing through Honolulu on commercial or naval vessels. In the cases of visiting Japanese naval training squadrons, the officers invariably made sightseeing trips around Oahu, taking them within full view of Pearl Harbor, certain Army reservations, airfields, and strategic beaches. Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, expelled from the United States in the summer of 1941, is reliably reported to have come ashore here and to have driven with the Japanese Vice Consul to the vicinity of Waianae, long considered a possible landing beach. (#)

93. It is also believed likely that when Japanese naval oil tankers used to call at Honolulu (up until 1941), tanker personnel occasionally would be left in Honolulu on specific missions, and would take a later vessel back to Japan. adequate control of the personnel of such vessels was ever effected here. Tallies made by other Government agencies of the number of persons leaving and going aboard such ships here often would show that more persons had gone ashore than had returned before sailing, but the accuracy of these tallies cannot be positively asserted. A Japanese clerk of the Consulate who had been engaged in espionage activities stated, when interrogated, that he once heard that Japanese tankers would sometimes leave some of their personnel in Honolulu, but he could not state the source of his information. (#)

94. In an effort to "make face" with Japan's officialdom, several local Japanese residents (aliens and citizens) have gratuitously, and in some instances voluntarily, engaged in espionage or propaganda activities beneficial to Japan. The Japanese bookstore owner preivously refered to was found to have gathered extensive military information (of dubious value, however). He also willingly obliged a visiting Japanese, since found to have been an espionage agent, by driving the latter to points of military importance on the island of Oahu. other occasions (1936-1941), in response to requests received while visiting Japan, he sent to Japan large quantities of maps, charts, and hydrographic publications on sale in Honolulu. The full volume of what he transmitted is not known, but his effects show that he sent at least 43 ocean charts, 6 air charts, and 51 maps, as well as several publications. (#) Many other local Japanese residents, over a period of 20 years, voluntarily (and in most cases, proudly) volunteered to drive visiting Japanese naval personnel to points of interest on the various islands at which such personnel called. One Japanese alien residing on Aiea Heights, whose home has an unsurpassed view of Pearl Harbor, is known to have been visited on occasions by officers of Japanese naval vessels which called at Honolulu prior to the war. (#)

(C) Operational methods

(1) Collection of information

95 From the facts at hand, it must be said that almost all military and naval information known to have been transmitted from Hawaii to Japan, either by the Consulate or agents sent here on special missions, was gathered by the simple expedient of open observation, without trespassing restricted areas. In this connection it will be remembered that an analysis of graphs 17-21) the military and naval data found in the effects of Lieutenant Commander Itaru TACHIBANA, IJN, prior to his expulsion from the United States in the summer of 1941, revealed that about 70% of the national defense information was compiled from public reading material. (#)

96. In only a few instances were Consulate observers known to have used binoculars to observe Pearl Harbor and the [27] Naval Air Station,

Kaneohe Bay, and even then, not illegally.

97. In the few cases of trespass to Government reservations and defensive sea areas that were investigated before the war, none were investigated beyond the point necessary to secure a conviction for trespass. It was therefore never established that the trespassers were or were not trespassing incident to espionage activity.

98. Accurate maps and charts of the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent waters long were on sale in downtown Honolulu, and available to any purchaser. Tourist maps showed the approximate location of many military and naval

installations. (#)

99. Photographs of many strategic places on Oahu were on sale in Honolulu stores—even panoramic views of Pearl Harbor. (See Paragraph 19.) With the exception of the highly suspicious activity of seven Japanese seen photographing from various points on the shore of Kaneohe Bay, looking toward the Naval Air Station, on November 4, 1941, no outstanding cases of suspicious photographing have been noted. (#) The Kaneohe Bay incident is significant, however, because construction work then in progress at the Naval Air Station could not readily be seen from any point close to the station, the same being on a peninsula. Photographs taken from across the bay, however, would have provided excellent information.

(2) Evaluation of information

100. Since nothing is known of the contents of intelligence reports transmitted to Japan by couriers, it cannot be said whether the information therein was evaluated by the Consulate as to its over-all value, or as to reliability only, nor whether information sent through the Consulate was digested before transmission. However, according to former Consulate clerks, where reports were sent by commercial radio or cable, they were always predigested. Where a newspaper was the source of information transmitted by radio or cable, that fact would be stated.

101. It is believed that in general the Vice Consul was responsible for making close initial evaluation of all intelligence transmitted to Japan. While he rarely made observations himself, it was he who questioned the Consulate staff members who were sent to view ships in Pearl Harbor or to observe vital installations on Oahu or the outlying islands. He also seems to have been the person through whom reports from all available sources filtered, and in one specific [28] case he is reported to have told a secretary that the latter's observations on a certain matter were wrong (presumably basing his conclusion on what he considered better evidence from another source). (#)

102. Considerable information transmitted to Japan was clipped from local newspapers, all of which were personally studied and marked for clipping by the

Vice Consul. (#)

103. With regard to facts not of a military or naval nature, but affecting the Japanese residents of Hawaii (and possibly Japan's international relations with the United States), these generally were discussed by the Consul General and the Vice Consul, in consultation with prominent alien Japanese residents who acted as advisors to the Consulate.

(3) Transmission of information to Japan

104. While vessels of the N.Y.K. Line were running regularly through Honolulu (until mid-summer, 1941), much of the Consulate correspondence was transmitted to Japan by diplomatic couriers, who made regular trips between Tokyo and the embassy in Washington, and return. The captains of N. Y. K. liners and of Japanese naval oil tankers also carried pouches from the local Consulate to Japan.

105. However, in 1941, a large volume of commercial radio and cable messages was sent to Japan, most of the messages encrypted. (#) These means of communication were particularly necessary in the fall, when only one ship, which left

Honolulu on November 5th, went to Japan.

106. Although there were many amateur radio operators of Japanese ancestry in Honolulu who might have been used for the purpose, there is no evidence that any Consulate traffic ever was sent to Japan through them. (#) Commercial communication facilities being open for that purpose, there was no need to jeopardize a potential source of wartime espionage transmission. Neither is there any evidence, nor was there ever any reason to believe, that the Consulate maintained its own radio transmitter for direct communication with Japan.

V. PRESENT JAPANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY IN HAWAII

(A) Introductory

(1) Evidence of enemy espionage

107. In the earlier sections of this analysis, there are set forth certain facts tending to show specific instances of enemy espionage activity. Properly functioning counter-espionage organizations must assume the existence of such enemy

activity at the present time, for the contrary cannot be proved.

108. It is believed that there have been sufficient unexplained suspicious activities in the past 16 months to warrant the assumption that Japan is carrying on some form of espionage in the Hawaiian Islands. Assuming that the unidentified craft that have been detected at night close off Oahu and Maui since the outbreak of war were Japanese submarines and were in Hawaiian waters primarily on combat or reconnaissance missions, their presence here for either or both of those purposes alone cannot be reconciled with the fact that they have unnecessarily exposed themselves in waters close to shore—particularly in waters outside fruitful combat and reconnaissance areas. It is tactically unsound for submarines to have operated in many of the areas in which the unidentified craft were detected, except if they were there for some other reason—to put agents ashore, receive communications from shore, and the like.

(2) Espionage activity as affected by the state of diplomacy

109. It should be mentioned, in passing, that espionage activity must be, and in Hawaii has been, affected by the state of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan. The three usual states of international relations are:

(a) Period of normal diplomatic relations.

(b) Period of ruptured diplomatic relations, or non-diplomacy.

(c) Period of belligerency.

110. In the recent history of United States-Japanese relations, the period of normal diplomatic relations ended on December 7, 1941. During that period, espionage in Hawaii was largely handled through the Consulate, which could $[3\theta]$ expeditiously report its intelligence to Japan in encrypted despatches

and by commercial cable and radio.

111. It is believed that the Japanese contemplated that a period of ruptured relations would exist before war was started, and appropriately planned a system of communication to be used in that period. Reference has been made to the signalling system of the Consulate. (See Paragraph 42 (a)). This system was designed and submitted to the Consulate by KUEHN, referred to in Paragraph 90. It is not known whether the signalling system was ever used.

112. The third phase in which an espionage system would have to work is the period of war, in which period all Japanese consulates and Japanese (foreignowned) business houses, which formerly might have collaborated in the gather-

ing and transmission of intelligence to Japan, would be closed.

113. It is believed that, in all likelihood, the espionage organization which would go into action in wartime would not have been operative as such before the war. At least, it would have maintained no connections with the Consulate or leading alien Japanese business houses, for fear of attracting the attention of counter-espionage agencies. The remainder of this analysis will dwell upon what is believed to be a workable pattern of Japanese wartime espionage in Hawaii.

(B) Personnel

(1) Selection of personnel prior to the war

114. The successful operation of an espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime implies a considerable amount of forethought and planning. The key personnel of the system must have been in the Islands, prepared to

execute their basic orders under such conditions as might develop.

115. Appendix "C" is a schematic diagram setting forth the various functional units of an espionage organization. It will be noted that the organization is divided into the directive, collection, evaluation, and communication units. Presumably the key men in the Islands when war broke out included the heads of each of these units. In discussing the matter of the probable or possible Japanese espionage organization in the Hawaiian Islands, it is not intended that the use of the singular should imply that it is believed that only one such system might exist. The possibility must always be considered, that there are two or more systems, working [31] jointly or separately.

116. It is not necessary that all personnel ultimately needed in the organization should have been recruited before the war. In many of its functions, the espionage system will use in the most exposed positions persons recruited from time to time, either because of their loyalty to Japan or for their love of money or revenge. It is quite possible that in past years the local Japanese Consulate General, through its toritsuginin (themselves appointed because of their loyalty to Japan), had established lists of loyal Japanese who could be called upon at any time to aid Japan's cause. (Giichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45–46, may have been a loyal Japanese so selected.)

117. Also presumably available to the wartime espionage organization would be a list of all persons, Japanese and non-Japanese, who might ever have been used by the Consulate in any criminal or subversive capacity. This group should contain many persons loyal to Japan, or otherwise disaffected. In addition, such

persons are likely to be more valuable because of their prior experience.

(2) Type of personnel used

118. Opinion is varied concerning the nationality and race of personnel in the wartime espionage system. The operating premise of counter-espionage agents must embrace three conceptions of the possible composition of the Japanese espionage organization, namely, that it uses:

(a) Individuals of Japanese ancestry only; or,

(b) Only non-Japanese; or,

(c) A combination of Japanese and non-Japanese.

The concensus of those who have carefully considered the problem is that the

third possibility is the most likely.

119. It is reasonable to assume that Japan would have preferred to have built her wartime espionage organization in Hawaii wholly around Japanese of known loyalty to Japan. However, certain considerations might deter the adoption of such a policy:

(a) Upon the outbreak of war, all Japanese in Hawaii immediately would

invite the greatest degree of suspicion.

[32] (b) Japan could not foresee the attitude of United States authorities in Hawaii towards resident Japanese, for the excellent reason that no policy concerning control of resident Japanese was formulated until after war began.

(c) Therefore, Japan had no reasonable assurance that any person of Japanese ancestry would retain freedom of movement in wartime. Japan might well have assumed that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be denied access to vital areas in wartime, that many such persons (possibly all alien males) would be interned, that stringent curfew, travel control, and communications restrictions would attach to all such persons, and that mass evacuation or relocation measures might be invoked to remove virtually all Japanese from at least the island of Oahu.

If the foregoing facts were so considered by Japan, she would never have built

her local espionage organization entirely around a nucleus of Japanese.

120. On the other hand, Japan may have reasoned that the magnitude of the Japanese problem in Hawaii, in terms of sheer numbers (160,000 Japanese residents), was such that the United States authorities would have to allow many Japanese to remain at liberty. If this were the reasoning, one might expect to find that the espionage agents include American-born Nisei, probably expatriated, who have negative records of pro-Japanese activities and positive records of pro-Americanism. They might well be informants of the counter-espionage or law enforcement agencies. They could reasonably expect to be among the last Japanese to be evacuated or interned. It is therefore pertinent to observe that many of the Japanese so described are still at large and are able to carry on their appointed tasks.

121. Variations of the above two extremes are equally possible. For purposes of security, the vital core of the organization might be composed of non-Japanese. As the extent and effectiveness of United States security and counter-espionage methods became more apparent, the espionage leaders would be able to draw upon loyal Japanese personnel to the extent deemed prudent and necessary.

Contrariwise, the central unit might be under instructions to use no Japanese. [33] 122. On the other hand, the nucleus of the organization may be composed of Japanese, who will make use of non-Japanese as the need and opportunity arises. This group might even have available a non-Japanese whose sole function would be to assume direction of the espionage organization in case the members of the original core are immobilized or rendered ineffective by security or counter-espionage measures.

123. The Japanese already have used individuals of other racial groups to collect information. In Hawaii, during the last few weeks of peaceful relations, the Japanese Consulate General requested KUEHN, an alien, to submit a plan for shore-to-ship signalling. The Farnsworth and Thompson cases may also be cited. A former clerk of the local Consulate, when interrogated, told a story given him by one of the Consulate secretaries, that for years Japan had been purchasing information from a British naval officer stationed in China. (#) Reports from Mainland Naval Districts indicate that the Japanese contemplated using disaffected Negroes for espionage work. It is entirely plausible, then, that the Japanese espionage organization may be using Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, or members of other racial groups represented in the Territory of Hawaii.

124. A clear distinction must be made between the concept of a Japanese espionage organization which employs non-Japanese, and the concept of a German espionage unit operating here for the benefit of Japan. The existence of the latter type of organization, while possible, is deemed doubtful. Germany has little immediate military interest in Hawaii, and lacking that, it is doubted that it would risk the services of trained German agents to aid a not completely trusted Axis partner. If a German espionage unit is functioning in Hawaii, it probably exists merely as an observational check on information which Japan from time to time undoubtedly supplies Germany regarding military and naval operations centering around or emanating from Hawaii. There is the possibility that German and Italian agents might before the war have recruited personnel for the wartime Japanese espionage organization, and it is known that an Italian courier system was operating across the Pacific, through Honolulu, prior to the closing of the local Italian Consulate in July, 1941.

(C) Operations

(1) Functional units of the espionage organization

125. Reference to Appendix."C" will show that the functional [34] divisions of the espionage organizations are believed to be four:

(a) Directive unit;(b) Collection unit;(c) Evaluation unit;

(d) Communication unit.

The word "unit" is intended to mean functional, rather than personal, unity in operation, although a single person might in some cases be the entire personnel of one or more units. It is intended to stress the functions of the organization, rather than the number of personnel.

(a) Directive unit

126. This is the person or section of the organization which directs all operations. It is assumed that well in advance of war, the head of this unit received explicit instructions as to the nature of information to be gathered in Hawaii in wartime, the relative importance of different types of intelligence, and the manner in which the same should be reported. The directive unit would be responsible for the entire espionage organization, centralize the authority therein, and keep the machine functioning.

127. Probably but not necessarily, the head of the directive unit of the organiza-

tion would also be directly in charge of the evaluation unit.

(b) Collection unit

128. The function of this section is to cull from available sources (see Paragraphs 16-30) such information as is known to be of value to Japan. The director of this unit may confine his activity to collection work alone, or may supervise that in addition to other duties. Conceivably, the directive head of

the whole organization might personally direct the collection unit.

129. In all probability, the collection unit was partially organized before the war. In order to be able to best utilize certain sources of information in wartime, previous preparation would have been necessary. For example, to effect ready and constant observation of Pearl Harbor, it would be desirable to have a home on Aiea Heights occupied by an agent of [35] the espionage organization. (#) Agents could more readily be "planted" in the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and in other vital areas, and disaffected persons could more readily be developed as sources of "inside" information, before the war then thereafter.

130. The prime requisite of an agent operating for the collection unit is that he have access to the information he desires without creating suspicion. Not

all agents can collect information at their normal places of work or abode; some must travel to obtain it. For the latter, unobtrusive mobility is a necessity.

131. While much information of value can be learned in the course of a normal day's activity in the city of Honolulu proper, regular trips around the whole island of Oahu undoubtedly would be of great value (and perhaps be considered absolutely necessary by the directive unit). Travel around Oahu in the daytime is virtually unrestricted, and the trained observer can readily determine the location of many new plane dispersal points, searchlights, radar installations, machinegun emplacements, and landing fields. For example, the new airfield at Kunloa, Oahu, extends across the around-the-island highway, so that private vehicles drive across the runway of the field, and planes land across the highway. Automobiles on the highway are required to drive slowly in this area, but are not allowed to stop, unless planes are landing or taking off, when automobiles must stop. Normal driving speed, however, affords ample opportunity, on two or three trips, to locate most of the camouflaged revetments, estimate the length of the field, and locate wooded areas in which planes are hidden or being overhauled, and where fuel trucks are parked.

132. It would also seem likely that observers have been placed on the outside islands of the Hawaiian group (principally Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai), in order to make available to the head of the espionage organization (presumably on Oahu) military and naval information available on those islands. No censorship of mails transmitted between islands is maintained, and travel of civilians (including Japanese) by air is considerable, so that transmission of the information from outside islands would present no great difficulty. It is possible, though improbable, that agents on outside islands would communicate their information directly to Japan. More likely still is the possibility that information may

be sent from Oahu to outside islands for re-transmission to Japan.

[36] (c) Evaluation unit

133. This section of the organization probably would contain one or more trained operatives familiar with military and naval matters. In order to discharge its duties, the evaluation unit would have to be cognizant of the basic instructions of the organization as to the type of intelligence required to be reported to the enemy.

134. This section would evaluate and digest all information of value to the enemy, determine what information should be communicated, and probably the manner of its communication—subject to the general supervision of the directive

unit.

135. Where coding of messages is required, the same probably would be handled by this section, and not by the communication unit. This would be in keeping with the principle that, insofar as possible, the workings of the organization and the product of its work be known by as few persons within the organization as possible.

(d) Communication unit

136. The function of the communication section is to transmit information from the Hawaiian area to the enemy, utilizing any or all of the means indicated in Paragraphs 42–80, subject to the general supervision of the directive unit. Since the manner of transmission to be employed in each case will vary with the nature and urgency of the information to be sent, presumably the directive unit would determine what means of communication would be used.

137. A technical communication section is not required for all types of transmission. While the use of short-wave radio would require technicians, the use of other means might require only an expert cryptographer, who might be a member of the directive or evaluation units. However, there are many amateur radio operators in Honolulu (a large number of them Japanese), from whom could possibly be drawn the necessary technicians for short-wave radio work. Many communications might be released in different ways through a business "front."

138. Since it is believed that the espionage organization exposes itself most while communicating information, it is felt that those most exposed agents are the agents most likely to be securely insulated from the directive center. The organization should be so constructed that the apprehension of a communication agent would not lead to exposure of the whole system. Following the usual echelon pattern, the [37] agent farthest from the hub would know no one but the agent from whom he receives his instructions (and preferably not even him). Various ways of effecting liaison between agents who do not know one another have been discovered in the past history of espionage and new

ways may be devised by a directive head having a good imagination and a reasonably good knowledge of prevailing counter-espionage measures in a given

locality.

139. In the shore-to-ship sub-unit of the communication section (see Appendix "C") men of known loyalty to Japan, but not necessarily possessed of better than average intelligence, could be used to good advantage. These persons might be denominated "action men," whose only function it would be to conduct blinkertube signalling, or to swim or row to a submarine off shore, or to arrange land or sea caches. These persons would know little or nothing of the rest of the organization; they need not be told the meaning of messages they might be directed to transmit, nor the contents of pouches they might deliver.

140. Perhaps Giichiro UYENO, mentioned in Paragraphs 45-46, was an "action Immediately before he was killed, his actions were those of a person who might have been proceeding to a point of vantage from which to conduct visual signalling to a submarine off shore. He was a recluse, living in such a manner and at such a place that suspicion was not likely to be attracted by a person calling upon him to give him instructions with regard to signalling. Had he been captured, rather than killed, he likely would not, and perhaps could not,

have named the person or persons who had given him instructions.

141. Anticipating that all local stocks of radio equipment might be commandeered for military use in the event of war, or that the purchase of suitable transmitting equipment during wartime would arouse suspicion, the organization certainly would be well supplied beforehand with such equipment, as well as with technicians and operators.

(2) Use of a business firm as a "front"

142. As previously stated, the espionage organization must employ deception to cover many of its activities. Private individuals cannot, without good reason, engage in the ramified work of the espionage organization without soon inviting Therefore, a "front" of some kind for the organization, most likely suspicion. the use of a business firm is required. It is not assumed, however, that the would have to be a business house.

"front" 143. A glance at Appendix "C" shows the many activities that the espionage organization may engage in. The use of a business firm in discharging the communication function is stressed in the diagram, although it is obvious that the same "front" could be used also in the collection of information. For example, deliverymen of many Honolulu firms have access to certain restricted areas on Oahu; salesmen and collectors regularly make the around-the-island

road trip in dealing with customers; workmen of all types have regular access to the Honolulu waterfront.

144. The heads of the directive or evaluation units, or both, might be managers of the business "front." Among customers patronizing such business house might be agents of the espionage organization who call there to meet with their chiefs, either to receive instructions or to report information. Deliverymen and salesmen of the firm could in the normal course of their work contact with

members of the espionage organization who never visit the business house. 145. An established business house whose volume of business warranted the same would be in a position to use regular commercial radio advertising as a medium for the transmission of intelligence to the enemy; similarly, overseas

telephone calls, radiograms, cables, and mail.

146. An important advantage to be found in the use of a suitable business "front" would be the availability to it of large sums of cash, the procurement of which the ordinary individual in Hawaii at the present time would find most difficult.

(3) Finances of the espionage organization

147. An espionage organization must have available to it at all times large sums of money for a number of purposes, among which may be mentioned:

(a) Payment of agents' salaries;

(b) Maintenance of a business "front"; (c) Purchase of supplies and equipment;

(d) Purchase of information.

It will be recalled that the eight Nazi saboteurs captured in [39] the United States in 1942 were supplied with currency amounting to more than \$100,000.00 for their operations.

148. Currency control measures instituted in the Territory of Hawaii since the war began could well have seriously affected the enemy espionage organization's

financial structure. First, the Military Governor ordered that all persons in the Hawaiian Islands should turn in to banks all currency in their possession in excess of \$200.00, and that they might thereafter draw no more than \$200.00 cash a month. Corporations and businesses requiring larger sums of cash on hand were given special licenses. Second, the Treasury Department called in all standard United States currency circulating in the Hawaiian Islands and issued new like currency bearing the word "Hawaii" overprinted thereon. The overprinted currency may not be taken from the Islands and is not legal tender elsewhere. Standard United States currency can no longer be used as legal tender in Hawaii, except when presented by United States Navy personnel arriving from outside the Territory.

149. Since it is difficult to smuggle into Hawaii in quantity money which is legal tender here, telegraphic and draft transfer of credits is the only feasible means of supplying the espionage organization with funds from without. These means afford little opportunity for the transfer of large amounts of money with. out suspicion, because of the close watch kept on all such transfers by censorship

authorities. (#)

150. It is possible that the espionage organization might have foreseen that drastic currency control measures would be put into effect in the Hawaiian Islands in wartime, and to have planned accordingly. This could have been done in some measure by the purchase before the war of readily realizable assets, such as high grade securities and readily marketable real estate.

(4) Instructions from Japan in wartime

151. The general operating instructions of the enemy espionage organization as formulated prior to the war must have specified definite types of data that should be gathered during wartime and the manner of communicating the same to Japan. However, the course the war might take would affect these matters, necessitating new directives to the organization.

152. Code messages over Radio Tokyo are known to have been among the contemplated means of disseminating information to Japanese consulate abroad, just about the time of the outbreak of war. (#) This is still considered

a likely means of [40] communicating with agents in Hawaii.

153. For the transmission of detailed instructions, new operating codes, or the introduction of new outside personnel into the organization, physical contact by enemy submarines with Hawaiian shores is feasible.

[41]

VI. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE MEASURES IN HAWAII

(A) "Counter-Espionage" defined and distinguished

154. "Counter-espionage" is that intelligence activity which "has as its objective the denial of information to the enemy," and which "includes the supervision, coordination, and active operation of all investigative measures intended to prevent espionage." (#)

155. Counter-espionage does not include the functions of maintaining internal security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, or isolating disaffected persons. However, agencies charged with the latter functions and the counter-espionage agencies must work in close cooperation and maintain a constant exchange of information regarding subversive trends, persons, and

groups.

156. As used in this analysis, "internal security" does not refer to the security of the Naval Establishment, but to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands The maintenance of such internal security is chiefly a problem of population control, and, from the intelligence viewpoint, is simply a matter of isolating from the general public enemy sympathizers and disaffected persons whose future actions may be detrimental to good public morale or injurious to vital (#) The maintenance of the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands, under martial law, is the responsibility of the Military Governor, but the Navy has a fundamental concern in its maintenance:

"The Navy has a vital and paramount interest in maintaining the internal security of these Islands. This interest arises from the fact that, from a military point of view, the sole function of the Islands is to afford the United States an

advanced Naval base." (#)

It must be emphasized, however, that the problems of internal security (that is, population control) and espionage (enemy information-gathering activity) are essentially dissimilar, and must be approached from entirely different angles.

157. The District Intelligence Officer has in the past investigated both espionage and internal security cases in the civilian population. Still a third class of cases, which now occupies the greatest portion of the investigative efforts of this office, is made up of the so-called "Naval security" cases, which concern the loyalty of Naval personnel and employees and other persons having access to Naval ships,

[42] stations, and other areas under Naval jurisdiction.

158. The functions of maintaining internal security or Naval security, preventing sabotage, detecting seditious or other criminal acts, and countering espionage are not unrelated. It often develops that an espionage investigation will uncover persons whose activities or sympathies are inimical to the United States and its internal security, but do not necessarily involve espionage activity. In the respective cases, prompt dissemination of information is required, so that the officials properly charged with responsibility in the premises may pursue their own courses of action. This avoids having counter-espionage agents doing internal security and police work, and of having internal security and police officials working in the counter-espionage field.

(B) Various approaches to the espionage problem

(1) Introductory

159. Historically, espionage is a military operation, not a crime. The laws of war have always classed espionage as a permitted military practice, at the same time recognizing the right of nations spied upon to punish individual spies for their gathering or communicating of information to an enemy. (#) However, since the adoption of the Espionage Act of 1917 in the United States, whereby espionage was for the first time in this country defined as a civil (as distinguished from military) crime, there has been a tendency to class espionage as just

another, albeit "glamorus," Federal criminal offense.

160. Because of the popular fallacy that espionage is just a crime, there has seemingly developed another popular (and costly) belief that the way to catch spies is to apply proven crime solution methods in counter-espionage work. This has not been wholly beneficial. While the skilled investigator's services are needed in counter-espionage work, his detective viewpoint (that is, crime solution rather than crime prevention) is a seriously diverting influence. By training, his mission has been to solve a crime that has already been committed. Figuratively, the detective's work is half done when he starts, because at least he knows that a crime has been committed, and he need only find the person or persons responsible. Therefore, as a detective, he thinks in terms of starting an investigation only when evidence of a crime is shown him (that is, when he learns of the corpus delicti), usually by means of what he calls a "complaint."

161. But, there is seldom a visible corpus delicti of [43] espionage. By their very nature, espionage operations are conceived to be imperceptible if possible, and they rarely leave any evidence of their commission: A photograph taken of a warship leaves no tangible trace on the subject photographed; the irresponsible person who divulges confidential information is not warned when his utterances reach enemy ears; a secret code book is not marred by photostatting. The professional detective, however, attempts to adapt himself to this new field by considering the suspect himself as the corpus delicti. Thus, he opens a case on the basis of a specific or vague complaint, concerning a known or unknown person who "has been acting suspiciously," "spends too much money," "keeps his ear cocked when there is talk about ships at Pearl Harbor," "owns several cameras and does his own developing." and the like. He cannot appreciate the lesson of experience, that spies, unlike criminals, do not commit espionage in the sense that ordinary crimes are committed, nor do they generally "act suspiciously" in the presence of the good citizens who generally are the informants in these cases.

162. In the rare instance where an espionage agent gets his desired information by overt criminal action (for example, by stealing classified matter), there is generally a discernible corpus delicti. From that point on, sound police investigation methods can be employed with a normal expectation of success of determining who committed the theft. However, counter-espionage is only incidentally interested in "catching the criminal"—it uses the immediate criminal as a guide to other members of the espionage system, with the thought in mind of eventually uncovering the whole network. Then, and only then, should any thought of prosecution (and its necessary, but undesirable, concomitant, publicity) be considered. Here, again, the police detective adopted into the

counter-espionage fold is at a disadvantage, for he has been used to looking

for newspaper recognition for his successful solving of cases.

"The disclosure of these /foreign espionage/ services is the main purpose of counter-espionage work and the most difficult problem which confronts the Intelligence agent. Law enforcement or police procedures are entirely inappropriate for this work. Experienced counter-espionage agents have long since learned the futility of attacking espionage services by routine methods of investigation which may have proved successful in ordinary crime detection . . ." (#)

(2) The "Suspect" Approach [44]

163. The "suspect" approach in counter-espionage is that which concerns itself with the investigation of one or more persons suspected of being espionage agents. For purposes of exposition, these suspects may be divided into three classes:

"Logical" suspects

(b) "Complaint" or "reported" suspects (c) "Developed" suspects

164. The logical suspects are those persons who, because of the very nature of their occupations, are known or assumed to be engaged in espionage of one sort or another. In this class are diplomatic and consular officials, military and naval attaches, and visiting foreign government officials. Investigation of such persons may be made to determine whether in fact they are engaged in espionage, and, if they are, what other persons in contact with them are likewise engaged.

165. The reported suspects are those who are investigated on the basis of a specific complaint or report alleging that they are suspicious or subversive. (See Paragraph 161) Approaching the espionage problem chiefly through the investigation of reported suspects is costly in effort and largely unproductive.

It represents the police detective approach to a non-police problem.

166. Trying to identify the enemy's espionage organization by this approach alone generally is successful only if the original report is accurate and has been properly evaluated. Unfortunately, the intelligence offices are deluged with complaints, of which proper evaluation can generally only be made after some investigation. In practically all such cases, the complaints are found groundless. In many cases, the allegations made can be neither proved, disproved, nor explained. The fact that a person is engaged in espionage can be established in most cases only after intensive and discreet surveillance. Obviously, surveillance cannot be used in the investigation of every complaint.

167. The "complaint approach" psychology is fatal to effective counterespionage, because it causes the investigator to depend mainly upon the incidental scraps of information supplied by voluntary informants who are mainly untrained. Trained informants, paid or voluntary, are relatively few. Enemy agents are not likely to create suspicions in the minds of untrained [45] informants, and rarely will they leave themselves open to detection by even the

most trained informant.

168. Because complaints are not likely to be received concerning the vital matters which the counter-espionage services should know, those services will continue to remain ignorant of espionage activity as long as they depend upon receiving complaints before instituting counter-espionage measures of which investigations are but a part. And, as long as counter-espionage agencies continue to function principally on the "complaint basis," they are easy prey for the enemy espionage agents, who will provide diversions in the form of false reports (i. e., "complaints") to the intelligence services, causing the counter-espionage agents to waste a great deal of valuable time. Every investigative man-hour wasted on a false "lead" is an additional hour of security for the espionage organization. (#)

169. What we have chosen to call the "developed" suspects are those persons who have been for all practical purposes established as enemy agents, either after investigation, or by chance. The development of a suspect to the point where he becomes a known enemy agent then presents a situation where further counter-espionage measures may be taken along either the suspect or the func-

tional lines, or both.

(3) The "Functional" Approach

170. The functional approach in counter-espionage work is that imaginative approach which, utilizing a full knowledge of all known facts concerning the modus operandi of enemy agents and reasonably estimating the objectives of the enemy's espionage, seeks to detect, counter, and neutralize enemy espionage functions. This approach is essentially a screening operation, the purpose of which is to throw both an observational surveillance and a protective cordon around places and things it is believed the enemy agents will try to learn about. It is the same in principle as the putting of cheese in traps to attract and catch rats, thereby saving the tremendous effort of seeking out the rodents individually

without having a clear idea of where to find them.

171. The difference between the functional approach and the suspect approach can be illustrated in a simple situation: Assume that on the island of Oahu there is a hill that affords the best possible location for visual signalling from shore to ship. Using the functional approach, a surveillance should be placed around the hill to ascertain what persons, if any, visit the locale either to engage in signalling or for no apparent [46] valid reason. When a likely suspect is noted in this manner, further investigation along appropriate lines can be made. On the other hand, using the suspect approach in the same situation, the counter-espionage agents would sit in their offices, not thinking of the hill more than anything else, and await reports from informants concerning unusual occurrences or suspicious persons, some of which reports might possibly involve the hill.

172. Constant patrol or observation—the active seeking of information, as distinguished from the passive receiving of it—is another manifestation of the functional approach. Thus, the continuous monitoring work of the Federal Communications Commission radio intelligence units in Hawaii is essentially a functional approach to the problem of detecting enemy transmissions. If the FCC monitors were to take action only upon the receipt of specific reports or complaints of suspicious radio activity—the suspect approach—the situation

would be patently absurd.

173. It has been asserted that in discharging its communication function, the espionage organization is most vulnerable. Communications, above everything else, should be attacked vigorously and functionally. It is foolhardy to sit back complacently and await reports from informants who believe they have noticed a suspicious transmission, whether by radio, visual signal, or otherwise. Rather, all avenues of possible communication should be under constant observation. Then, if the enemy agent indulges in communication, he must cross the field of observation, thereby risking detection; and, if he does not attempt communication, the ultimate purpose of counter-espionabe has been fulfilled, for no information has been transmitted to the enemy.

(C) Responsible Agencies

174. The United States Government agencies which before, or during, the present war were, or are, charged in some way with denying information to the enemy in the Hawaiian Islands are:

(1) (Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department. (MID)
 (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu Field Division. (FBI

(3) District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District. (DIO)
[47] (4) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area). (FCC)

(5) National Censorship:

(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii.(b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.

(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu.

The functions of each of these agencies is discussed briefly below:

(1) Military Intelligence Division

175. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department, is in charge of both combat intelligence and domestic intelligence staff functions. Active direction of domestic intelligence activities is delegated to an officer designated as the Contact Officer, whose office is in downtown Honolulu, proximate to all other agncies above named.

176. Until the declaration of martial law in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, MID had no investigative responsibility in counter-espionage matters except in cases wherein the subjects were persons in the Army, employed by the Army, or having access to Army reservations. (#) However, upon the outbreak of war, the Army Department Commander assumed the Military Governorship of Hawaii

and MID took over active direction of intelligence work affecting the general

civilian population.

177. On February 9, 1942, at Washington, the heads of MID, FBI, and ONI signed a new delimitation agreement, wherein it was provided that in areas under martial law the military commander should be responsible for domestic intelligence coverage. As to Hawaii, the new agreement has been interpreted to mean that the Department Commander (Military Governor) is the military commander. The Contact Officer, MID, derives his authority from the Military Governor and is actively responsible for such intelligence coverage.

178. The Contact Officer is in close and frequent consultation with the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, and the District Intelligence Officer. He has a subordinate designated as liaison with FCC for radio intelligence work. In lesser degrees, the Contact Officer is in touch with the work [48] of the District Postal

Censor and the Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu.

179. Except in cases of espionage "directed solely against" the Navy and for subversive activities occurring within areas under Naval jurisdiction, or involving Naval personnel or employees or Naval contractors' personnel, the Contact Officer is responsible for counter-espionage planning and coverage in the Hawaiian Islands.

(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation

180. The Special Agent in Charge heads the Honolulu Field Division, FBI, which field division embraces the Hawaiian Islands and not Honolulu alone.

181. Prior to December 7, 1941, FBI had investigative responsibility in all cases of subversive activity (including espionage) involving the general civilian population. In cases of Japanese subjects, FBI and DIO had concurrent authority and responsibility. FBI supervised the formulation of a list of persons considered dangerous and who should be taken into custody in the event of war. Persons on whom the Attorney General of the United States had authorized the issuance of custodial detention warrants were promptly apprehended on December 7th or as soon thereafter as possible by squads of FBI, MID, and DIO agents, and local police. Other persons on whom the Attorney General had not issued such warrants were apprehended under the authority of the Military Governor.

182. Even though the pre-war delimitation agreement (among MID, FBI, and ONI) remained in force until February 9, 1942, on the outbreak of war FBI in effect deferred to MID in the matter of counter-espionage responsibility and direction because the superimposition of martial law on the Hawaiian Islands effected such a radical change of circumstances as to make the then existing

delimitation agreement inapplicable to conditions of martial law.

183. Under the present delimitation agreements, FBI has no responsibility for counter-espionage coverage in the Hawaiian Islands, but does cooperate with MID and the DIO in intelligence matters. However, FBI does in fact conduct some investigations of possible espionage suspects, seeking to determine whether certain persons have acted as foreign governmental agents without having properly registered with the Secretary of State. Even though the investigation of such suspects might also be of counter-espionage concern, the delimitation agreements do not make reference thereto.

[49] (3) District Intelligence Office

184. The District Intelligence Officer is in charge of this organization and is directly responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence. The District Intelligence Office is composed of a main office in downtown Honolulu, three zone offices on outlying islands, and ten intelligence units operating within Naval stations on Oahu, Maui, and Midway.

185. Prior to December 7, 1941, the DIO had investigative authority in all counter-espionage matters where the subjects were Navy personnel and employees and Naval contractors' employees, and concurrently with FBI, counter-espionage responsibility in cases of Japanese subjects. Upon the outbreak of war, the DIO also deferred to MID, when the Contact Officer took over active direction of intelligence matters concerning the general civilian population. The DIO concentrated its efforts on Naval security cases, assisting MID insofar as possible in internal security matters.

186. Under the new delimitation agreement of February 9, 1942, the Military Governor was charged with intelligence coverage, including the coordination of the facilities of other agencies with MID. Cognizance over strictly Naval cases has been retained by the the DIO, who has also lent all available assistance to

MID. Under a local agreement signed by the Military Governor, District Commandant, and the Special Agent in Charge, FBI, on March 27, 1942, there was reserved to the DIO authority over "All matters pertaining to espionage and sabotage, directed solely against such naval units or installations or fleet units, and all matters pertaining especially to Fleet and Naval Intelligence, both domestic and beyond the Hawaiian area," as well as cases involving personnel of ships tied up at territorial and privately-owned piers. (#)

(4) Federal Communications Commission

187. The Radio Intelligence Division of FCC maintains a Radio Security Center (Hawaiian Monitoring Area) in downtown Honolulu. This FCC activity has close liaison with MID, as well as with Army and Navy communications offices: Other investigative agencies, including the-DIO, refer information concerning suspicious radio activity to FCC.

188. The FCC is actually a counter-espionage organization, for its duties in-

clude:

[50] (a) Detection of violations of the Espionage Act, as far as it relates to the use of radio for subversive purposes.

(b) Investigation of complaints and/or other information received alleging

illegal and subversive radio activity.

(c) Detection of violations of rules and regulations established by the Director

of Censorship relating to the operation of radio stations.

(d) Aiding other agencies of the Federal Government and representatives of the Allied Governments having an interest in operation of radio stations by espionage agents throughout the world as well as other related radio intelligence matters. (#)

(5) National Censorship

189. Functioning under the Director of Censorship, in Washington, the National Censorship organization has two main divisions in Hawaii, the Postal Censor and the Cable & Radio Censor. The primary mission of wartime censorship is to deny information to the enemy. Because of this, censorship is primarily a counter-espionage function.

(a) Postal Censor, District of Hawaii

190. Censorship of the mails leaving the Territory of Hawaii has existed since December 7, 1941. Such censorship is peripheral only, and does not extend to local or interisland postal carriage.

191. MID, FBI, and the DIO maintain close liaison with the Postal Censor, who supplies those and other interested offices with comment sheets concerning

postal intercepts deemed to have intelligence value.

192. Postal censorship is not operated under the authority of the Military Governor, nor is it affected by any of the delimitation agreements previously referred to.

(b) Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu

193. Censorship of overseas radio-telephone calls, radiograms, and cablegrams was invoked by the District Intelligence [51] Officer on the morning of December 7, 1941. On March 1, 1942, he was relieved of this censorship function by the Cable & Radio Consor, Honolulu, who is responsible directly to the Director of Censorship, Washington.

194. The Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, has supervision over only those

194. The Cable & Radio Censor, Honolulu, has supervision over only those communications leaving the Hawaiian Islands through commercial facilities. Inter-island radio-telephone and wireless traffic is censored by a representative

of the Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

(6) Collector of Customs, Honolulu

195. Inasmuch as certain of his work is concerned with the enforcement of statutes and executive orders whose purpose is to deny information to the enemy, the Collector of Customs must be included as a counter-espionage officer.

196. In this field, the Collector's principal wartime function is to enforce the Trading with the Enemy Act. He has the right to examine any cargo leaving the United States not under government control, and enforces the requirement that export declarations be filed concerning exports. He is also responsible for seeing that persons other than accredited United Nations couriers, entering the United States through the Hawaiian' Islands, do not carry on their persons or in their effects censorable matter not previously passed by competent authority.

(D) Investigation procedure

(1) Prior to December 7, 1941

197. Prior to the outbreak of war. investigations within their respective spheres of authority were made by FBI; MID, and the DIO of Japanese, German, Italian, and Communist subjects. Whether the investigations were denominated "espionage" or "internal security" cases was of little import, for the manner in which either type of case was handled was generally the same. Most cases were opened on the basis of a "complaint" or specific report, alleging that a person was "acting suspiciously," was "pro-Nazi" or "pro-Japanese," had served in the Japanese Army, and the like. The investigative process normally would include some or all of the following steps:

(a) Check files of FBI, MID, DIO, Honolulu Police Department, and credit

agencies (in most cases).

(b) Check files of Immigration & Naturalization [52] Service or other Government agencies (in appropriate cases).

(c) Interview or re-interview original informant.

(d) Interview subject's employer, business associates, and neighbors.

(e) Check bank accounts.

(f) Consult confidential informants.

(a) Surveillance (rarely).

The type of investigation indulged in was well suited for the purposes of internal security, that is, determining whether certain persons in wartime would likely be loyal to, or sympathize with the cause of, or give to, nations at war with the United States. It was not suitable for counter-espionage

purposes.

198. In a few instances was the espionage problem in Hawaii attacked from the functional standpoint. This was largely, not not entirely, the fault of the responsible local agencies. There was a serious shortage of trained personnel available for counter-espionage work. Inadequately staffed, in numbers, FBI was hard put to investigate all prospective custodial detainees. The DIO devoted a majority of its investigative time to investigation of Naval personnel cases, including applicants for the Naval Intelligence Service, and civilian employees of the Navy and Naval contractors. While there was full cooperation between FBI and the DIO, insofar as assisting one another upon request, there was not close coordination of their work in attacking the Japanese espionage system here.

199. In the several instances of functional approach to the Japanese espionage problem, FBI and the DIO generally worked jointly. Together, they maintained a partial survellance of the activities of the Japanese Consulate General and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line), utilizing informants on the spot. FBI's investigation of the activities of the Italian Consul, in which the DIO assisted, was similarly conducted, with fruitful results. When the last Japanese "evacuation liner," the Taiyo Maru, was in Honolulu. November 1–5, 1941, FBI, the DIO, and Customs closely coordinated their efforts in effecting scrutiny of passengers returning to Hawaii from Japan, in searching persons leaving for Japan on the liner, and in maintaining a surveillance of the ship and activities on the nearby docks while the Taiyo Maru was in port. In furtherance of [53] the purpose of this investigation, representations were made to the Postmaster General, in Washington, with the result that he ordered that no mail other than second class matter (newspapers, magazines, etc.) be put aboard the Taiyo Maru for carriage to Japan. (#)

(2) December 7, 1941, to March 27, 1942

200. Almost immediately upon the outbreak of war, the Contact Officer, MID, assumed general direction of intelligence work concerning the general civilian population, with FBI and DIO assisting. In this period, intelligence agents devoted almost all their time to the handling of internal security cases, apprehending persons who had been designated for custodial detention, conducting searches and interrogations, and investigating hundreds of specific complaints and rumors concerning alleged subversive activity.

201. A joint investigation of the past espionage activities of the Japanese Consulate General was instituted by MID, FBI, and the DIO (and still continues) in the hope of gaining some indication of what Japan's wartime espionage organization in Hawaii might be like and what personnel it might employ. (#) Information gained in this investigation aided the FBI in its

investigation of Otto KUEHN, and established the latter's connection with the Consulate. The product of this joint investigation, added to the facts ascertained by the pre-war partial surveillance of the Consulate, illustrates the value of the functional approach to the espionage problem.

(3) Since March 27, 1942

202. After the signing of the local delimitation agreement on March 27, 1942, FBI ceased to investigate internal security and espionage cases as such, but continued to make available to MID and the DIO all information in its files or thereafter acquired. The DIO also ceased opening its own internal security cases in the general civilian field and opened about 2,000 security cases on persons of Japanese ancestry employed on Naval projects. DIO Zone Offices have continued to conduct internal security investigations when requested to do so by Army S-2 officers in their respective zones, to the extent of available time

203. On the islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, preliminary hearing boards, usually of three men (one each from MID, FBI, and DIO), hear nearly all cases where custodial detention of a person is considered. The function of the boards is to supplement investigations by interrogation, and advise the appropriate Army authority whether a warrant of detention should From time to time, in Honolulu, special investigating groups of MID, FBI, and DIO personnel are convened to interrogate persons likely to have im-

portant information concerning local Japanese subversive activity.

204. On three occasions, special investigating parties, composed of MID, FBI, and DIO representatives, generally totalling about 20 men, have flown to outside islands to aid resident intelligence personnel in conducting internal security

investigations in large volume.

205. Cooperation of the three intelligence agencies in internal security work has been excellent. However, there has been virtually no effective work done in the filed of counter-espionage. A small number of the cases investigated in this period (and since the war began) are entitled "espionage," but in few has there been anything other than an "internal security" approach to the problem. In nearly every instance, the emphasis has been on the personalities and their ntterances, criminal and credit records, and probable nationalistic sympathies. There have been few cases approached in light of the functional bases of espionage.

(E) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) Intelligence personnel

206. Much of the failure to cope with the espionage problem in Hawaii lies in the fact that sufficient trained personnel have not been assigned to this area. MID and DIO offices have grown greatly since December 7, 1941, without many additions of much needed trained counter-espionage agents. The number of trained FBI agents in Hawaii has been reduced during the war.

(2) Coordination

207. While there exists close coordination in the field of internal security cases, because the Army has complete responsibility therefor and either conducts itself or requests DIO Zone Offices to conduct such investigations, the same cannot be said of counter-espionage efforts. This is perhaps attributable to problems presented by the local delimitation agreement of March 27, 1942.

(3) Shoreline coverage

208. It is believed that no agency has been paying adequate tion to the coasts of the Hawaiian Islands, insofar as domestic intelligence coverage is concerned, nor is there known to be any plan for such coverage.

209. Insofar as this office has been advised, investigations of suspicious activities near or close off shore have been conducted by trained intelligence personnel in but a few cases. In some instances of reported suspicious activity, which activity might indicate that persons on shore were making contact with the enemy, the immediate investigation has been made by Army field personnel (sometimes working under the S-2 officer), but with no follow-up, detailed investigation by trained investigative personnel. (#)

210. The former Coastal Information Section (B-8) of the DIO functions under the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and has been separated from the DIO since before the outbreak of war. What coastal intelligence work it has

done has been confined to the operational or combat implications of happenings off shore.

(4) Travel control

211. Civilians entering and leaving the Territory of Hawaii have not been subject to careful scrutiny, interrogation, or search, nor required to identify themselves. Until only recently, almost any person not under surveillance could leave the Territory without the knowledge of the intelligence or law enforce-

ment agencies.

212. Several months ago, the DIO established the Naval Travel Control Office under the Commerce and Travel Section (B-5). The Naval Travel Control Office processes all persons leaving the Territory by Pan American Airways clippers, excepting military and naval personnel of the United Nations travelling under official orders, diplomats in diplomatic status, and United Nations civilian officials traveling on official business. The function of the processing office is to make sure of the identity of every commercial air traveller, and to apprise interested official agencies of what individuals are leaving the Territory. It is estimated that 2½% of the persons whose passage has been validated by the Naval Travel Control Office were of more than nominal interest to the intelligence agencies.

213. It is anticipated that in the near future, the Military Governor of Hawaii will promulgate a general order establishing a similar travel control office whose function it will be to process all travellers leaving the Territory [56] (save those exempt because of official status), whether passage is taken

by air or surface.

214. In the past, several violations of censorship have been detected in situations where persons leaving the Territory have carried uncensored censorable matter (principally letters) on their persons or in their effects upon going aboard ships sailing from here. In the discovered cases, however, no indication of espionage activity has appeared, the violations involving personal motives only. (#)

215. That enemy couriers could with ease enter and leave these Islands, carrying vital information on their persons or in their effects (or, better still, in their minds), is apparent. It is anticipated, however, that when surface as well as air travellers are processed before leaving, the risks to couriers will be increased.

(5) Lack of coordination among domestic intelligence, combat intelligence, and operations activities

216. Before and during this war the flow of information has been almost entirely from the domestic intelligence agencies to combat intelligence and operations activities, with little flowing from the latter to domestic intelligence. While it is true that combat intelligence and operations offices have the primary interest in operational data and are vitally interested in the security thereof, it is not true that they have an exclusive interest in all such information. For example, the domestic intelligence agencies are, or should be, greatly concerned with all information indicating the presence of enemy units (particularly submarines) close off the Hawaiian Islands.

217. As previously stated, the presence of an enemy submarine close to shore, in an area and at a time inappropriate for combat action or reconnaissance, should be assumed to present a situation wherein the enemy is attempting to effect contact with agents on shore. The responsibility for destroying or repelling the enemy craft off shore lies with combat activities; the responsibility for detecting who are the enemy agents on shore lies with domestic intelligence. But, domestic intelligence will not know that there is a specific instance of possible enemy contact or signalling which it should investigate, unless the pres-

ence of enemy (or unidentified) units off shore is reported to it.

218. When there are operational movements in the Hawaiian [57] area of such importance that enemy observers would be likely to report the same to the enemy—such as the facts concerning arrivals and departures of Naval task forces—the counter-espionage agencies should be made cognizant of such movements. Knowing what the enemy agents are likely to be interested in provides a clue as to when enemy communications may be made. The security of operations would not be endangered by providing counter-espionage agencies with this type of information, for it would be desired only in eases where an enemy agent on shore could by simple observation learn it himself. It is reasonable that such information should be given to the counter-espionage agencies, otherwise they will have to go to the absurd extreme of stationing their own observers to obtain in the same manner that enemy agents do the information concerning ship movements.

[58]

VII. CONCLUSION

219. The criticism implicit in the foregoing analysis is inescapable. It is intended to be wholly constructive. The effect of the criticism is not directed against any one intelligence agency any more than any of the others. While there has been excellent cooperation among the agencies, coordination of plans and measures to deal with espionage in Hawaii has not been what it could have

220. Whereas this analysis is the result of studies made by one of the intelligence agencies, the District Intelligence Office (Counter Intelligence Section), and is believed to be based upon all available pertinent facts, it is felt that little, if any, progress can be made until the three principal agencies jointly approach the problem discussed herein. It would be highly desirable to have a small group of officers and agents—possibly only one or two from each agency, who should be the best suited for the task involved—appointed to study the question of espionage in Hawaii. Such a joint study should enable the representatives to make intelligent and comprehensive recommendations for the improvement of counter-espionage technique and procedure in this area.

221. Unless vigorous, astute and coordinated counter-espionage measures are placed in operation in Hawaii, the primary task of Counter-Intelligence—denial

of information to the enemy—will never be performed.

[A-1]APPENDIX "A": SOURCE MATERIAL

This appendix has been prepared chiefly for the benefit of readers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, who may wish to pursue further certain topics mentioned in the foregoing analysis. No attempt has been made to supply disseminees of this analysis with copies of all reports and other materials referred to below.

Immediately below are listed, as references, a number of investigation reports and other official correspondence which are cited in support of certain portions of the analysis. Following the list of references are explanations or citations of authority, arranged in the numerical order of paragraphs of the analysis.

REFERENCES

(a) DNI Conf. Ltr. A8-2/EN3-10, Serial 02525216, dated November 11, 1942, subject: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Activities.

(b) ONI Counter-Intelligence Section (Op-16-B-7) Operating Plan, dated Octo-

ber, 1942.

- (c) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 9, 1942, subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU-Espionage Activities.
 - (d) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 14, 1942, same subject.
- (e) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 19, 1942, same subject.
 (f) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 7, 1942, same subject.
 (g) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, same subject.
 (h) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 6, 1941, subject: JAPANESE EVACUATION SHIPS.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 15, 1941, same subject.
 (j) 14ND Investigation Report, dated November 25, 1941, same subject.
 (k) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 1, 1942, subject: Ernest Shigeru MATSUSAKA.
- (1) 14ND Summary Report, dated April 30, 1942, same subject. (m) 13ND Investigation Report, dated May 1, 1941, subject: Lt. Comdr.
- Sadatomo OKADA, IJN.
 - (n) 12ND Investigation Report, dated July 17, 1941, same subject.

ANESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

- (o) 14ND Investigation Report, dated August 6, 1942, subject: Oliver Albert KIRKEBY.
 - (p) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 30, 1942, subject; Giichiro UYENO, (q) DNI Conf. Memo., dated October 1, 1942, subject: GERMAN SABOTAGE
- AGENTS. (r) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 15, 1943, subject: Richard
- Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO. (s) 14ND Investigation Report, dated February 6, 1942, subject: Yoshiye
- MIKAMI, alias John MIKAMI. (t) DNI Secret Memo., Serial 02304616, dated November 3, 1942, subject: JAP-

- (u) 14ND Investigation Report, dated July 13, 1942, subject: Rev. Unji HIRA-YAMA.
- (v) 14ND Investigation Report, dated May 2, 1942, subject: Otto Carl Ferdinand JAENTSCH.
 - (w) 12ND Investigation Report, dated May 30, 1942, same subject.
 (x) 14ND Investigation Report, dated June 11, 1942, same subject.
 (y) 12ND Information Card, dated June 19, 1942, same subject.

(z) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 24, 1942, subject: Louie SLATON.

(aa) 5ND Investigation Report, dated May 19, 1942, subject: Espionage, Vis-

able Shore Signals and Enemy Radio Activity.

(bb) DNI Conf. Memo., Serial 01398716, to DIO-8ND (copies to DIOs-10-11-12-13-14-15 NDs), dated June 3, 1942, subject: Flashing Lights and Suspected Signals Along the Coast—Investigation of.

A-3] (cc) 11ND Investigation Report, dated October 8, 1941, subject: Itaru

TACHIBANA.

(dd) 14ND Investigation Report, dated December 1, 1942, subject: Visits of Japanese Public Vessels to the Island of Oahu.

DOCUMENTATION BY PARAGRAPHS

Foreword.—All quotations are from reference (b), Pars. 1215–1216 and 1003. Par. 19.—Reference (e); Reference (g); Reference (r); Reference (s), pp. 2–5. Reference (dd). The panoramic photograph of Pearl Harbor and ships therein was taken by E. J. PARISH, Honolulu photographer, about 1937. An almost identical photograph, taken by PARISH in 1938, is contained in the files of this office. In 1937 or 1938, before offering such photographs for sale to the public, PARISH called at the District Intelligence Office to obtain official permission for sale. At that time, PARISH was told that while the Navy objected to the sale of such pictures, there was no law prohibiting such publication.

Pars. 24–25.—Reference (o) presents a case in point, illustrating how a Navy enlisted man was first "pumped" for Naval information, then developed as a source of "inside" information, for which he was paid in "loans". KIRKEBY's offenses were committed in 1936–1937, and he was met by Japanese espionage

agents both in San Francisco and in Los Angeles.

Par. 32.—For examples of the type of information reported by the Consulate to Japan in 1941 by cable and wireless, see reference (d).

A-4] Par. 42 a/.—The Consulate signalling system referred to is set forth

in Reference (c), Par. 4.

Pars. 45-46.—A preliminary report of the UYENO case, containing only the details of the shooting but nothing concerning UYENO's possible motives, was received from the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.), Honolulu, shortly after the incident. The investigating agent recommended further investigation, but a check of the files of the Army Contact Office on February 15, 1943, revealed no further reports, and at that time a representative of the District Intelligence Officer was informed that the case was closed. UYENO is subject of reference (p).

Par. 47.—Informant who furnished the information in the two indented paragraphs is given reliability "A" by this office. His report was not rendered until four months after the events reported. A copy of informant's report was forwarded to the Army Contact Office, which returned to the District Intelligence Officer the following comment from another Army activity (not naming it):

"* * As to a man swimming ashore and the finding of prints in the sand,

there is no record on this * * *

"It is very improbable that the events described in this report could have happened without being recorded at this Headquarters."

Par. 51.—Reference (q) reports the landing and capture of eight Nazi sabo-

teurs in the United States, 1942.

Par. 52.—Investigation by the Army Contact Office (M. I. D.) of former Japanese sampan fishermen in Hawaii has revealed that many of the fishermen entered the United States illegally and are extremely pro-Japanese, but has produced as yet no specific evidence of espionage activity by such fishermen.

Par. 60.—See article on frequency modulation: "This New FM", Naval Insti-

tute Proceedings, February, 1942.

Par. 63.—The suspicious radio message was intercepted as follows:

[A-5] RAUMIG HINDERUST SINDEN ZURCH REMSCHED REMSCHIE OWES ZAE MERE MSCHE ID ____ DECK SEDWIG CGER DECK ORENE

EL ZELME MELZEN HAFNO ANN EDLMANN ISAR ISAR SETZE UME IN

MEUWEG SIEDEN IN GELS

Source of above information was Combat Intelligence, 14ND, who reported: "This transmitted Sunday A. M. /December 7, 1941/. Apparently local station to local station. Received from Army." A very free translation of understandable parts of the message was also submitted by Combat Intelligence:
Extensive areas have been completely razed . . . Oriental

Oriental . . . Set oil and machinery fires one after another Edlmann /proper name/

in which many were killed.

Par. 64.—FCC writer referred to is Mr. Lee R. Dawson, supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area. Quotations are from Mr. Dawson's letter of January 10, 1942, to Chief of National Defense Operations Section, FCC, subject: Additional Secondary Monitoring Units Needed in the Hawaiian Area. (Copies of this letter were indicated for Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.)

Quotation of the Director of the FBI, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, is from his letter of January 16, 1942, to Hon. James Lawrence Fly, chairman of FCC. (Copies of this letter were sent to G-2, War Department, and ONI, Navy Department.)

Par. 78.—The Japanese are known to be using couriers among officers and seamen of merchant vessels plying between United States and South American

ports: reference (t).

Par. 81.—Reference is to Tamotsu MATSUMURA, interned alien Japanese, who was at one time a paid informant of this office. Before coming to Hawaii prior to the first World War, WATSUMURA was in the Japanese overseas colonization service, being a civil secretary to the governor-general of Formosa. He admits having transmitted information of strategic value, concerning Hawaii, to Japan prior to 1914. In recent years, especially 1937-1940, he was a leading propagandist for Japan in Hawaii.

Par. 83.—This appears from the admissions of Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, formerly a clerk at the local Consulate, who visited the islands of Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii in 1941 on espionage missions for the Consulate:

reference: (g).

Par. 84.—See enclosure (A) of reference (d).

Par. 86.—From KOTOSHIRODO's admissions: reference (g). Par. 88.—Buddhist priest referred to is subject of reference (u).

Par. 90.—Propagandists referred to are Frank VON HEILAND and Rev. Paul Junichiro TAJIMA. Paid informants of the Consulate, among them some Koreans, are discussed in reference (g).

Par. 91.—Japanese agent who was in Hawaii in 1932 was Rinzo SHIMURA, mentioned in references (k) and (l), and Japanese bookstore owner was Ernest

Shigeru MATSUSAKA, subject of those reports.

Par. 92.—OKADA is the subject of references (m) and (n) Par. 93.—The Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.

Par. 94.—For a detailed description of the information gathered by MATSU-

SAKA and transmitted to Japan, see enclosures to reference (k).

The alien on Aiea Heights is Shigeichi TAKAFUJI. A report of the activities of personnel of Japanese Naval vessels while visiting Hawaii before the war is contained in reference (dd).

Par. 95.—Report concerning information gathered by TACHIBANA is con-

tained in reference (cc).

Par. 98.—When KOTOSHIRODO and Consulate Secretary Tadashi MORI-MURA made observation trips to the outside islands of the Hawaiian group in 1941, they carried with them only the innocuous-looking Hawaii Tourist Bureau cartographic maps. According to Consulate clerks interviewed, the maps and charts used by the Vice Consul in his office were standard U. S. Hydrographic Office and Coast & Geodetic Survey publications.

Par. 99.—The photographing incident was referred immediately to FBI, Honolulu, but no report of FBI's investigation of this case was written. The driver of the car which carried the seven Japanese has not been interned, but is serving a prison term for violation of a general order of the Military Governor regulating

the amount of currency an individual may carry on his person.

Pars. 101-102.—KOTOSHIRODO related the information reported in these paragraphs: see reference (g).

Par. 105.—See references (c) and (d).

Par. 106.—Army Contact Office, Honolulu, for some time past has been investigating all local Japanese known to have operated radio transmitters in Hawaii prior to the war. To date, the DIO has not been informed of any operator who has been found to have used his transmitter for subversive purposes.

Par. 123.—Consulate clerk referred to is KOTOSHIRODO.

Par. 129.—Japanese aliens still live on Aiea Heights and on Pearl City Peninsula (which juts into Pearl Harbor to a point only several hundred yards across open water from a carrier berth).

Par. 149.—While considerable amounts of "Hawaiian currency" have turned up in Mainland banks, it is believed that such currency could not be purchased

from those banks because of prevailing legal restrictions.

Par. 152.—First sentence: source secret, but known to ONI. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomingtang (Overseas Department) is currently using regular short-wave broadcasts from China for the transmission of instructions in code to Kuomingtang representatives in the United States. (See Postal Censorship Records No. SF-8991.)

Par. 154.—First quoted clause is from reference (b), Par. 1005; second is from

ONI-T-8-10, Sec. 21203 (2).

Par, 156.—The distinction between the maintenance of internal security and the countering of enemy espionage seems to have been kept clearly in mind in a recent [A-8]lication: War Department Counter Fifth War Department pub-Column Plan (1942 Revision), promulgated November 2, 1942. Therein, the task of countering the Potential Fifth Column is essentially the task referred to in the foregoing Analysis as the maintenance of internal security in Hawaii. the Counter Fifth Column plan seems not deemed to be applicable to Hawaii (for the Hawaiian Department commander is not on the distribution list), it is significant that the Plan and its study and improvement are the responsibility of the Provost Marshall General, and not of the Military Intelligence Service. This is a clear recognition of the fact that Counter Fifth Column planning is a police, rather than a counter-espionage function.

Quotation is from "A War-Time Problem, THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII, An

Analysis", page 1, by Lt. Comdr. C. H. Coggins, MC, USN, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District (April, 1942).

Par. 159.—"War cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the forces and the intentions of the enemy, and about the character of the country within the zone of military operations. To obtain the necessary information, it has always been considered lawful to employ spies, and also to make use of the treason of enemy soldiers or private enemy subjects, whether they were bribed, or offered the information voluntarily and gratuitously. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations enacted the old customary rule that the employment of methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country is considered allowable. The fact, however, that these methods are lawful on the part of the belligerent who employs them does not protect from punishment such individuals as are engaged in procuring information. Although a belligerent acts lawfully in employing spies and traitors, the other belligerent, who punishes them, likewise acts lawfully . . ." Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (5th ed., 1935), Vol. II, Sec. 159, p. 337.

Par. 162.—Quotation is from ONI-T-8-10, Sec. 23201.

Par. 168.—While there is no positive evidence of the fact, it appears that several false reports concerning alleged Japanese espionage in Hawaii were given to the U. S. Naval Attache, at Mexico City, in early 1941. Each report contained some important known facts, around which apparently were spun many false statements. While ONI gave the reports very low reliability rating, the reports were of such a serious nature as to require investigation.

Par. 176.—Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, entered into by FBI, MID, and ONI, governed the respective spheres of responsibility of the three agencies

in Hawaii until the outbreak of war.

Par. 186.—Copy of local agreement of March 27, 1942, was sent to ONI as enclosure to DIO-14ND (IHM/w) Conf. Ltd. (Personal) to Rear Admiral

T. S. Wilkinson, USN, dated June 20, 1942.

Par. 188.—Statemenet of FCC duties taken verbatim from memorandum of E. K. Jett, Chief Engineer, FCC; to all offices of the FCC Radio Intelligence Division, dated June 3, 1942, subject: Jurisdiction of the Radio Intelligence Division.

Par. 199.—Reports on Japanese "evacuation liners": see references (h), (i),

and (j).

Par. 201.—Reports of the joint investigation of the Japanese Consulate; see references (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).

ONI in that procedure.

Par. 214.—In one case, a merchant marine captain cabled his wife, "Happy birthday", to indicate the fact that his vessel was about to sail from Honolulu: references (v), (w), (x), and (y). In another case, the second officer of a cargo vessel used a simple code in ordinary correspondence to reveal movements of his ship prior to sailing: reference (z).

(Pages 197D and 198D of Exhibit 5, being an outline map of the Island of Oahu—Appendix "B"—and a chart captioned "Pattern for Espionage, Hawaiian Islands"—Appendix "C"—will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 10 and 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

> FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL, Honolulu, Hawaii, 3 December 1941

Confidential

MEMO FOR THE FILES

Reference: Wilkinson Report, 6 October 1941.

During the past 3 years in North China I had considerable official and social contact with various German firms and their representatives in North China, and with reference to the Wilkinson Report of the 6th October 1941, the following

information is submitted for what it may be worth.

1. The German merchants in occupied China are given very little preference over other foreign (i. e. American, British, etc.) merchants and their businesses are being interfered with to practically the same extent by the Japanese military; except in such cases as the military directly benefits. The German merchants fully realize they are only being used to the advantage of the Japanese and what preference they receive is only on sufferance.

2. The average German definitely detests the Japanese military clique and Japanese businessmen in China and much prefer to do business with the Chinese.

They consider their future is with China rather than Japan.

3. In March 1941, one (Wilhelm?) Dunsing (official Nazi representative in Northern Shantung) the Chefoo manager for Niggeman & Co., had just been forced by the local Japanese Gendarmerie to sell something like 90,000 bags of flour (U. S. goods) at a considerable loss; remarked to me, "never mind we (meaning Germany) are only playing with them for the time being, we will get even, etc., etc. They will be chased from country (China) and put where they belong. It is all planned". Dunsing then pointed to a map of the world on office wall and saying, "here is our first step", drew an arc starting from Germany with the vertex passing through the center of the Caspian Sea, and ending in the vicinity of Karachi. Dunsing was extremely angry at this time and while talking was intermittently cursing the Japanese in general.

4. I had known DUNSING for about four years and am sure that he was sincerely expressing himself. This same sentiment has been expressed to me by other German merchants in China, and particularly by Helmut Lanz, owner and manager of the Shantung Traders Inc. of Chefoo; Rollo Miss of A. H. Anz & Co. Chefoo (German Consular Agents); Waldemar Balthaser of Krauch & Co., Shanghai, China, representatives of Deutsche-Stickstoffhandelsgeselschaft.

T. W. Joyce Lt. (jg) T. W. Joyce

Copy sent to M. I. D. on 12-5-41. S.

Attention Ens. Stevenson

Nov. 5th, 1941

NOTES-COMMENTS

I suggest that the number of German advisors and technicians appearing in these reports is somewhat exaggerated. I have met several of them in China

during the past year and up to May of present year—and was given the impression that Germany is reluctant to send as many as Japan asks for—also they are mostly erectors or mechanics supervising installation of German designed arms and machinery, etc., and move about from yard to yard.

T. W. JOYCE.

(Handwritten in margin:) this info. too old to be of use—if Jap C. G. has arrived—fact will be reptd by U. S. Consuls—or friendly Consuls.

COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, October 14, 1941.

Op-16-F A8-4/EF13 Serial No. 0965916 From: Director of Naval Intelligence

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Secret Agent in Manila—Information received from)

Reference: (a) DIO-14 letter IHM/ba, dated August 22, 1941.

(b) OPNAV dispatch 072049, October, 1941.(c) OPNAV dispatch 061720, August, 1941.

1. In paragraph 1 of reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer stated that a British secret agent in the Far East suggested that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent could be carried in special locked compartments of the Pan-American Airways clipper between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation, the British agent in the Far East would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy as gathered by him or his agents in the Far East.

2. In reference (b), the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, were authorized to arrange for the transmission of correspondence between accredited British intelligence officers in the Far East and in the Fourteenth Naval District by locked compartments or locked boxes in the Pan-American Airways service between Honolulu and Manila whenever space and other considerations within the discretion of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, render

such service practicable.

3. It is to be understood that this service is not to be considered in exchange for information gathered by the British Intelligence in the Far East and sent to the Fourteenth Naval District via clipper for transmission to the District Intelligence Officer. Such transmission is decidedly cumbersome, slow and impractical. Any such information should be transmitted by the British representatives to representatives of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, for his information and further transmission at his discretion. The proper British authorities in Washington have been informed of the foregoing and requested to make arrangements accordingly.

4. As a matter of interest to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, he is advised that the information contained in enclosure (A) with reference (a) was not of importance or of particular interest to the Division of Naval Intelligence, because it was too detailed in its nature, too local in its application and too

late in its reception.

5. It is to be noted that reference (b) cancels reference (c).

(Signed) A. G. Kirk.

Copy with copy of ref. (a) to: CINCAF

Shanghal French Concession—Japanese Designs on.

14ND #1534 Rating "C"

Ref: 14ND C rd #1463

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Japanese Government is "contemplating" taking over French Concession of Shanghai in the name of Nanking Government. Japanese Army wishes to take action immediately but is not in complete agreement with Japanese Naval landing party. Meanwhile, Nanking

Government is going ahead selecting personnel for future administration in what will be called "Shanghai Special Administrative Area". Informant believes that Nanking's action is more wishful thinking, but states that both Japanese and Nanking efforts at penetration of the Shanghai French Concession lately has been intensified.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC com14

14ND #1534 Rating "C"

Thai-Japanese Activities in

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: (A) In the middle of August, 1941, thirty aircraft of various types were transferred from DON MUANG to CHIENG-MAI airdrome; (B) Investigations are being carried out by Japanese Special Service Department agents into the number of lighters and their tonnage in the Gulf of Siam; (C) The following proposal was said to have been presented to the Prime Minister of Thai on August 18 by the Japanese Minister: (1) SATTAHIB Naval Base to be loaned to Japan; (2) 6 airdromes in north, south, and west Thai to be lent to Japan, who will undertake to improve them; (3) Double tracks to be laid on the railway from ARANH to BATTAMBANG; (4) Japan to guarantee territorial integrity and independence of Thai; and (5) Japan to cooperate in improving Thai armed forces; the foregoing proposals to be taken up by the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival at Thai. FBI and MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1535 Rating "C"

Formosa-Meito Airdrome

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 27 August, 1941: On 18 June the following left for unknown destination—3 3-engine monoplane bombers, 9 twin-engine monoplane bombers, 4 fighters, 2 reconnaissance. On 28 June following left for Hainan under command of MIYASAKI—15 twin-engine monoplane bombers, 11 single-engine monoplane fighters, 8 single-engine bi-plane reconnaissance. On 3 July 24 aircraft under command of MORI GITARO left for Hainan.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14 ·

14ND #1533 Rating "C"

Confidential

JAPAN-General Intelligence

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of 1 September, 1941: (A) 5 new (reorganized) divisions have been mobilized in Japan for service in Manchuria; (B) All forces in Korea other than two divisions are to be in process of moving into Manchuria and to North Korea; (C) 3 new mechanized divisions have been added to Kwangtung Army as well as chemical warfare units trained in Japan by German instructors; (D) Training of parachute troops is being intensified but is considerably delayed by lack of transport airplanes; passenger airplanes from a commercial air line are being used for training purposes; (E) Informant reports unvertited information to the effect that two Japanese Capital Ships will be completed and commissioned in the battle fleet by the end of 1941 and that two airplane carriers will be completed in March and July, 1942, respectively.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM1.

14ND #1531 Rating "C"

Confidential

Japanese Fleet Organization

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports; That from and after June, 1941, Japanese Navy was to have been divided into four fleets, with Admiral KATO as Com-

mander-in-Chief. The first fleet will be stationed near Indo-China, Thai, and Hainan; second fleet will be the main force for the southward advance; third fleet to be stationed to cover the Pacific flank and oppose the American Fleet; and, fourth fleet to be engaged in transport (convoy?) work. FBI and MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1532 Rating "C"

Indo-China-Japanese Moves In

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese Navy intends to construct a submarine base at CAMRANH BAY. Japanese are reported to be taking steps to completely suppress all pro-Chunking elements in Indo-China, and to encourage Annamite independence movement which would be definitely pro-Japanese and anti-French. It is believed that object of Japanese moves is to create internal domestic trouble in Indo-China, thus providing further excuse for expansive Japanese control.

PBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1528 Rating "D"

Japan-Ordnance Production

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Chinese staff Secret Booklet of October, 1940, contains following information on Hiroshima Iron Works—Yearly production 9 anti-aircraft guns, 3 tanks, unknown number of Naval and Military guns. Monthly production of shells 300. Raw materials are obtained from Yawata, Kyeshu. 2,000 men and women employed.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

Confidential

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14 From: 14ND 9-23-41

14ND #1529 Rating "C"

Japan-Indication of Action in Malaya

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That Japanese Army is calling up all English and Malay-speaking Japanese irrespective of age. Some Japanese born and educated in the Straits Settlement have left for Army service in Japan.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41 To: ONI CINCPAC com14

14ND #1530 Rating "C"

Far East Exports to Germany

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (as of 23 July, 1941): German firms in the Far East have received instructions from the Commercial Counsellor instructing them that they *must* keep all goods purchased for export to Germany for a period of at least five months, since it can be expected that transport via Siberia will be resumed at the expiration of that period. Firms encountering difficulty over storage space are advised to ship goods to Dairon for storage. Further, all purchases of goods in the immediate future for export to Germany must be of "non-perishable" kind. FBIHON and G-2ND are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1526 Rating "C"

China Blockade—Smuggling

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 28 June, 1941, Asaji FASAHARA, Commanding Officer of the Destroyer ACHI (or ASHI) of the Japanese Thirteenth Destroyer Flotilla, was found guilty of having allowed smuggling in his blockade area and was replaced by his second-in-command. The ACHI was patrolling off Hainan Island at the time. Admiral Seiichi SHIMOMI (or HIMI), Commanding the Japanese South China Fleet, is suspected by his subordinate officers of being financially interested in the South China smuggling racket.

When Chiu-Ting-Wah, puppet magistrate at Chungahan, was assassinated recently in Macao, it was extensively rumored that SHINOMI's personal demarche with the Governor of Macao was brought about by the consideration that CHIU had previously been working hand in glove with SHINOMI in breaking the blockade which the latter himself was responsible for maintaining. FBI and MID cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1527 Rating "C"

Formosa-Coastal Defenses

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: The seacoast at Chinchiku has been strengthened by 46 machine gun posts. These are placed at intervals of 150 yards and each is manned by six to eight men. They were recently erected in great haste. 4,000 troops, with 6 tanks and 8 armored cars, are stationed at Taichu.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa (Takao)—General Military Intelligence 14ND #1825

Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Transport #174 arrived at Takao on 17 June with large quantities of military personnel, equipment (uniforms, steel helmets, respirators, etc.), all of which were sent by rail to Tainan. Sixty German Naval, Military, and Air Force experts and over thirty Japanese officers arrived on same vessel, but soon after landing they all left via SS HOSAN MARU for the Pescadores. It is reported that all of these men will soon be transferred to South China. On 21 June, 260 Mountain Artillery, together with local recruits, left Tainan for Koshun for maneuvers. On 25 June, 6 armored cars and 3 tanks left Tainan for Taito to participate in coastal defense exerc. On 28 June, about 800 recruits from Koshun Sector were sent to join Labor Corps at Tainan. These men were given a complete set of uniforms and equipment but no rifles. Their ages were from 35 to 45. On 6 June, they returned to Koshun for further training.

FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa—Conscription Rating "C" 14ND #1523

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Governor of Formosa has received orders to recruit within the next month (by 5 September, 1941) 100,000 men between the ages of 35–45 for service in Labor Corps. It is reported that an additional 150,000–200,000 recruits in Formosa are to be mobilized for intensive military training.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Formosa—Troop movements Rating "C"

14ND #1524

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: From 23 to 29 June, 1941, 500 troops of Taihoku Infantry were exercised in coastal defense near Shinchiku. On 25 June, 180 Artillery arrived at Karenko from Taihoku, together with 6 anti-aircraft guns drawn by trucks and 4 anti-aircraft machine guns. 25 June, Transports #141 and 163 arrived at Keelung and embarked military supplies and provisions. They both sailed for Hainan on 27 June.

FBIHON, G-2HD are cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Japanese Troop Movements

14ND #1520 Rating "B"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 25 June, 1941, six hundred troops of Nakana Armored Car Unit arrived, together with three hundred Service Corps Troops with unknown number of armored cars and motorcycle combinations, all embarking on two transports at Shibaura, Tokyo, bound for Formosa. On 5 July, one thousand men of 32nd Infantry Regiment embarked in two transports at same port for Formosa. FBI and MID cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41 To: ONI CINCPAC COM14 Japanese Troop Movements

14ND #1521 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: On 16 June, 1941, one transport arrived at Shikama (Port of Himeji) from Shanghai and discharged 200 wounded of the 11th Mixed Brigade, and 100 boxes of ashes. Wounded were sent to Tsuyama, Okayama-Ken. Reinforcements which left Japan in May and June, 1941, for North China were drawn from Sendai, Kanasawa, Yamagata, and Yonasawn. Reinforcements for the same period for South and Indo-China were drawn from Kanasawn, Kyushu, Kagoshima, Kurume, Saga, and Kumamoto. FBIHON G-2HD cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41 To: ONI CINCPAC COM14 Formosa—Supplies

14ND #1522 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 17 June, 1941 SS MORAI MARU arrived at Keelung from Japan with about 400 cases of military uniforms and steel helmets. 200 cases were sent to Karenko by SS FUKUSEI MARU and the remainder to Taihoku by train. 19 June, Transport #140 arrived at Keelung from Japan with military supplies which were sent by rail to Taihoku and Taichu. This Transport left again on 22 June with a full load of copper ore. 20 June, Transport #135 arrived at Karenko with 600-700 tons of petrol from Japan via the Pescadores (where she unloaded an unspecified amount of petrol). FBIHON, G-2HD cognizant.

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41
To: ONI CINCPAC COM14
Manchuria—Trayel Restrictions

14ND #1518 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August 1941: New regulations affecting all Europeans and most Chinese were introduced as of August 1, 1941 in Manchurian Frontier Regions. Permits for all travel must be obtained from Police Headquarters. Restrictions are especially severe in Mulin District, while travel in the interior is prohibited. Special control has been established at Mulin and Suisenho. Early in 1941 pressure was brought to bear on all foreigners in Jehol Province, and many left. Remaining foreigners, about twenty-five missionaries, are not now permitted to travel beyond the city. Tarter businessmen have been told to remove their business to Mukden area, the reason given being that Jehol is not safe. Garrisons in this area have been greatly augmented, large troop movements are taking place, considerable road construction is in hand, and it is not desired that aerial maneuvers should be witnessed by foreigners. FB1HON and G-2HD are Cognizant

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41 To: ONI CINCPAC COM14 Manchuria—Censorship

14ND #1519 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: All the correspondence from within Manchuria, addressed to China, is now censored. FBIHON and G-2HD are cognizant

Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

Manchuria Mobilization

14ND #1516 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports, as of August 15: Whole population, men and women, of eastern part of former Chinese Eastern Railway District has been mobilized as "militia" for defense and anti-aircraft work; all are registered and may not leave their villages without permission from Staff Headquarters. Fresh units of Japanese troops arrived in Mulin District the end of July, movements being shrouded in great secrecy. Troop movements at night. Police forbade population to visit villages or to engage in fishing or other occupation in vicinity except under special permit, this applying even to normal agricultural labor. FBIHON, G-2. Cognizant. Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41

To: ONI COM14 CINCPAC

14ND #1517 Rating

Manchuria-Construction British Secret Agent, Far East, reports as of 15 August, 1941: New barracks near Mulin Coal Mines are now occupied by troops recently arrived. Maneuvers in which tanks participated have been held. Work has commenced on new highway from Irikte through Chola-Arabanu District. Cossacks, residing in this district, are engaged in the work. 1,500,000 Manchurian dollars have been allocated for hospitals, barracks, and other works at Teian-Heiho. Several European firms at Harbin have been permitted to tender work in the Tiamosi District and for work in connection with the Tiamosi-Madalsian Railway which opened two years ago. 3,000,000 Mongolian dollars have been allocated for Government Buildings, residences, hospitals, barracks, etc. All employees must be certified. Work to be completed not later than June 1, 1942. FBIHON, and G-2HD are cognizant. Confidential

From: 14ND 9-23-41 To: ONI CINCPAC COM14

IHM/MB SEPTEMBER 20, 1941.

Confidential

From: District Intelligence Officer.

To: Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C. Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with. Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th ltr. dated 27 June, 1941. Subject Mr. Gerald H.

Wilkinson.

(b) OpNay Despatch on same subject.

(c) DIO conf. 14th ND ltr. dated 22 August, 1941. Subject British

Secret Agent in Manila, information received from.

1. Subject British Agent in Manila continues to forward information via Lock Box in Pan American Clipper planes to the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District. Much of this information is of value to the Military Intelligence in Hawaii, and to this office, as well as to the office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed by numbers some of the cards containing this information which have been disseminated by the office of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the District Intelligence Officer considered this information to be valuable and requested authority by despatch to permit the sending of information by the local representative of Subject agent to Manila in the lock compartment of Pan American Airways planes.

3. The despatch reply requested in paragraph five of reference (c) has not

been received to date.

I. H. MAYFIELD.

Hongkong-Prospective disorders,

No. 1482 (Rating "C")

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Japanese are preparing to create strikes, disturbances, and riots when and if Japan breaks with England. Source stated that puppet officials of the Chungshan area and Japanese agents are being permitted to enter Macao with arms, and that it is through this channel a large quantity of illicit arms are being smuggled into Hongkong. An agent in the employ of FURUKAWA, Chief of Japanese Naval Intelligence at Macao, has been recruiting 100,000 refugee street-sleepers to take part in sabotage and nuisance activities in Hongkong on the outbreak of hostilities. A large number of these street-sleepers are already receiving financial assistance from the Japanese. The following Chinese are said to be actively engaged in the foregoing work in the pay of Japan: JOHN LUI, a senior member of the Shanghai Tai Fing Insurance Co. His headquarters are at 19/20 Connaught Road, West, 3rd Floor (next to Ping On Hotel) where he operates as the Chun Kin Firm. He visited Shanghai in July 1941 and was said to be planning a trip to Singapore thereafter. CHENG SAI-HOI, son of the Chief Detective of Amoy, is one of Lui's close associates. TAM KWOK-WA has made many visits recently to Hongkong and is said to be employed by the Special Service Department of Japanese Intelligence at Macao, to act as Liaison between Macao and Hongkong. CHAU WING TING has been in the employ of the Japanese for the past ten years, operating mainly in the Swatow/Amoy sector. He is believed to be residing in Connaught Road, West (number of house unknown.) FBI, MID cognizant.

From: 14ND 9-12-41.

To: ONI; All ND's; CincPac; Com14.

Japanese Foreign policy.

14ND #1492 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Admiral NOMURA (Ambassador to the U. S.) has been instructed to work for a modification of the American embargo policy and to offer re-adjustment of American-Japanese relations on the basis of mutual recognition on land, sea, and air of all areas defined and recognized as foreign spheres of influence of the United States and of Britain. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. Com14.

Japanese-Chinese Relations.

14ND #1470. Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Japanese movement is considerably perturbed by the "insincerity of the Siamese Government". B. Japanese Government states that in spite of military "representations" by Japanese Minister at Bangkok, there has been little if any improvement in the uncompromising attitude of Siamese Government towards Japan and that is clearly due to British and American intrigue and influence. C. Instructions have been sent to Japanese Minister at Bangkok to make further immediate and strong representations to Siamese Foreign Office on matter. D. FEI WEN CHUAN further stated Japanese Government in carrying out its programme in French Indo-China is most anxious that its relations with Siam shall be clarified and that unless latter changes its attitude towards Japan and her co-prosperity programme Japan will take whatever steps she deems necessary to bring Siam into line." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

Manchuria-Japanese Troop Movements.

14ND #1466 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. Between 10 July and 17 July about 50,000 Japanese troops passed through Mukden proceeding north * * * carried full war kits. (Note. No means of checking numbers, which should be accepted with reserve). B. During period named a total of 75 troop "specials" passed through Mukden. Flat cars carried artillery and tanks. C. On departure from Mukden on 21 July squrce was told by Japanese station master of South Manchurian railway that he had received orders to transit a total of 240 troop specials, but over what period was not stated. As South Manchurian Railway was short of cars these would be drawn from Peking-Mukden, Peking-Suiyuan and Peking-Hankow lines. D. On 20 July troops from Jehol area arrived in Mukden. They travelled in special troop trains via KOUPAUTZE on Peking-Mukden line. Source saw great activity at Tangku Tun junction." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC Com 14.

Japanese Foreign Policy.

14ND #1467 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: Admiral TOYODA (Japanese Foreign Minister) already has informed German Ambassador OTT the Japan is ready to re-adjust its political relations with the Reich at a pre-requisite for closer economic accord upon which will be founded the future economic relations between Asia and Europe. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL

Honolulu, Hawaii

Manchuria-Railways, Buildings, etc.

14ND #1465 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A. It is reported that the following railways in Manchuria are now regarded as military lines on which number of passenger trains has been reduced to minimum: Harbin-Lafa-Tunhara and to Korea via Tumen, Harbin Peian-Heiho, Hsingchiang-Taonan, Taonan-Doekk Arshan, Tsitsihar-Peian, Tsitsihar-Budhedu-Hailar and Manchouli, Tumen-Mudadzian, Mudadzian-Tzetsiamusi, all railways in Jehol. B. Since end of June 1941 steps have been taken to increase capacity of single track Hsingchiang Harbin by construction of sidings and numerous small stations for storage. C. In Kwangtung leased territories since 1940 sand bag emplacements guarding bridges station, etc., have been replaced by permanent brick and cement structures. Japanese War Office has acquired by purchase several large buildings in Harbin and private hospitals have been warned that they may be taken over if necessity demands." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM 14.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL

Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND #1463 Rating "D"

Shankhai French concession. Japanese Designs On.

Ref: 14 ND card #1462 (Tientsin French Concession)

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: That a plan similar to that stated on the reference card for Tientsin is said to be in order for Shanghai French Concession, with the Nanking Government said to be ready to assume control of the concession before 10 October, 1941. It is rumored that there is a committee studying this matter under the chairmanship of HSU LIANG (Foreign Minister) and General KAGESA, and that their recommendations have been forwarded to Tokyo for consideration. FBI (Hon) and G-2(HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI; All NDs; CincPac; Com 14.

Formosa-Japanese Airplane Movements

14ND #1456

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 25 July, 1941 following aircraft left OKAYAMA Airdrome for HAINAN: 24 twin-engine monoplane, heavy B; 15 monoplane fighters; 3 reconnaissance. 28 July following left for Indo-China: 6 three-engine monoplane, heavy B; 9 single-engine monoplane, light B. 26 July, 27 aircraft comprised mainly of twin-engine monoplane, heavy bombers, arrived KAGI from Japan and left 29 July for Indo-China. 1 August, 9 heavy bombers and 6 fighters left HEITO for Indo-China. Parachute troops are being

trained daily at TOGO airdrome, 8 aircraft being used. FBI (Hon); G-2 (HD) cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September 1941. To: ONI: All NDs: CincPac: Com14.

Formosa-Japanese Troop Movements.

14ND #1457 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 20 July, 1941 the following left KARENKO for INDO-CHINA—24,000 TAKAHASHI Infantry; 1200 ISE Artillery; 600 KONDO and FUKASE, A. F. V. Units with 16 armored cars, 15 light tanks, 40 motorcycles, and 32 field guns. FBI-Hon and G2— HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI (2); All NDs; CINCPAC; COM14

Japanese Naval Ordnance.

14ND #1456 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3); Naval guns are being made at Osaka Arsenal under German supervision. On 8 May, 1941 warships at YOKOSUKA were being fitted out with new guns from this arsenal. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Factory.

14ND #1455 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports the following concerning the AICHI Aircraft Factory at NAGOKA. Beginning 3 April, 1941 German engineers arrived at this factory from the DORNIER works. They are said to be supervising construction of a new type of fighter. This is described as K.22 type twin-engine 2 seater, which is still in the experimental stage. 2600 laborers are working 24 hour shifts, and the production schedule aimed at is 50 planes per month. FBI-Hon and G2- HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Troops in Indo China.

14ND #1455 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 21 August 1941 the strength of Japanese troops in southern Indo-China numbered about 80,000, composed of units of: Guards; 28th Division; 38th Division; Formosan Army Corps; Naval landing party. Lieutenant General HDA is the Army High Commander, Major General KWANGI for air, and Vice-Admiral HIRATA for Navy. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Troop Movement.

14ND #1450 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East reports that on 8 June, 1941, 12,000 men left French Indo-China. He stated that it is rumored that they were bound for Manchuria, but he takes this with great reserve. On 14 June the following units of the 11th division, totalling 3300 men left Haina for an unknown destination: HIROSE Infantry Regiment, NAKAMURA Medium Artillery Battalion, HIROKA Transport Company and YOSHINO and KUNO Cavalry Squadrons. FBL-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14. Japanese Naval Construction.

14ND #1451 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (with considerable reserve) that 20 vessels of the following type were in July 1941 under construction at HARIMA Shipyard, OSAKA: Displacement 100 tons; dimensions 200 ft x 28 ft x 5 ft 6";

speed 30 knots; armament 6 machine guns. These vessels were to be completed by the end of July 1941. Informant's source stated that these ships were to be used as troop landing craft in the Southern expansion movement of Japan. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 Sentember, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

14ND #1452 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-4): That Japan is constructing "Pocket Destroyers" by building the new craft *inside* some old hulks that have been emptied of machinery and equipment. He stated that as a further aid to secrecy the positions of these hulks are changed from time to time by being towed from one place to another. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant,

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese Aircraft Factory.

14ND ---Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a factory situated at KAWAGUCHI in OSAKA, in May 1941, started manufacture of fighter aircraft wings and parts of fuselage for the AICHI Factory, NAGOYA. It is estimated that a labor force of 2,600 working ten hours a day, under supervision of 3 German advisers, is producing wings and fuselage for 100 fighter planes per mouth. FBI-Hon and G2-Hd cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

- - Island-Japanese Construction.

14ND #---Rating "C"

400 men of a naval landing party and 160 coolies. On 19 April these same ships had arrived at KOBE and unloaded scrap material and 1,800 caskets of ashes and were loaded up with construction materials and 40 cases of aircraft components. The above measured about six by eight feet. FBI and G2-ND cognizant. From: 14ND 9 September, 1941. To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

German Raiders in Pacific.

14ND #1449 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that on 20 Apr, 1941 two of the German vessels lying at KOBE left for KURE. Guns were to be fitted and the ships were to be ready for sea again at the beginning of August. FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941,

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC. Com14.

Japan-Kobe Navy Yard.

14ND #1444 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): The flating dock at Kobe, capable of accommodating ships of 18,000 tons, is expected to be transferred to Hainan. At the end of May 1941 an aircraft tender was under repair in this dock, 2,000 workmen working day and night shift were engaged on the aircraft tender and reconditioning the deck. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDS. CINCPAC Com14.

Japanese Submarine Construction.

14ND #1446 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): In collaboration with German advisers the construction of 75 submarines is projected in Japan. Shipyards in Osaka have been allotted 20 ships and the Osaka Iron Works is to build 4. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Japanese aerial bomb factory.

14ND #——— Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that there is a Japanese aerial bomb factory named HAKABE Heavy Industrial Works, located in Himeji. In mid May 1941 this factory was said to have had a working force of 600 laborers and 4 German engineers, producing monthly 3,000 aerial bombs and 2,500 flares. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japanese National Policy.

14ND #1442 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that a competent British observer has rendered the following report: "When Itagaki was appointed C-in-C, Korea, this writer took the view that he is a convinced northern expansion, as opposed to southern expansion believer; and that his appointment was therefore to be interpreted as a precaution against the need for big operations in Manchuria, Korea being the first reserve pool for Manchuria. A technically competent observer in Hongkong now confirms this view and adds that Ushiroku, formerly C-in-C, South China, now Chief of Staff at Nanking of the Japanese forces in China, is of the same persuasion. He may be counted on not to neglect the north, therefore, however tempting the easy gains in the south may be at the noment. Renewed reports from Shanghai that observers there expect something to happen in Thailand, South China, Indo-China, etc., by a certain date, such as September 15th bear all the earmarks of crude Japanese attempts to wage a war of nerves on the democracies, doubtless at the request of the senior Axis partners. The Japanese in the past have often revealed their long term objectives, but have very seldom talked about their next move and carried it out, secrecy in that respect being a habit with them." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japan-Airdrome at Kamakura.

14ND #1445 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: A large airdrome is under construction near Kamakura (believed to be identical with Totsuka airdrome). The field is 3,500 yards long and 3,500 yards wide and was to have been completed at the end of August, 1941. 8,000 laborers were said to have worked on the field under the supervision of 18 German engineers. 3,000 parachute troops under training there. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14.

Japan-General Military and Naval Information

14ND #1440 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): "A There are naval bases or depots at KOSHIRO, TAKAHACHI and ZUSI, and air bases at KAMAKURA and TOYOHASHI. B. Source states that at end of June there was considerable movement of Japanese sailors from Tokyo to Koshiro and Takahachi and that between 26 and 28 June, 1941 numerous tramloads of young men arrived at Zusi. C. At Rumit source observed soldiers wearing green badges on shoulders and also several howitzers pulled by heavy trucks with camouflaged gun platforms. D. At HAMAMOTO he observed 97th, 72nd and 8th divisions. E. At Wushizu 22nd Division. At OKOYAMA and HIROSHIMA 2nd and 4th Divisions. New oil storage tanks in this district which is very heavily industrialized. (Comments: All above observations were made at end June. Although agent has had military training he is newly recruited and I have had no opportunity of cross-examining him. Valuation therefore C-3). F. Area between Kobe, AWAJI and SAKAI heavily fortified. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Japan-Underground Airdrome at Takarazuka

14ND #1441 Rating "?"

British Secret Agent, Far East, was informed by a Polish refugee journalist, who was in Japan at the end of June 1941, that the latter had seen great earthworks, indicating underground airdrome, with planes landing at TAKARAZUKA. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Japanese National Policy

14ND #1439 Rating "B"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation B-2): That a fairly reliable informant of his states that his Japanese business associates (who include local heads of Mitsui and Yokohama Specie Bank) appear genuinely to believe that present Japanese threats of future southward expansion are merely a "war of nerves" and that, under present conditions, Japan does not intend to fight Great Britain or America. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Philippine—The Japanese Propaganda in

14ND #1439 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, Reports (Valuation C-3): That an informant of his, a Sakdal candidate for the next Philippine election has stated that local Japanese agents have recently cultivated him closely and volunteered the following information: That 650-700 airplanes are now assembled on Formosa; that an attack on the Philippines and Singapore will take place simultaneously about the end of August; that the campaign in the Philippines will begin with a rising in Mindanao and the bombing of Manila; that the attack on Singapore will be overland through Siam where at least 3 divisions of Siamese army will support the Japanese; that heavy troop concentrations are ready in Hainan and Saipan. Informant states that he has given the names of the alleged Japanese agents to American Military Intelligence. He gives his own information on the Valuation C-3 and states "This looks like a wispering campaign." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Dutch East Indies-Japanese Propaganda in

14ND #1435 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "It was reported 12 July that in Japanese whispering campaign in N. E. I. following is now being said: 1. In MENADO. Japan has decided to attack N. E. I. Local Japanese will be taken off in vessels from Polao. a. Japan will send her invading forces, ships and aircraft to N. E. I. from eastward of the Philippines. N. E. I. will capitulate before aid from U. S. arrives. 3. Japanese will not be evacuated as evacuation would give N. E. I. indication of pending attack." FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Saigon

14ND #1436 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-2): "Following from Free French sailors who left Saigon about August 8th: A, S. S. FRANCOIS LOUIS DREYFUS is leaving or has left Saigon with cargo of rubber in lower hold marked "Tokyo." Rest of cargo, nature not known, marked "San Francisco." B. Vessel will be escorted by escort vessel AMIRAL CHARNER and the submarine PEGASE. C. S. S. SAGITARE has turned back near Cape of Good Hope and will have gone to Madagascar instead of proceeding to France with her cargo of rubber." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Philippine—Japanese Business in

14ND #1437 Rating "B"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation A-1): "A. Local Agents Tokyo Fire and Marine Insurance Company received telegram August 15th from Tokyo instructing them: 1. To accept no new business or renewals until further

notice. 2. To cancel local reinsurance Treaty. 3. To persuade local Japanese clients to insure direct with Japan if possible. B. This company's 1940 premium income from Philippines slightly exceeded 200,000 pesos (25,000 pounds)." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941 To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT District Intelligence Office Sixth Floor, Young Hotel HONOLULU, HAWAII

Japanese National Policy

14ND #1438 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: "A translation of a letter from Information Section of Concordia Society to local branch of same, dated 2 July, which states that on that day the national policy in connection with Russo-German war was decided at a liaison conference between the Government and High Command. The following general principles were stated to have been decided upon: A. Japanese Government recognizes as her main guiding principles her national safety and the success at any cost of establishment of new order in East Asia. B. Japan must depend only upon her own strength and resources and concentrate her attention upon East Asia problems. C. She must use every means to further her own aims but always take into consideration the constantly changing international position and must not allow herself to be detracted from her present course by any claims, requests or suggestions, if even slight risk of wasting her power and resources is involved." FBI-Hon and G2-ND cognizant. From: 14ND 9 September, 1941 To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL HONOLULU, HAWAII

Anti American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China

14ND #1433 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports: 27 July, 1941 Japanese High Command at Canton discussed retaliatory measures against American and British freezing of assets, and the following steps were decided upon and forwarded to Tokyo for approval: 1. Ascertaining financial holdings of Americans and British in South China; 2. Watch on movements of Consuls and merchants in occupied zone and possibility of expulsion; 3. Banning of exports to Hongkong and tightening of blockades. (The Nanking Government to be forced to co-operate in this measure); 4. Expedition of plans for the subversing of Indian and Chinese personnel in British forces; 5. Unifying of new territories of Hongkong and KULANGSU to the Nanking Government. FBI-Hon and G2-HD cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Indo-China

14ND #1431 Rating "C"

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports (Valuation C-3): "A. Between July 25th and July 29th 12,000 troops left Bangkok for Indo China frontier. B. Partial confirmation is afforded by official Siamese communiques which stated that infantry, artillery, cavalry, tank, signal, veterinary and special mission units left for frontier—— of July. C. An order has been placed with Japanese for delivery in July 1942 of 2 warships probably torpedo boats to replace 3 vessels sunk by French. D. 500,000 TICULS have been paid on accound of this order." FBI-Hon and G-2-D cognizant.

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

14ND #1432 Rating "C"

From: 14ND 9 September, 1941

To: ONI (2) All NDs CINCPAC COM14

Confidential

IHM/ba

AUGUST 22, 1941.

From: The District Intelligence Officer.

To: Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence. Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila; information received from. Reference:

(a) DIO Conf. Ltr. dated 27 June, 1941 on same subject.

(b) Opnav despatch same subject.

Enclosure: (A) 14ND Cards Nos. 1345-1348, inclusive, and 1351-1355 inclusive.

1. In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer outlined the proposal of a Mr. Wilkinson, a British Secret Agent in the Far East, that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent, Mr. Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compartments of Pan-American Airways clippers flying between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation Mr. Wilkinson would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by himself and his aides in the Far East and of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy. It was proposed that the District Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth and Sixeenth Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements with Pan-American Airways.

2. Reference (b) stated that the Department could not authorize the above plan at this time because of the status of the matter and the small amount of information submitted. The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of the Department's decision and has declined to forward any further correspondence from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson. However, every clipper from the Orient brings confidential mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the

District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District.

3. By despatch from the District Intelligence Officer, Sixteenth Naval District, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was informed that Mr. Wilkinson was thoroughly reliable and trustworthy. Investigation in Honolulu discloses that Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager in Manila for Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his wife is a grand- [2] daughter of the original Mr. Theo. H. Davies. This company is one of the five largest corporations in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated as an Hawaiian corporation, the majority of its stock is held by members of the Davies family who are British subjects and live in England.

4. Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship department of Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, a British subject, and British

vice-consul for Hawaii.

5. The District Intelligence Officer considers the information received from Mr. Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by despatch to effectuate

the arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.

6. Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence on Fourteenth Naval District dissemination cards Nos. 1240, 1322-1326 (inclusive), 1333, 1334, 1345-1348 (inclusive), and 1351-1355 (inclusive). The last nine cards listed are forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A).

I. H. MAYFIELD.

14ND #1333 Rating "B" Japanese Military Armor

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports that the Tohuku Imperial University, Japan, Metallurgical Laboratory, has compounded an excellent bullet resisting steel, said to be more efficient than similar foreign steel. According to the patent announcement the steel is composed of: 0.15–0.35% carbon; 0.5–1.5% chrome; 0.6–2.0% manganese; 0.2–1.0% molybdenum; 0.2–1.0% cobalt of vanadium; 0.8% silicon; remainder iron. Discoverers of the steel are K.ONO and S. CAHIBA. FBL (Hon); MID (HD) cognizant.

From 14 ND 8-15-41

To: ONI (2) CINCPAC (2) COM 14 (2)

Japan Military Body Armour

An excellent anti-bullet steel has been evolved by the Metallurgical Laboratory of the Tohoku Imperial University headed by Mr. K. HONDA. According to the Patent Announcement, the steel is composed of the following:

0.15-35% of carbon, 0.5-1.5% of chrome. 0.6-2.0% of manganese, 0.2-1.0% of molybdenum. 0.2-1.0% of cobalt of banadium, 0.8% of silicon

and the remainder iron.

Series of tests for hardness proved that the metal was more efficient than the best foreign anti-bullet steel. Discoverers of the metal are Messrs, K. ONO and S. CAHIBA.

14ND #1334 Rating "B" Japanese Industrial Management

British Secret Agent, Far East, reports information on above subject, which is related verbatim; A. Controller. Decides all quantities of all materials required by factory under his control. Controls all purchases of tools, machines, etc. Can even control development and study of prototype. Decides all promotions, changes in personnel, organization of leisure and adjustment of internal disputes. Supervises allotment of salaries, wages, bonuses. His control is complete and his decisions are final. B. Trained Engineers. All certificated engineers from Imperial Universities of Tokoyo, Kyoto, etc., are earmarked for Naval, military or aviation factories. Engineers with certificates from private universities (such as Waseda) may work in other defence industries. Factories which are not working for national defense get no certificated engineers. Numbers are carefully fixed, e. g., Ishikawajima is Allowed only 3 Imperial University graduates per annum. System extremely unpopular amongst students. C. Limitation of Salaries. Imperial University engineers draw total yearly salary and bonus of 1440 Yen. Graduates from private university get 1170 Yen annually. Rises only begin after five years service and absolute maximum attainable is 2,000 Yen per annum. D. Artisans. Average wages are 50 to 65 sen per hour, with exceptionally good hands getting Yen 1.25 to 1.50 per hour with a working of 12 hours, this works out at higher salaries than that of certificated engineers. Good workmen are treated with utmost circumspection but in spite of this work is often held up by absence of whole gangs who are shamming sick and have taken a week or fortnight's holiday. Ei Discipline. No factory personnel may change their factory or branch of work without consent from the controller. Management is a matter of utmost delicacy as personnel is excessively sensitive and will accept no supervision. They are also disinclined to accept any responsibility. F. Naval and Military Friction. This extends to an astonishing degree, even when the same article is being made for both services. Files of all drawings have to be produced in two different forms for the Army and Navy. All component parts have to have entirely different names for the Army and Navy with

the result that double checking and control service has to be established. distinct trial and reception services have to be established. Wastage involved in this duplication is incalculable. FBI-Hen and G-2HD are cognizant.

CLARGON LYCENTRATION DATES NO. 6.

Inscription by Lt. Cubonet Henry C. Chansen, JACH, for the Stevelory of Wor-Engaltmentory to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

The following documents comprise reports, numbered by me I through 185, from the British Secret Intelligence Service (Colonet Gerald Wilkinson) at Manila to the Navy, the Army and the FBI at Housinle, and were obtained from their respective files.

They comprise reports during the period from June to December 1911.

· Urpent eable received from Munita night of Dec. 3, 1941

We have received escal-terrible intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China;

A. J. Accelerated Japanese preparation of sir fields and ratimage

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 trees and considerable quantities fighters, medium bembers, ranks and guns (75 mm).

B. Dulmates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington

Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

C. Our considered epinion concludes that Japan inviseges early hostilities with Religion and U. S. Japan does not report not intend to stinck thusin at present but will set in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Navay Intelligence Honolulu.

ce. Col. HECKNELL Mr. STRITTAGE Capt. MAYFFED

Copy of coble received Nov. 27, 1941

Secret source (usually reliable) reports that,

A. Januarie will dunck Krakow Indiana from sea on Disc. 1, repart Dec. 1. without any ullimatum or declaration of break, with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singspore.

B. Attacking forces will proceed direct from Heisen and Formers. Main had-

ing point to be in Soughtin area,

Valuation for above is No. 3, repeat 3 (i. e. only about 55 to 69 per cent probable accuracy).

American Military and Naval Intelligence, Manila informed.

Copies to: Mr. Survives Capit, MATERIA Col. BICENDL

Coble reed, from Wellington 25.21.51

I weifie raider intelligence.

(1) On 6th November U. S. A. "Capillo" nighted surface vestel in 003° 29' South 177* 32 Elect. Vessel is thought to have been raider G number 41 believed to be "Stylermark" of HAPAG Line.

GC55X/25

Flatract from Manita

To: Capt. MAYNTELD Mr. Smiring Col. PRONNIZZ

Following received indirectly from German source, reported to have good connections in Japan.

A. German and wat of the concentrating;
1. On breaking down denocratic tendencies of Court groups and winning over to pro-Axis views the head of the Japanese fleet who are anxious to avoid con-Blet with America.